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ABSTRACT

Justice and Economic Theory
May, 1980

Barry Stewart Clark, B.A.

,

Ohio University

M.S., University of Wisconsin, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by;

Professor Herbert Gintis

The purpose of this dissertation is to reexamine the works of past
economic theorists in light of the perspective offered by John Rawls'

A Theory of Justice

.

The fundamental task of liberal social theory is

claimed to be the legitimation of a society based on private property
and the maximum feasible range of individual liberties.

This legitima-

tion must be grounded in the consent of individuals, and yet, if contingency is to be avoided, an objective criterion of right must be formu-

lated in order to determine that to which consent should be given.

The

objective criterion provides a basis for assessing the justice of society,
but its viability depends on its ability to generate the consent of the

individuals constituting a given society.

Thus the major liberal theor-

ists have sought to construct syntheses of rational and empirical criteria
of right.

In the work of Locke, natural law provides the objective criterion
to which rational persons will consent.

Since Locke expects individuals

to consent only to that which serves their interests, the criterion of
them.
natural law dannot bind men to social rules and authority which harm

vi

Thus consent and natural law are consistent and mutually
supportive only
so long as the least advantaged rational person perceives his
interests

to be

served through obligation to rules and authority.

Locke's theory

of justice is an embryonic version of Rawls' theory, and Locke's
apparent

justification of unlimited accumulation should be rejected as inconsistent

with the whole of his theory of justice.

Adam Smith initially developed a theory of justice based on mutual
recognition and approval between persons.

However, his fears that market-

oriented behaviour would corrupt morality led him to an economic theory of

value as a method for justifying the outcomes of market transactions.
The labor theory of value provided the objective measure of value, but
it also revealed the extraction of surplus.

Thus Smith turned to a

"labor-embodied" theory, attempting to retain labor as the measure of
value while legitimizing property income.

His dissatisfaction with his

own theory of justice led Smith to the threshold of utilitarianism.

John Stuart Mill found Bentham's utilitarianism to be an inadequate
theory of justice since it provided no objective criterion of right capa-

ble of generating consensus among opposing class interests.

Mill intro-

duced a dynamic element, making the maximization of utility over time
the objective criterion of right.

Through competition, superior preference

structures would develop so long as a class— neutral government maintained
the conditions essential to fair competition.

John Rawls' recent reformulation of the theory of justice reveals

vii

the extent to which liberalism must transform if it is to remain

internally consistent in the face of an interventionist government
and monopoly power.

Responding to the failure of neoclassical wel-

fare economists to construct rational norms for liberal societies,

Rawls develops the maximin principle as a solution to the indeter-

minacy of the social welfare function.

According to Rawls, this

principle would be chosen by persons ignorant of their personal
attributes and status and thus constitutes an objective criterion
of right which is both appealing and compelling to rational persons.

Yet Rawls has overlooked the prevalence of class divisions which

would make both the choice of and the subsequent commitment to
his principles of justice highly unlikely.

viii
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INTRODUCTION
The appearance of John Rawls* A Theory of Justice in
1971 sparked
a virtual renaissance

of social philosophy.

Yet Rawls' notoriety stems

not so much from the ultimate persuasiveness of his arguments as
from

his willingness to make definitive statements about a topic which had

been largely .removed from the realm of respectable intellectual discourse.

Specifically, Rawls believes that a single conception of jus-

tice exists which can be rationally defended.

Such boldness demands

considerable substantiation>i'lanid /Rawls has risen to 'the task

ifibh a 'book

which, given the initial response, will be the most controversial work
in political philosophy of the twentieth century.

Ironically, the analytical rigor which has led modern philosophers

away from the intense moral concerns of their predecessors is eagerly

employed by Rawls to give weight to his deductions.

Even as he re-

kindles interest in the issues of justice, fairness, and goodness, he
urges that "we should strive for a kind of moral geometry with all the
rigor which this name connotes."^

Rawls* work is suffused with the for-

mal precision of modern game theory, and much of the critical response
to A Theory of Justice has been directed at the illogic of Rawls* de-

ductions while largely ignoring the intrinsic merit or significance
of his principles of justice.

However, Rawls himself cautions that his

work must not be judged solely on the basis of analytical rigor because
ii2

his reasoning "is highly intuitive throughout."

To fully appreciate Rawls* intentions and measure his success, his

work must be situated within a series of efforts devoted to the con1

2

struction of a liberal theory of justice.

The term 'liberal* is taken

to refer to the advocacy of social arrangements which are based on the

private ownership of property and the maximum feasible range of individual liberties.

A theory of justice is a formal attempt to demonstrate

how rights and duties, which are a necessary component of all social
arrangements, ought to be distributed among individuals.

What distin-

guishes a liberal theory of justice from ancient or medieval theories
is that the stress on maximum individual liberty elevates the individual
to a central role in assessing the justness of society.

A liberal theory

of justice must demonstrate that the exercise of individual liberties in

the context of a private market economy will lead to a distribution of

rights and duties which is sufficiently satisfactory to the participants
to make them willing to continually affirm liberal institutions.

Or,

failing in this, the theory must recommend remedial solutions which are

consistent with the institution of private property and the exercise of
individual liberties.

My intention in this work is to analyze the evolution of the liberal
theory of justice by focusing on the ideas of three prominent theorists

John Locke, Adam Smith, and John Stuart Mill.

Then, having developed an

appreciation of the logical requirements facing a liberal theory of justice and the shortcomings of previous theories,

uate the Rawlsian theory of justice.

underlying this task are enormous.

I

shall proceed to eval-

The methodological difficulties

Empiricism is certainly not a suit-

able method' for evaluating theories of justice.

On the other hand, logi-

3

cal analysis, which may reveal internal inconsistencies
in a theory,

cannot judge the theory’s ultimate relevance in a given
historical
situation.

Thus, I begin by rejecting what Mark Blaug refers to as

the "polar opposites" of relativism and absolutism.^

The former views

ideas as reflections of the contemporary social environment and usually

searches for logical necessity in the evolution of social structures,

while the latter focuses on internal coherence and logical necessity
in the evolution of ideas.

partial or one-sided.

I

reject both of these extremes as being

The roles of ideas and the material world in

shaping the course of history are themselves historically relative,
and there can be no "general historico-philosophical theory."^
However, any analysis must be based on certain methodological

assumptions; careful consideration of the factors specific to a par-

ticular historical epoch will yield little without an interpretive
framework.

For purposes of this paper,

I

shall adopt the relativist

assumption of an intelligible connection between social structures
and ideas.

In analyzing theories of justice, it seems reasonable to

presume that the social structure of a particular society generates
a certain type of interpersonal relationship, which, in turn, gives

rise to a particular way of assessing and evaluating other people and
thus of judging how society’s rights and duties should be distributed.

Having accepted the validity of the relativist position for this
study,

I

approach,

also want to defend a partial reliance on the absolutist
'^ince my study is

restricted to liberal theories,

I

assume

A

that the basic contours of the problem of justice have been
the same

for all theorists.

Certain logical requirements face any liberal theory

of justice, and hence these theories may be analyzed and assessed as

detached intellectual discourse.

Employing both relativist and absolutist methods,

1

intend to

analyze the manner in which changing material circumstances have interacted with a body of theory which is to some extent logically rigid.
At the outset, I emphasize that liberal theory is not a homogeneous

entity, but rather a collage of offerings from the various intellectual

disciplines.

By their very nature, some of these disciplines have been

quite responsive to alteredconditions while others have been compelled
by the perceived logic of liberal society to resist challenges to orthodoxy.

Thus, during periods of rapid social change, a certain degree of

dissonance has typically arisen between the prevailing "vision" of
society's economy, the "vision" of its political process, and the

contemporary ethical paradigm.

The ideal point of accesj for examining

this tension is the works of the great theorists who have managed to

encompass the different disciplines.

Possessing "that passion for

intellectual unity and simplicity which is

scientific minds,"

a. ..

legitimate ... feature of

Locke, Smith, Mill, and Rawls recognized that their

task required a comprehensive approach.

The criterion of justice in a

liberal society rests largely with the perceptions of individual citizens,
experience
and thus the theory of justice must encompass all aspects of
in which the sense of injustice might arise.

While a theory of distri-

.

5

butive justice for economic goods and political power is a
central component of a liberal theory of justice, political and economic
theory must be

grounded in an ethical system which establishes the method for
locating an

ultimate value or hierarchy of values.

Once the criterion of right has been

determined, the relative worth of different persons can be assessed and

society
due

s

rights and duties may be distributed ’to each according to his

’

The liberal theory of justice has gone through several major transitions during its approximately three hundred year lifespan.

To briefly

preview the subsequent chapters, we may note that early theories were based
on natural rights established by individual sovereignty over one’s person
and possessions.

However, as the uneven accumulation of property proceeded,

an increasing conflict developed between the inequality of property rights

and popular demands for equal political rights.

To resolve this tension,

the natural rights doctrine was overturned in favor of utilitarianism.

Rights came to be defined in relation to their consequences for social

utility and hence were regarded as being contingent on circumstances.

The

central problem underlying a utilitarian theory of justice is that utility
is a subjective experience and hence there can be no

for a specific pattern of rights.

objective legitimacy

Although various theorists have attempted

to construct objective measures of utility, their efforts have been thwarted

by the fact that individualsensations are a function of the social environ-

ment and hence cannot serve as an independent criterion for assessing the
justice of that environment.

6

During the twentieth century, a comprehensive and consistent
formulation of the liberal theory of justice has been absent.

In neoclassical

economic theory, the issue of justice has been circumvented by relegating
the determination of a fair distribution of assets to an unspecified
social

welfare function.

Liberal political theory has been characterized by an

unresolved tension between natural rights, utilitarian, and idealist conceptions of justice.

This vacuum in liberal theory was relatively unimport-

ant so long as liberal societies continued to generate empirical proof of
of their justice in the form of popular allegiance to liberal institutions.

However, the growing crisis of confidence in Western societies demanded a

viable and coherent theory of justice, and it is in this context that John
Rawls' work must be judged.

Aside from any problems of internal inconsis-

tency, the criteria of success for the Rawlsian principles are whether or

not individuals in a liberal society could be expected to (1) choose the

Rawlsian principles as embodying their considered judgement on the issue of
justice and (2) continually affirm the institution of private property once
the Rawlsiam principles had been realized.
is unrealistic,

of justice.

I

If either of these conditions

the Rawls has failed to construct a viable liberal theory

shall argue that he has failed and that his theory is inade-

quate on two counts; it is based on a faulty notion of ethical behavior, and
it fails to comprehend the nature of private market economies.

7
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CHAPTER

I

JOHN LOCKE AND THE ORIGINS OF THE LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE

As popular ideology, John Locke's theory of justice has
been

adapted with a straightforward simplicity which largely accounts for
its perennial appeal.

From this perspective, property is legitimate

if

through original claims to nature or through mutually agreeable
exchanges, and justice is achieved when economic resources are rewarded
in accordance with prices determined in competitive markets.

Thus, the

^distribution of benefits is beyond challenge so long as productive as-

sets are acquired through fair procedures.

The foregoing interpretation of Lockean justice has been sufficiently

compelling that it still serves today as a major defense of private property and individual rights, despite extensive alterations in both social

institutions and ideas during the intervening three centuries.^ In sharp
contrast to the popular view, a major theme of Locke scholarship and

interpretation has been the accusation of incoherence.
his introduction to Locke's Two Treatises

,

Peter Laslett, in

claims that "Locke is perhaps

the least consistent of all the great philosophers, and pointing out the

contradictions either within any of his works or between them is no difficult task."

Thus, Laslett adds, "it is pointless to look upon his

work as an integrated body of speculation and generalization, with a
t.3
general philosophy at its center and as its architectural framework."

Other authors support Laslett

's

8

view.

J.W. Gough notes that

9

"Locke's theory is ultimately illogical if all its implications
are

pressed."

W. von Leydon,

Law of Nature

,

in his introduction to Locke's Essays on the

refers to the tension between "Locke's hedonism and his

belief in an absolute system of moral principles."^

Von Leyden doubts

thatinconsistency can be avoided by any theorist who subscribes jointly
to "two doctrines which, if not altogether incompatible, are bound to pro-

duce vacillation and vagueness in the mind of him who holds them."^
In recent years, a trend has emerged in which the proclaimed incon-

sistencies in Locke's thought are either suppressed or synthesized into a

coherent framework.

Laslett refers disparagingly to this trend as the

search for "some more remote and unrealistic principle of reconciliation
(which) must be found to defend a great

thinker."^

Perhaps the first

formal attempt at such a reconciliation was made by Willmoore Kendall in
his 1941 work, John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority-Rule

g
.

Kendall

argues that Locke was a covert "collectivist" who masked his support of
the general good with rhetoric concerning individual rights.

Continuing in this tradition, Leo Strauss overturned traditional interpretations and claimed that Locke deviously concealed his true Hobbesian
inclinations.

Locke "does not commit the absurdity of justifying (private

property) by appealing to a nonexistent absolute right of property.
Rather, he justifies private property "in the only way in which it

can be defended:

he shows it is conducive to the common good, to public

happiness or the temporal prosperity of society."

9

According to Strauss,

on each
Locke shared the Hobbesian view of men as having no moral claims

10

other.

Thus they would willingly submit to an authoritarian
government

in return for the security of property essential to their
"joyless

quest for joy."^^
H.

Strauss’s theme was further elaborated by Richard

Cox in his Locke on War and Peace

.

A not dissimilar approach to Locke was taken by C.B. Macpherson
who claims that Locke "logically destroyed his natural law system" in
his attempt to theoretically establish morally unfettered property
rights.

12

Although Macpherson ’s work added a Marxist viewpoint to

Locke criticism, his basic point had been recognized at least eighty
years earlier by T.H. Green.

In Principles of Political Obligation

,

Green argued that a state of nature governed by natural law could
lead to "no motive to the establishment of civil government."

Thus,

natural law must not govern the state of nature or else the transition
to political society must represent a "decline" from the state of nat-

ure.

13

A variety of other authors have similarly concluded that Locke

cannot be interpreted consistently without suppressing one or another
aspect of his thought.

14

Apparently, then, Locke may be interpreted in one of three ways.
The intricacy of his ideas may be ignored, the tensions between aspects
of his thought may be elevated to the extent that Locke's work no longer

deserves the title 'political philosophy’, or important aspects of his

work may be suppressed in order to preserve a coherent philosophy.
However, a fourth possibility presents itself in the writings of Locke

scholars such as Hans Aarsleff, Ramond Polin, and Patrick Riley.

11

Locke is viewed by these authors as having developed
an elaborate and

rather delicate juxtaposition of theoretical elements usually
regarded
as incompatible.

Aarsleff asserts that "the overall tenor of (Locke's)

dominant principles and ideas is not inconsistent."^^
stronger statement

j

Polin makes a

we would like to show that (Locke's) metaphysics,

morals, and politics are tightly interwoven and that the meaning of his

political liberalism, a truly moral doctrine, can be understood only in
the light of his philosophy considered as a really coherent totality.

My purpose in this paper is to argue, in support of the fourth
position, that Locke did develop a coherent theory of justice.
first section,

I

In the

shall illuminate Locke's intentions by outlining the

major difficulties facing social theorists as the institution of private

property gained ascendency during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
Next,

I

shall cover Locke's resolution of those difficulties in the areas

of moral and political philosophy.

Much of the material in this second

section has been adequately treated by Aarsleff, Polin, and Riley, but
in the third section,

I

want to suggest that their analysis lacks an

appreciation of the role played by Locke's economic thought in the
totality of his theory of justice.

Finally,

I

shall conclude that Locke's

between indepentheory is relevant only to an economy based on exchange
dent producers.

The coherency of his theory cannot sustain the legit-

I

the uneven accumulation characteristic of capitalist devel-

imation of
j

opment.

If true, my claim would indicate that latter-day Lockeans are

entirely misled in their attempts to employ John Locke

s

theory in the

12

justification of capitalist society.

I

Before turning to the evolution of theories of justice immediately
prior to Locke,

I

want to describe the general problem to which a theory

of justice is addressed.

An integral component of any social system is

the shared body of concepts by which individuals find purpose and meaning

in their daily existence.

18

In an on-going society, these concepts tend

to develop quite spontaneously, become popular wisdom, and serve to chan-

nel individual intentions along lines consistent with the stable repro-

duction of that society.

However, at certain historical junctures, this

process is disrupted as people either develop new intentions which conflict with the old social order or else find that a changing social order

impedes their original purposes.

The popular response may be to seek to

either hasten or reverse the change so that subjective and objective
schemes are restored to harmony.

During these periods of discord, intellectuals are moved to employ
their theoretical skills to hasten the return of social stability.

They

seek to describe a social order which is sufficiently grounded in 'objective truth' to command the consent of divergent interests and yet, at the

same time, roughly congruent with subjective intentions so that inordinate

sacrifices by individuals are not required.

These intellectual constructs

have come to be called theories of justice.

Medieval theorists faced the relatively easy task of grounding their

13

conceptions of justice in a transcendent order manifesting God's
divine
will.

However, as private property and market activity gradually eroded

the stability of the feudal hierarchy, the "whole conception of a social

theory based ultimately on religion.

.

.was being discredited."^^

The in-

dividual conduct characteristic of the emerging social order frequently

violated the moral precepts of medieval society.

Sensitive to the

intensity of men's newly acquired motives, early liberal philosophers
sought to buttress the transcendent mooring of medieval conceptions of

justice with appeals to individual consent.
any doctrine based solely on revelation.

Thus they found unacceptable

If moral precepts were to be

established which would take precedence over the expediency of the market,
they must have abstract appeal to and gain acknowledgement from all

persons, despite conflicting religious convictions or differing economic
status.

From the beginning, then, liberal social theory was at least

partially grounded in the consciousness of the abstract, isolated individual.

This inter iorization of the locus of legitimacy meant that the

appeal of ethical, political, and economic norms would ultimately depend
on what kinds of knowledge are possible.

Epistemology attained prominence

in liberal philosophy as an attempt to excogitate convincing norms in

the absence of any criterion of validity.

The foundation stone of the

moral edifice would no longer be found in 'the nature of things

,

but

rather in the norms of cognition.
emerged.
As liberal epistemology developed, two identifiable traditions

intelligible
According the the first, nature is orderly, and this order is

14

to the mind.

Thus the innate and universal human capacity for reason
is

capable of discovering objective moral rules and universal
principles
which, when known, will serve to constrain the pursuit of arbitrary

desires in accordance with the law of nature.

The appeal of rationalism

in the promise of a purpose to political and social conduct which
is beyond the mere fulfillment of contingent private ends.

It provides

a deontological system of ethics in which the right is prior to the Good.

Rationalism remained suspect, however, because natural law, like
God's will, was beyond demonstration.

Thus a second epistemological

tradition made sensory perception the sole source of consciousness and
motivation.

This empiricist epistemology implies a teleological ethics

since the criterion of right must be immanent and subordinate to the

Good defined as the satisfaction of individual desires.
not unaware of the shortcomings of empiricism.

Theorists were

Whereas rationalism

suffers from the necessarily abstract and formal nature of its criterion
of right, empiricism must accept all desires as legitimate and thus cannot

provide a genuinely normative criterion at all.

Similarly, while the

criterion offered by rationalism is so universal that it can provide
only vague and general social rules, empiricism's criterion of right is

necessarily arbitrary, capricious, and expedient.

Recognizing these

flaws, early theorists usually attempted a synthesis of the two by basing

their theories on the consent of men, but, at the same time, searching
for an objective criterion of right by which to determine that to which

men would or wouldn't consent.

Employing natural law theory to reason

15

about men abstracted from civil contingencies such
as birth and fortune,
they sought to generate norms which would have abstract
appeal to and

gain the acknowledgement of all persons.
To fully appreciate the difficulty of synthesizing rationalist
and

empiricist elements in a coherent theory of justice, consider the work
of Hugo Grotius, one of the very earliest liberal theorists.

Grotius

employed natural law to argue that the state of nature had been characterized by the joint ownership of property and hence a natural equality
of rights.

Then, shifting to consent as the basis for defending private

property and individual rights, he maintained that a social contract

would be universally agreed to as a means to prevent quarrels over the
use of nature.

Grotius might easily have explained why men would con-

sent to an equal division of the once jointly-held property, but universal consent becomes problemmatic when men are asked to agree to a contract

which legitimizes inequality and undermines the natural equality of rights.
Facing this difficulty, Grotius injected a further element of rationalism.
Men, he claimed, have "a faculty of knowing and acting according to general principles”

21

which leads them to perceive that private property is

in accord with the law of nature because it preserves men’s natural

equality of rights to enjoy the fruits of their labor.

Men are thus

obliged by natural law to observe and respect established property rights.

However compelling this argument may appear, it is open to fundamental
challenges.

One might ask how natural law can possibly oblige men to

observe a social convention which may reflect the influence of arbitrary

16

desires and expediency.
then couldn

rights?
tions

t a

Furthermore, if property is a social convention,

later, revised contract legitimately abrogate property

Grotius's theory offers no satisfactory response to these ques-

.

Thomas Hobbes was another early liberal thinker who struggled to
find the mixture of rationalist and empiricist elements which would

produce a viable theory of justice.

Suspicious of rationalism, Hobbes

sought to base his theory of obligation predominantly on empiricist

arguments.

He did, however, make use of natural law theory to conclude

that reason, as a mere instrument of desire, was incapable of arbitrating
in the conflict between men in the state of nature who legitimately believe

that they have a right to everything.

The chaos resulting from the un-

restricted pursuit of private ends and the resulting desire for security

would generate universal consent for political authority.

Yet Hobbes,

like Grotius, still had not offered an adequate basis for on-going support
of and obligation to rules and authority which govern over vastly unequal

property holdings.

Such a demonstration requires, in Macpherson’s words,

the "postulate that the individuals of whom the society is composed see

themselves. ..as equal in some respect more fundamental than all the re-

spects in which they are unequal."

Hobbes appealed to both the equality

to the
of persons before the law and the equal subordination of persons

impersonal mechanism of the market.
in motiGiven Hobbes’s emphasis on the primacy of economic interests

law could not be
vating persons, the formal nature of equality before the

17

expected to inspire consent to rules and authority which are perceived

by some people as thwarting their economic interests.

Therefore, the

of Hobbes s theory of obligation is thrown onto the equal status
of all persons as buyers and sellers of commodities in the market.
if individuals have fundamentally different economic prospects,

Yet

their

status as buyers and sellers has only a formal sense of equality and

could generate obligation only if men judged that their economic interests

would be best served by a particular set of social rules.
theory is precariously tentative.

Thus Hobbes’s

If any individual perceives that his

interests would be better served by an alternative organization of
society, he could deny having ever agreed to the social contract and

his obligation would cease.

This inadequacy should come as no surprise;

any criterion of right based exclusively on empiricism can only be
immanent, and so obligation to social rules can only be tentative.

When

individual perceptions of self-interst change sufficiently, former rules
lose their legitimacy.

Unwilling to follow Grotius in appealing to rationalism, Hobbes
turned to a positive law criterion of right.

This strategy reduces
„23

justice to legality; "the laws are the rules of just and unjust."

Although Hobbes has been accused of abandoning liberalism, he did offer
a liberal justification of absolute State power.

Positive law derives

volits legitimacy, Hobbes argued, from the fact that individuals have
the sovuntarily consented to transfer some of their natural rights to

ereign in return for security of property.

However, hidden in this

18

logic is a ploy which is unacceptable and destroys the
viability of the

Hobbesian theory of justice.

He has restricted the choice of individuals

to one of two options; they can either remain in the state
of nature and

endure chaos and insecurity or they can consent to the establishment
of
rules and authority and enter civil society.

Hobbes does not, however,

permit the choice between alternative rules and forms of authority.

Once

civil society is established, consent becomes inoperative and individuals
are obligated to whatever form society may take.

Clearly, such a theory

locates no grounds for the continued affirmation essential to an on-going
society.
By the mid-seventeenth century, a viable theory of justice for the

emerging liberal society had yet to be developed.
formidable.

The task was indeed

Any criterion of right based on natural law lacked demon-

strability and could be appropriated by radical political groups to

argue that inequality in property holdings violated the natural equality
of rights.

A criterion based on consent, on the other hand, was neces-

sarily contingent unless one accepted the Hobbesian state with its

absolute power.

In response to this impasse, John Locke sought to

develop a theoretical framework in which natural law and consent, ration-

alism and empiricism, would support and require each other.

In the next

two sections, I shall argue that Locke managed, through a rather ingenious

interweaving of apparently conflicting strands of thought, to form a coherent, internally consistent theory of justice.

19

II

Nowhere in Locke's work do we find anything resembling an extended
thematic treatment of justice.
idea of justice.

.

Yet Polin claims that for Locke, "the

.constituted the center of reference around which his

metaphysical conception of the world, his theory of man, and his moral
r\ t

and political doctrines are coherently organized."

Polin 's statement

is controversial, but to argue that Locke's fundamental purpose was the

construction of a viable theory of justice is hardly to search for "some
more remote and unrealistic principle of reconciliation."
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Seventeenth

century century England was a society in turmoil, and it would be more

surprising if Locke had not been keenly aware of the pressing importance
of restoring a sense of justice.

In what follows, I shall argue that

justice was Locke's major theme and that the apparent inconsistencies

within his work may be viewed as essential to his purpose.
The ontological and epistemological assumptions of classical liberal

philosophy were designed to appeal to an ascending class whose livelihood
was based on market exchanges.

Thus men were viewed as autonomous agents

who confronted each other from positions of moral sovereignty.

To the

extent that they recognized moral obligation, it must be consistent

with their rational self-interest.

The task of the early liberal theorists

private
was to show that obligation to rules and authority that protected

property was in the interest of all persons.

Their strategy was to

of private
simultaneously argue that each person benefits from a system

and that
property (and thus obligation follows from self-interest)

moral order (so that
private property is consistent with an objective

.
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any perceived interest in violating property
rights is both immoral
and shortsighted)
In developing the objective grounding for his
theory of justice,

Locke relied on natural law.

The natural law, which is "as intelligible

...as the positive laws of commonwealths,"^^ dictates
that men have

property in their own person and that they may, by injecting
their

personality into nature through labor, gain a proprietary claim over
parts of nature.

By establishing property rights in the state of nature,

Locke resolved a problem which had troubled earlier natural law theorists.
If property was a natural right which could obligate others without their

prior consent, then property rights could not legitimately be abrogated

by any legislative body.

With property viewed as an extension of the

self, Locke could place property rights on an equal footing with individ-

ual rights to life and liberty.

Natural law, however, was only one basis for Locke’s theory of justice.
He held that even a perfectly rational moral principle could not function
as a law unless it were willed by a superior being.
To establish morality .. .upon. .. such foundations as may carry
an obligation with them, we must first prove a law, which
always supposes a law-maker; one that has a superiority and
right to ordain, and also a power to reward and punish according to the tenor of the law established by him. This
sovereign law-maker who has set ^ul^^ and bounds to the
actions of men is God, their Maker.

Locke buttressed natural law with divine law because he regarded reason
as "only a faculty of our mind"

28

which could assist in locating moral

principles but could not constitute those principles as law.

.
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It is plain that human reason unassisted
failed men
in its great and proper business of morality.
It never

from unquestionable principles, by clear deductions,
made out an entire body of the law of nature.
(If reason alone uncovered laws,) mankind might hearken
to it,
or reject it as they pleased; or as it suited
their
interest, passions, principles or humours. They were
under no obligation. ^

However, Christian revelation was quite a different matter.

Here morality has a sure standard that revelation
vouches and reason cannot gainsay nor question; but
both together witness to come from God the great
law-maker

Divine law was thus "the only true touchstone of moral rectitude,
and it gave natural law both its content and its authority.

Even natural law backed by divine law was held by Locke to be in-

adequate as a basis for a theory of justice.

Though the law of nature be plain and intelligible
to all rational creatures, yet men being biased by
their interest, as well as ignorant for want of
studying it, are not apt to allow of it as a law
binding to them in„the application of it to their
particular cases."'
Locke's rationalism had always left room for error in understanding.

He

claimed that "without the help and assistance of the senses, reason can

achieve nothing more than a labourer can working in darkness behind shut
tered windows."
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Since sense perception provided reason with the mater

ial from which to deduce the law of nature, any partiality in perception

might preclude full knowledge of one’s duties.

This possibility was

reinforced by Locke’s theory of representative perception which asserts
that reason must work with ideas which may or may not adequately repre-

.
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sent the real world.

We all "see but in part, and know but in part,

and therefore it is no wonder we conclude not right
from our partial

views
Given that knowledge of objective laws is unreliable, Locke
turned
to an empiricist criterion of right.

Understanding

,

In the Essay Concerning Human

he concluded that "good and evil... are nothing but

pleasure and pain, or that which occasions or procures pleasure or
pain to us."„35

Locke’s hedonism can be reconciled with his natural

law theory by arguing that pleasure and pain are the means by which
God guides man to moral conduct.

However, Locke apparently shunned

such a facile solution, noting that

Men have a natural tendency to what delights and from
what pains them. But that the soul has such a tendency
to what is morally good and from evil has not fallen
under my observation and therefore I cannot grant it.
In the Essays on the Law of Nature

,

Locke offered a resounding

denunciation of a purely empiricist ethics; "if the ground of duty
were made to rest on gain and if expediency were acknowledged as the
standard of rightness, what else would this be than to open the door
to every kind of villainy."
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He roundly criticized those who

seek the principles of moral action and a rule to
live by in men’s appetites and natural instincts
rather than in the binding force of a law, just as
if that was morally best which most people desired.
Can Locke possibly avoid inconsistency in both advancing and de-

nouncing an empiricist ethics?

An affirmative answer holds only if

these apparently contradictory claims function as poles within a syn—
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thetic framework.

Locke realized that a viable liberal theory
of justice

must be grounded in the consent of men, yet he
was certain that general
consent alone could not provide an adequate criterion
of right.
...there is almost no vice, no infringement of natural
law, no moral wrong which anyone who consults the
history of the world and observes the affairs of men
will
not readily perceive to have been not only privately
committed somewhere on earth, but also approved by public authority and custom. ^

Locke’s dilemma is evident.

natural law to curb

On one hand, he trusted neither consent nor

the corruption and viciousness of degenerate men.”^^

On the other hand, he believed that a divinely-based natural law was
'the only true touchstone of moral rectitude’ and that nothing can

obligate a person "to any Earthly Power, but only his own Consent.
His solution was to propose that the gulf between the ideal and the
/

real be bridged by the authority of "a known and indifferent judge"^

with power to establish and execute civil law.

0

Reluctantly, he con-

cluded that "for the bulk of mankind. .hearing plain commands is the
.

sure and only course to bring them to obedience and practice."

43

The civil authority Locke had in mind could not be a king since
"even the princes of the world are... as well infected with the depraved

nature of man as the rest of their brethren."
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Only through a system

of majority rule could the partiality of particular interests be sub-

jected to the public test of reason.
’natural political virtue’ to mankind.

Unlike Hobbes, Locke attributed

Men have a capacity for awareness

of the relation between private and public good and are able to construct

rules for mutual security without granting absolute power to the civil

.
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authority.

Moreover, Locke believed that the rationality
of man would

increase through ’exercise*, and thus active
citizen participation in

public affairs would result in a civil code in conformance
with the
law of nature.

As a result, men would be led to consent to, and
only

to, rules and authority which are objectively just.

Locke did have two major reservations concerning majority rule.
First, he would limit political participation to property holders
since

theyhave demonstrated sufficiently rational conduct to permit them
to play a role in public decision-making.

Second, Locke held that rea-

son alone was incapable of knowing the full extent of divine law, and

hence public policy should refrain from interfering with conduct which
is

’indifferent' from the viewpoint of social tranquility (e.g., relig-

ious beliefs and practices)

.

So long as property rights are faithfully

observed,
.men of different professions may quietly unite under
the same government and unanimously carry the same civil
interest and hand in hand march to the same end of peace
and mut^^l society though they take different ways towards
.

.

heaven
The foregoing analysis has shown that Locke succeeded in constructing a theory of justice in which natural law and consent are both con-

sistent with each other and mutually supportive.

Without natural law

and its divine sanctions, men would lack sufficient motivation to respect the rights of others and fulfill their duties.

On the other hand,

without a ’known and indifferent judge’, which is the product of consent,
natural law ’is incapable of obligating men.

The interpretations of
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Laslett, von Leyden, Gough. Kendall, Strauss, Cox,
Green, and Macpherson

all

mis^he fundamental point

of Locke's writings; men are obliged to

consent to those rules and and authority which protect their
natural
rights.

Conversely, they are under no obligation to recognize the

legitimacy of rules and authority which are contrary to the law of nature.

Ill

The Lockean theory of justice is certainly relevant to a society

based on the private appropriation of property.

Having rejected the

traditional doctrine of the communal ownership of nature prior to civil
society, Locke could argue that property, a natural right, was not dependent on the consent of men.

Thus civil law, which is a product of consent,

must have as its basis the absolute protection of property rights if it
is to conform with natural law.

If the general consent which is essent-

ial to the legitimacy of civil law is to be forthcoming, men must perceive

not only that social rules preserve their natural rights, but also that

continued obedience to those rules will promote their individual interests.
Furthermore, since these interests are taken by liberal theory to be

economic interests, a satisfactory theory of justice must demonstrate not
only the justice of private appropriation, but the fairness of market
exchanges.

Property is ultimately a claim on the benefits accruing to

a productive asset, and it is not immediately evident that market exchanges

will result in a just distribution of benefits.

Due to this inadequacy in

the early liberal theory of justice, philosophers become increasingly
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interested in a theory of economic value.

Value theory supports a theory of justice if market prices can
be
shown to converge on a value which is determined independently of
the

market process.

However, a theory of value alone does not constitute

a theory of economic justice.

In addition, economists postulate certain

'constants’ which embody the "natural, psychological, and institutional

factors which affect the process to be analyzed without themselves being

affected by the latter."

46

These constants delineate the necessary con-

straints within which the economic process occurs, and they, in conjunction with the independent variable provided by the theory of value, form
an image of an economy governed solely by the interaction of ultimate

values and necessary constraints.

Since that which is necessary is not

susceptible to value judgement, a theory of economic value buttressed by
constants in the theoretical system forms a theory of economic justice.
In this section, I shall outline the process by which value theory became

essential to the liberal theory of justice and then examine the relation

between Locke's theory of value and his natural rights theory of property.
Justice consists of 'equal treatment for equals', and thus the realization of justice requires some common dimension between persons by which
their similarities or differences may be assessed.

From the perspective

of early liberal philosophy, men differ by what they desire, but they

share a rational capacity for knowing the world in the same way.

47

Since

dimenthe pursuit of means to fulfill arbitrary desires yields no common
to the dission between- -persons, the concept of justice was not applied
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tribution of economic goods.

Justice was held to be relevant only in

the arena of reasoned public discourse, and theorists thus
subsumed
the theory of justice under the theory of political obligation.

Since

the inherent justness of individual claims was indeterminate, the

justice of the political order would be assessed by its ability to
generate consent and obligation through the equal protection of all
interests.

Hence justice was initially viewed by liberals as the equal

subordination of every member of society to the civil law.
However, the attempt to confine justice to the political sphere

was extremely tenuous because early liberal theorists viewed economic

interests as primary and regarded political activities as instrumental.
The Hobbes ian analogy between the equal subordination of citizens to the
law and the equal subordination of buyers and sellers to the market

might satisfy those concerned merely with protecting established claims,
but it did little to assuage the demands of the dispossessed for greater

substantive equality.

Certainly, the political power of radical groups

such as the Levellers and the Diggers was insufficient to undermine the

viability of the early liberal conception of justice, but powerful material changes were gradually setting the stage for a major reorientation
of social theory.

In a society based on immovable wealth, the ownership

of property was visibly linked with power over people, and hence it was

inconceivable that economic theory should be separate from political
and moral philosophy.

However, as production was increasingly geared

over
toward exchange rather than use and movable wealth gained primacy

.
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immovable wealth, the economy emerged from its
political and ethical
fetters.

Coinciding with the increasingly visible autonomy of
the

economy was the emergence of economic theory as a
distinct body of
thought

The process by which economic theory came to play a central role
in the liberal theory of justice began as markets and exchange
gradually

supplanted custom and tradition as the fundamental determinants of distribution.

The theory of the just price, as developed by Aquinas, dis-

tinguished between distributive and commutative justice.

Distributive

justice is concerned with the distribution of goods among members of
society or "the proportion between things and persons."

Commutative

justice relates to transactions between individuals and requires the

equalization of "thing with thing."

Aquinas claimed that distributive

justice "prepares the field for commutative justice" 48 (i.e., justice
in exchange is conditional on a just pattern of factor ownership.)

Due to the lexical ordering of distributive and commutative justice,
market prices could easily diverge from the just price.
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In fact,

the market process, whereby an equality of thing with thing is estab-

lished, would satisfy commutative justice only when distributive justice

has secured the appropriate relations between person and person.

Aquinas was able to develop a theory of economic justice because,
unlike the early liberal theorists, he located a common dimension between persons extending into the economic sphere.

dignitas in proportion with his contribution to

Each person had

f elicitas

or the good
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of society.

Distributive justice required a pattern of ownership
in

accordance with the relative dignitas of each person.

The early liberal

theorists, on the other hand, discarded the doctrine of the
just price
as a potential obstruction to the free functioning of the
market.

Not

only could it hinder the competitive pricing mechanism, but it implied
that profit-making was an extractive phenomenon.

As late as 1580, Mon-

taigne could write, "the profit of one man is the damage of another...
no man profiteth but by the loss of others."^^

Liberals were instead attracted to a subjective theory of value which,
like an empiricist ethics, measures the Good by what men desire.

Grotius

considered need to be the most natural measure of value, although he

admitted that since man "desires many more things than are necessary,"
desire would also be a measure of value.

Pufendorf observed that "the

foundation of the price or value of any action or thing is, fitness to
procure either mediately or immediately, the necessaries, or conveniences,
or pleasures of human life."
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Hobbes held that "the value of all things

contracted for is measured by the appetite of the contractors, and
therefore the just value is that which they be contented to give."
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The

problem with a subjective theory of value is that it leads to the same
impasse as an empiricist ethics.

If value is dependent "upon the mutable

minds, opinions, appetites, and passions of particular men,"

then no

objective standard exists by which to assess the justice of market transactions.

So long as the theory of justice was conflated with the theory

of right
of political obligation, the absence of an objective criterion
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in the economic sphere was ignored.

increasingly untenable.

Such a strategy, however, became

Seeking to free the economy from the fetters

of general morality, liberal theorists needed to
demonstrate that the

logic of the economy was oriented toward the good of society.

To this

end, an objective theory of economic value was developed.

John Locke’s economic theory was by no means built on a fully
articulated theory of value and distribution.'^^

However, while Locke

lacked the rigor of later economists, he clearly had a labor theory of

value in mind when he claimed ”tis labour indeed that puts the difference
of value on every thing.

Similarly, he held that "ninety-nine hun-

dredths (of costs) are wholly to be put to the account of labour.

Although Locke never explained why he turned to a labor theory of value,
it seems reasonable to assume that he viewed it as a natural extension

of his labor theory of property.

If a person obtains a juridical right

to dispose of a thing by embodying his labor in it, then he would, in

long-run equilibrium, freely exchange it only for those things which

embody at least an equal amount of labor.

Since each buyer and seller

would behave in this manner, goods would always exchange according to
Thus Locke

the ratio of labor time embodied in their production.

translated the natural right to appropriate property into a right to
the value-equivalent of the product of one's labor

—a

1
j
is obliged to recognize if justice is to be realized.

right which society
58

With apparent inconsistency, Locke also espoused a subjective theory
of value.

Echoing the earlier liberal theorists, he claimed that "the
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intrinsic, natural worth of any thing (is) its fitness to supply
the

necessities, or serve the conveninces of human life."^^
work, he asks

.

.

In another

.what is the measure that ought to regulate the price

for which any one sells so as to keep it within the hounds of equity

and justice."

The answer, according to Locke, is "the market price at

the place where he sells."

Locke's attraction to a subjective theory

may have been motivated by his practical concerns with trade during the

mercantilist era.

The labor theory of value couldn't explain the gains

from international trade, and it required the awkward distinction between
'contingent' and 'permanent' causes of price.

However, Locke appears to

have turned away from the problem of justice.

To equate the just price

with the market price is to lose any objective criterion of right for
the market process.

Supply and demand are not independent variables,

and hence a supply and demand theory of value cannot provide the basis
for a theory of economic justice.

Once more, inconsistency seems to appear in Locke's work.

Yet I

propose that Locke's supply and demand theory of value is no more in-

consistent with his labor theory of value than is his consent theory of

obligation with his natural law theory.

Locke realized that market prices,

as empirical facts, must be legitimized by a liberal theory of justice.
At the same time, that very legitimation required an objective measure
of value to which prices must conform.

Locke could hold both subjec-

so long as
tive and objective theories of value without inconsistency

elements play a
he could argue that market prices, where subjective
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role, tend, in the long run, toward
values representing just prices.
In that case, subjective and objective value
would coincide; in long-

run equilibrium, reward would be proportionate
with effort and satis-

faction would be proportionate with difficulty of
attainment.

In short,

individual satisfaction would correspond with individual
effort.

Locke’s

dual theory of value was not merely expedient, it was an
ethical proposition.

The theory of supply and demand, like the theory of consent,
sim-

ply provided recognition of the intentions of individuals.

Just as the

market may experience day-to-day contingencies, the political process
may be temporarily swayed by particular interests.

In both spheres,

however, rationality will prevail and the justice of social outcomes

will be assured.

IV
I

have argued that Locke did develop a thoroughly consistent and

comprehensive theory of justice.

Moreover, his theory dictates certain

institutional criteria of the just society.
the right to privately appropriate property.

It must permit and preserve

In the political sphere,

decisions must be subject to majority rule by property holders.

Thus

one might be led to conclude that Locke’s theory can be taken as ade-

quate justification of a capitalist economic system in conjunction with
a limited political democracy.

In this final section, I shall argue

that such a conclusion is mistaken.

Locke’s theory is relevant only

to an economic system based on exchange between independent producers
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with roughly equal access to nature.

His apparent justification of

the unlimited accumulation characteristic of
capitalist development

cannot be consistently situated within the whole of
his theory of justice.
In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, English society
was based

predominantly on a simple exchange economy.

Most labor was in family

workshops or on peasant holdings, and wages were usually supplemented

by some direct access to means of production.

By the seventeenth cen-

tury, however, the uneven accumulation which accompanies capitalist de-

velopment was sufficiently advanced to generate a number of dispossessed
persons who were forced to bid against each other for access to nature
and the means of production.

Once this condition appeared, Locke's

labor theory of property was no longer the theoretical equivalent of
a labor theory of value.

A person could now command the value-equiva-

lent of not only the products in which he had embodied labor, but also
the products of other people's labor which he controls through the

ownership of property.

Locke was apparently aware of this problem

since he initially attached egalitarian stipulations to his theory of

property.

Property was to be a natural right only when appropriation

was limited by a dual requirement; individuals may appropriate only

what they can use without spoilage, and appropriation is legitimate
only so long as "there is enough, and as good left in common for
others.

,.61

Yet Locke apparently amended his theory in a way that made these

limitations inoperative.

By consenting to the use of money, he argued.

3A

men tacitly "agreed to a disproportionate and
unequal possession of the
earth."
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The use of money negates the 'spoilage' constraint
since a

person "may fairly possess more land than he himself can
use the produce
of, by receiving in exchange for the overplus, gold and
silver, which

may be hoarded without injury to any one."^^

Locke also sought to cir-

cumvent the second constraint by assuming that appropriation and accumu-

lation would benefit all persons in society.

The 'industrious' and 'rat-

ional' individuals would employ their 'quarrelsome' and 'contentious'

neighbors and thus improve the general standard of living.

Justice, it

would seem, no longer requires a distribution of benefits in accordance
with individual labor, but instead is based on the tendency of differential property rights to release the human energy which will maximize the

preservation of all.
Neither of the preceding arguments can be reconciled with Locke's
theory of justice.

The use of money cannot be taken as evidence of con-

sent to vastly unequal property holdings because consent is obligatory

only for rules which conform to the law of nature.

The Lockean law of

nature states that men gain property rights by 'mixing' their labor

with nature, not by purchasing the labor of others.

The opportunity to

purchase labor undercuts the correspondence between effort and reward.

Locke himself was explicit on this point; money "transfers that profit,
that was the reward of one man's labour, into another man's pocket.

That

ii64
which occasions this is the unequal distribution of money."

The assumption that unequal accumulation will benefit every person
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is thoroughly utilitarian and hardly fits with
the delicate equilibrium

which Locke established between natural law and consent
as bases for
the criterion of right.

In earlier writings, he had vehemently rejected

an unlimited freedom to appropriate; "when any man snatches for
himself
as much as he can, he takes away from another man's heap the amount
he

adds to his own, and it is impossible for anyone to grow rich except at
the expense of someone else."^^

Locke was equally certain of his opposit-

ion to a utilitarian criterion of right.
For what reson is there for the fulfillment of promises,
what safeguard of society, what common life of man with
man, when equity and justice are one and the same as
utility?
...the rightness of an action does not depend
on its utility; og^the contrary, its utility is a result
of its rightness.
I

am led to conclude that Locke did not intend to justify unlimited

accumulation.

He simply 'reasoned' that society as a whole would benefit

when men continued to produce beyond what they could immediately consume,
and thus money could legitimately serve as a store of value.

Similarly,

he found the stipulation requiring "enough and as good left in common for

others" to be impractical in a community where all land had been appropriated.

Locke's intention, though, was to relax the constraints on appropri-

ation, not to eliminate them.

Inequality would be in conformance with

the dictates of justice only so long as the maj,ority of 'rational' per-

sons deemed it beneficial.

Through consent, the objective criterion of

natural law would assert itself over the accumulation of capital.

In

making laws
fact, Locke's definition of political power was the "right of
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...for the regulating and preserving of property ... for the public good."^^

He gave to the political authority "a power to appoint ways of transfer—

ring properties from one man to another."

Thus men could, through

their consent, empower the political authority to abridge the inviola-

bility of property rights whenever the public interest was jeopardized.
Locke's strategy was not necessarily utilitarian nor did it violate

natural law theory.

Consent was the product of reasoned discourse in

the political arena, and, in the end, men would consent only to that

which was objectively right.

Unlimited accumulation violates natural

law because it potentially forecloses access to means of production for
some individuals.

According to Locke, a man is obliged to fulfill his

duties to others only "when his own preseirvation comes not in competition."

When the claims of others threaten a person's well-being,

self-interest takes precedence over duties to others.

Men's other-

regarding capacities would be suppressed as they sought to protect
themselves from disenfranchisement, and the moral order would disintegrate.

In fairness to Macpherson and other critics who find an advocacy of

unlimited accumulation in Locke's writings, it should be pointed out that
Locke placed little emphasis on the necessity of restraints on property.
social
He viewed private accumulation as a prerequisite for expanding
of
welfare, but had he foreseen the emergence of vast concentrations

reservations
wealth, he would surely have been more explicit in his

concerning absolute property rights.

For just as an on-go ing dialogue
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between rational men is essential to reaching right political decisions,
so lively competition among many buyers and sellers is essential to

achieving right prices.

Economic monopoly is as much a threat to just-

ice as is political dictatorship.

John Locke’s theory of justice is a magnificent tribute to the
ingenuity of a great mind.
the fact that the

Yet theoretical finesse could not disguise

theory was becoming irrelevant even as it slowly

evolved during a lifetime of intellectual endeavor.

Locke’s continuing

popularity in certain circles stems from the fact that he has been inter-

preted as providing objective justification for unrestrained accumulation.
Yet we have seen that his theory of justice collapses when pressed into
such a mold.

Accumulation must conform to a criterion of right which

would be potentially appealing to every rational person, even the least
well-off.

Thus in Locke we find the Rawlsian theory of justice in em-

bryonic form.
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CHAPTER

II

BETWEEN NATURAL LAW AND UTILITY: ADAM SMITH'S THEORY OF JUSTICE

Despite the intense reexamination of Adam Smith occasioned by the
recent bicentennial of The Wealth of Nations

interpreting his works is still wanting.

,

a general consensus on

The bicentennial collection.

Essays on Adam Smith , reminded one reviewer of "the truth of the old

Indian tale about the blind men and the elephant."^

We should not, how-

ever, conclude that no progress has been made in moving toward consensus.

Perhaps the most significant area of agreement among contemporary critics
concerns the fact, if not the nature, of continuity between Smith’s two

major works
(WN)

.

The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) and The Wealth of Nations

This viexq>oint contrasts sharply with earlier interpretations which

stressed discontinuity, if not contradiction in Smith.

Most prominent in

the earlier tradition were the German economists, Hasbach, Leser, and Oncken,

who posed "Das Adam Smith Problem".

They found irreconcilable differences

between Smith the moral philosopher, who relied on sympathy as the basis
for social cohesion, and Smith the economist, who apparently claimed that

the unrestrained pursuit of private interests was sufficient to generate

social order.

Other writers who found themselves unable to reconcile the two Smiths
of liberal
have tended to view his work as marking a watershed in the history

and WN, a
social theory; in the interval between the publication of TMS

realm assumed
scientific co'nception of a self-regulating social and economic
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dominance over what had previously been an exclusively moral
and political
domain.

This position is taken, for example, by Elie Halevy who
distin-

guished between the rationalism underlying Smith's economics and the
natur-

alism which formed the basis of his views on politics and ethics.^

Simi-

larly, Jacob Viner claimed that "there are divergences between (TMS and WN)

which are impossible of reconciliation."

Viner admired WN because "it

abandoned the absolutism, the rigidity, the romanticism which characterized
the earlier book."

3

Denying that Smith was an ardent champion of laissez-

faire, Viner proposed that the doctrine of a divine order of nature had been

jettisoned to reveal "defects in the order of nature without casting reflections on the workmanship of its author."

4

Sheldon Wolin also points to Smith

as a key figure in the transition from 'polity' to 'economy'.^

Finally, a

recent version of this line of argument is Albert 0. Hirschman's claim that

by reducing all desires to the desire for economic gain. Smith destroyed the

moral significance of the term 'interests'.^

Thus, with WN, the justification

of capitalism ceased to be moral and political and became purely economic.

In contrast, the increasingly accepted approach to Smith stresses con-

tinuity between his two major works.

Empirical support for this position is

found in the fact that Smith left the content of TMS basically unaltered in
the fifth and sixth editions which appeared after the publication of WN.

Furthermore, Smith's Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue and Arms of 1763
reveals that his economic doctrines were substantially developed prior to
reliance
his contact with the Physiocrats who supposedly converted him to

on self-interest rather than sympathy.^

Those authors who support the inter-
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relatedness of Smith's works fall roughly into two groups.

On one hand,

WN is viewed as a special case of the framework developed
in TMS.

Advo-

cates of this position include A.L. Macfie who states that
WN "gives

merely a particular development of the broader doctrine" of
TMS.^

Simi-

larly, J. Ralph Lindgren views WN as an elaboration of a single
aspect of

Smith's moral philosophy

— that

of prudence or utility.^

Finally, Andrew

Skinner speaks of "the degree of abstraction involved in Smith's formal

S.

economics, where he was concerned with a part only of the range of experience which had been delineated in the TMS."^^

On the other hand, several authors have emphasized a greater degree of

consistency running through WN and TMS

.

Joseph Cropsey proposes that the

mechanistic psychology of TMS translates into an economic determinism in
WN

.

Moreover, Cropsey concludes, the commercial economy "generates freedom

and civilization", so that Smith was consistently a moralist in advocating

capitalism "for the sake of freedom, civil, and ecclesiastical."^^

Alter-

natively, Glenn R. Morrow claims that "the doctrine of sympathy is a necessary presupposition of the doctrine of the natural order expounded in WN."
Thus, "it was an ethical, and not merely an economic, individualism which

Adam Smith held up as an ideal."

12

Given these widely diverging interpretations of Smith, is it possible
to perceive 'the whole elephant'?

Is there a viewpoint from which the

alternative interpretations can be seen as a coherent whole?
and the perspective

I

I

believe so,

intend to develop is indebted to John Rawls insofar

theory
as he has reminded modern thinkers of the central role played by the
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of justice in the whole of social theory.

Employing this insight.

I

intend to show that Adam Smith built two
successive intellectual edifices

around the same basic intention—namely
justice.

,

the construction of a theory of

The differences and continuity between the two
edifices can

be more clearly understood by revealing their common
base.

A hint of

this approach is given by R.D. Collison Black who refers
to Smith's work
as

a system of thought which placed economic problems
firmly in the con-

text of ethics and jurisprudence and which was informed throughout
by
a concept of justice."
I shall

13

begin by mapping out the contours of moral philosophy in the

mid-eighteenth century.

It will be necessary to examine in some detail

the nature of the advance which Smith's philosophy represented over pre-

vious traditions.

In the second section, I shall argue that the economic

theory of WN was shaped by Smith's intention to both revise and augment
the theory of justice developed earlier in TMS.

Thus the moral philosophy

of TMS is incoherent without the economic theory of WN, and, conversely.

Smith's economic theory is puzzling unless its relationship with moral

philosophy is understood.

I

conclude that Smith's incorporation of econo-

mic theory into his theory of justice was based on his recognition of the

incompatibility between market activity and the model of moral development
set forth in TMS.

Yet despite the revisions. Smith did not succeed in

constructing an internally consistent theory of justice, a fact which accounts for his ambivalent attitudes toward most of the major institutional
features of capitalist society.
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I

Eighteenth century British social theory may be understood as
a
set of alternative responses to the impasse presented by the
Lockean

theory of justice.

The coherency of Locke’s theory required roughly

equal access to the means of production for all persons, or, should this

condition be violated, a general consensus that unequal access served
the interests of every person.

tively violated this condition.

The events subsequent to Locke effec-

While the seventeenth century English

economy had been based primarily on petty production in agriculture,
the enclosure morvement and the destruction of the open field system

resulted in a massive transformation of society between 1688 and 1750 .^^
By the latter date, petty production had been largely replaced by capi-

talist social relations of production with large landlords, tenant farmers, and wage-laborers.

Such a class structure was incompatible with

the Lockean theory of justice.

However, eighteenth century philosophers did cling to perhaps the

most important aspect of Locke's method.

They sought to develop a cri-

terion of right which was neither purely subjective nor abstractly rational.

The criterion should appeal to the Interests of concrete persons

in contingent circumstances, yet it should reflect more than the mere

fulfillment of any desire regardless of its quality.
it should be rational and yet not transcendental.

On the other hand,

In the words of Hegel;

Philosophy demands the unity and intermingling of the
two points of view; it unites the Sunday of life when
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man in humility renounces himself, and the
working-day
when he stands up independently, is master of
himself,
and considers his own interests. ^
Thus Adam Smith began with a full awareness of the
inadequacy of

either empiricism or rationalism alone as a basis for a
theory of justice.

He rejected Hobbes's empiricist-based criterion of right
by argu-

ing that a morality based on desire or self-love must reduce to one
of
two moral systems.

If we desire the good of society because of the in-

direct advantages to ourselves, then Hobbes's philosophy "runs into
that principle which gives beauty to utility.

On the other hand, if

we approve of things which do not affect us, then we have a morality

based on sympathy.

In Smith's words, "that whole account of human na-

ture... which deduces all sentiments and affections from self-love" has

"arisen from some confused misapprehension of sympathy.
The notion of a morality based on reason was also unacceptable to
Smith.

Rejecting the natural law theory of Grotius and Pufendorf, he

denied the possibility of a rational ethics; "it cannot be reason which

originally distinguishes" between vice and virtue, because "reason cannot
render any particular object either agreeable or disagreeable to the mind
for its own sake."

18

Smith also rejected the theories of other eighteenth century philosophers who had sought to transcend the empiricism/rationalism perspective.

Shaftesbury and Hutcheson had established a moral philosophy based on
an autonomous moral sense which would restrain the potentially destructive pursuit of individual desires.

Smith argued that any innate attri-
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bute of the individual would necessarily lack impartiality
and therefore could not be relied upon to generate social order.

Thus he rejected

"every account of the principle of approbation which makes it
depend upon
a peculiar sentiment distinct from every other.

Finally, despite his great admiration of David Hume, Smith was un-

able to wholly accept Hume*s moral philosophy.

Since Hume laid much of

the groundwork for Smith’s thinking, it will be useful at this point to

examine Hume’s theory of justice.

Hume steered British social theory

away from its reliance on innate individual attributes.

Viewing reason

as a mere "instrument" or "slave" of the passions, he made knowledge

depend solely on sense experience.

20

Positive social rules could not

be based exclusively on natural sentiments, claimed Hume, because the
passions always inclince men to give preference to those familiar and

close to them and thus cannot be the origin of impartial rules.

21

In

fact, he rejected any natural foundation for social rules; "the rules
of equity and justice depend entirely on the particular condition in

which men are placed."

Justice was therefore an "artificial virtue",

and the sense of justice could only develop through the experience of
the advantages and disadvantages which followed from certain rules of

conduct.

The artificiality of justice was also due to the fact that

its goodness must refer to the advantages accruing to society as a whole.

Unlike the natural virtue of benevolence, whose goodness is evident in
in a
every single act, justice may be contrary to our sense of humanity

particular instance.

Thus, "It would as often be an instance of humanity
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to decide contrary to the laws of justice as conformable
to them."^^

Such a situation could arise, for example, when "judges take from
a
poor man to give to a rich" or "bestow on the dissolute the labor of
the industrious."

24

For Hume, "public utility is the sole origin of justice, and... re-

flections on the beneficial consequences of this virture are the sole

foundation of its merit."

25

Hume was not, however, a classical utili-

tarian, weighing one man's loss against another's gain.

26

By utility,

he meant only the common good or the general interest of society in

maintaining social order through absolute security of property.

He could

based justice on utility without involving himself in interpersonal comparisons because he maintained that "every individual person must find

himself a gainer" from the observance of social rules designed to preserve property.

27

This conclusion hinges on the strategy, first employed

by Hobbes, of comparing only two states

— the

existing distribution of

property and "that savage and solitary condition, which is infinitely

worse than the worst situation that can possibly be supposed in society."

28

Employing this strategy, Hume was able to recommend "that everyone continue
to enjoy what he is at present possess'd of."

29

Attempts to equalize

property would prove futile in raising the general standard of living;
Render possessions ever so equal, men's different
degrees of articare and industry will immediately
break that equality. Or if you check those virtues,
you reduce society to the most extreme indigence; and
instead of preventing want and beggary in the
render it unavoidable for the whole community.
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As we have seen, Hobbes's attempt to construct an empiricist-

based theory of justice led to a positive law criterion of right and
the authoritarian state.

If the conception of justice is ultimately

based on the assessments of particular individuals, then the rules of
justice would seem to be subjective and potentially arbitrary without
the moral force of the State behind them.
of justice are not arbitrary"

Hume disagreed; "the rules

because "the intercourse and senti-

ments in society and conversation makes us form some general unalterable standards by which we may approve or disapprove of characters
and manners."

32

This intersub jective perspective from which men could

derive a common conception of justice was based on Hume's notion of

sympathy which, though too partial and weak to serve alone as the basis
for justice, could be trusted to maintain commitment and obligation to

social rules.

In Hume's words, "self-interest is the original motive

to the establishment of justice, but a sympathy with the public inter-

est is the source of the moral approbation which attends that virtue."

33

Hume conceived of sympathy not as a private virtue or an element of

human nature, but as actual participation in the sentiments of others.
Thus he viewed the development of moral consciousness as a social process with an 'objective' moral criterion emerging from mutually shared
sentiments.

By the mid-eighteenth century, then, liberal social theory

isolated and
had already begun to transcend its initial vision of the
right could
autonomous individual from whose attributes a criterion of

be deduced.

reliance
Clearly, such a transition was required if the
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on natural law and rationalism was to be
reduced.

accomplishments also posed difficulties.

However, Hume's

Basing the theory of justice

on the subjective assessments of self-interested
persons in contingent

circumstances is a potentially dangerous tactic for liberal
theory.

If

obligation is founded on utility or interest rather than consent
or contract, the obvious conclusion is that social rules can be
justified only
so long as they generate widespread support.

Each individual must be-

lieve that his interests are best served under existing arrangements;
otherwise, if the perceived advantage ceases, the obligation to existing
rules ceases.

This flaw in Hume's theory could only be overcome by

advancing to a full-blown utilitarianism, where the social good takes
priority over individual interests.
Perhaps sensing the utilitarian implications of Hume's theory (along

with the corresponding degredation of natural rights)

,

Adam Smith was de-

termined to show that justice arises from natural sentiments rather than

utilitarian calculations.

Smith's method can be fully appreciated only

with the understanding that, like Locke, he was seeking a synthesis of
empiricism and rationalism as bases for a criterion of right.

He was

committed, in part, to Hume's view of reason as being insufficiently auto-

nomous to shape the social order, yet he perceived that if reason is a
slave to the passions, then man must lack the autonomy of a moral agent.

Without the presumption of some degree of moral autonomy, the theorist is
left with two strategies for grounding the social order

— either

a divine

will must direct the affairs of men or else the empirical fact of social co-
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hesion must be taken as evidence that the pursuit of passions by
amoral individuals is conducive to social order.

Interestingly,

Smith has been variously interpreted as falling into both of these
camps.

Some critics have emphasized his optimistic theism as the

basis for his arguments resolving private interests and the social
good.

Others have lumped him together with Mandeville in concluding,

through observation, that 'private vices' work for the common advantage.

Neither of these positions is satisfactory for a liberal theory

of justice.

The former is insufficiently secular and thus lacks popu-

lar appeal, while the latter is necessarily contingent.

Smith rejected

both position as he sought to inject a rational, yet not transcendental,
element into Hume's theory of justice.
Smith's initial commitment to an empiricist-based criterion of
right is unmistakable; "the general maxims of morality are formed, like

all other general maxims, from experience and induction."

34

He followed

Hume in relying on the operation of sympathy to generate intersubjective
judgements.

Sympathy alone, however, could not provide a means of moral
1.35

discrimination since it was "fellow-feeling with any passion whatever."
Smith argues that prior to the expression of sympathy, we assess the

propriety of the other person's behavior relative to the given situation;
"Sympathy, therefore, does not arise so much from the view of the passion,
as from that of the situation which excites it."

Thus a certain degree

of rationality is involved in the sentiment of sympathy.

Although we

feel sympathy
strongly desire to enter into the sensations of others, we
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only to the extent that the behavior of others corresponds with our
own
sense of propriety.

Besides a desire to sympathize, we also desire sympathy.

Knowing

that we can sympathize only with those sentiments of which we approve,

our desire for sympathy translates into a desire for approbation.

Thus

we are led to constantly assess ourselves from the standpoint of others
in order to better determine how we may gain approbation.

This continual

process of adopting the perspective of others gradually enables us to

transcend the particular viev^oint of both ourselves and distinct others
in order to achieve an objective view characteristic of an 'impartial*

and 'well-informed' spectator.

Smith used the notion of the impartial

spectator to argue that "the sentiment of approbation always involves in
it a sense of propriety quite distinct from the perception of utility."

37

We approve of the exercise of prudence, justice, generosity, and public
spirit because they appeal to the impartial spectator, not because we

have calculated their consequences.
Smith rejected a utilitarian basis for morality because he was concerned to demonstrate that the criterion of right has a degree of inde-

pendence from individual interests.

He granted that the utility of vir-

tuous actions might be sufficient to recommend them to

men of reflection

and speculation," but utility "is by no means the quality which first
mankind."
recommends such actions to the natural sentiments of the bulk of

38

excite in others
Instead, because "the sentiments which (our acts) naturally

aversion than all their
are the objects of a much more passionate desire or
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other consequences,” 39 rules derived from the
experience of the approval
and disapproval of others are "the only principle
by which the bulk of

mankind are capable of directing their actions.

Yet even this strategy

for grounding social rules merely transfers the source
of morality from
the individual's own interests to the equally arbitrary
interests and

opinions of others.

Smith, however, dealt with this problem by arguing

that "man naturally desires not only to be loved, but to be lovely,
or
to be that which is the natural and proper object of vlove."^^

The desire

for praiseworthiness establishes an internal standard of conduct which ex-

tends beyond the subjectivity of self-interest or desire for approbation.

Smith ultimately appeals to "reason, principle, conscience, the inhabitant
of the breast, the man within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct"

as the source of intentions which are "capable of counteracting the strongest impulses of self-love."

42

The moral person responds "to the applause

of his own breast, as well as to that of others."

43

Although conscience is initially a product of the opinions of others.
Smith portrayed an internal spectator capable of becoming more objective
than actual spectators.

Due to this autonomy of conscience, "real magna-

nimity and conscious virtue can support itself under the disapprobation of
all mankind."

44

Clearly, despite his empiricist grounding of morality in

popular opinion. Smith sought to elevate the voice of conscience above

popular opinion and thus give morality an objectivity which it would otheirwise lack.

Undoubtedly, the voice of conscience represented, for Smith,

the voice of God, although his secularism restrained him from making this
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explicit.

At one point, though.

for persecuted persons;

Smith offered the following consolation

"Religion.

.

.alone can tell them, that it is of

little importance what man may think of their conduct, while the allseeing judge of the world approves of it."^^
The moral philosophy presented in TMS is an intricate construction

whereby empiricist and rationalist elements are interwoven and become

mutually supportive.

Smith quite obviously believed that a benevolent

God had designed nature for the purpose of .promoting the happiness of
mankind, and hence he saw no necessary contradiction between an empiricist theory of morality and a rationalism which was little more than a

mask for religious faith.

However, because he perceived the theoretical

weakness of basing morality exclusively on either method, he elaborated
a model of moral development which contained sufficient viability to be

subsequently resurrected by Mead, Durkheim, and twentieth century phenomenology.
uality.

Central to this model is the notion of reciprocity or mut-

Moral development becomes a function of the quality of inter-

personal relations since standards of conduct emerge only when approbation emanates from others whose authenticity is respected.

II

human
Thus far, we have described a moral philosophy in which the
based on
capacity for reason is nurtured through reciprocal interaction

mutual respect.

Yet this very condition troubled Smith, even in TMS.

of things
perceived that in a market economy, "the natural course

may

He
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produce effects which shock, all (man's) natural sentiments

For

.

example, "the general rules by which prosperity and adversity are

commonly distributed .. .are by no means suited to some of our natural
SGritiments.

Whereas our natural sentiments would prefer to see re-

wards bestowed upon virtue, the market "pays little regard to the
different degrees of merit and demerit which (persons) may seem to
possess in the sentiments and passions of man."

The market will re-

ward an "industrious knave" and overlook and "indolent good man."^^

Market activity also posed a threat to moral development insofar
as it promoted a depersonalized form of social interaction.

A market

society functions as an association of interchangeable individuals,

identical in nature, and interacting anonymously and mechanically through

external ties.

The inner world of values and motives becomes irrelevant

exceptas expressed in outward acts.

Yet Smith had argued that genuine

sympathy and beneficience would occur only when individuals became conscious of their relation to the social totality and internalized the

morality of the impartial spectator.

In the absence of shared intent-

ions and mutual interests, moral development would be stifled.

Despite his reservations. Smith was unwilling to launch a moral
condemnation of the market economy.

To begin with, he argued that such

posturing would be futile since "the natural course of things cannot
be entirely controlled by the impotent endeavors of man:
is too rapid and too strong for him to stop it."

48

the current

Moreover, despite

the market is
its offensiveness, the system of rewards effected by
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"useful and proper for rousing the industry and attention of
mankind.

This essentially utilitarian defense of a system in which "violence
and

prevail over sincerity and justice" ^ should surprise us since
Smith argued that utility "is by no means the quality which first recom-

mends .. .actions to the natural sentiments of the bulk of mankind.
Can Smith expect popular support for a system whose appeal is discernible
only through reflection on its future consequences?

Certainly the ra-

tionality of the masses could not be relied upon to ascertain this truth,
so Smith posited a 'deception’ which, by reconciling sympathy with the

selfish desire to accumulate, would accomplish the task of which reason

was incapable.
The deception consists of believing that "the pleasures of wealth
and greatness ... (are) well worth all the toil and anxiety which we are
so apt to bestow upon it."
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Smith consistently denies that the wealthy

derive much more pleasure from their enhanced ability to consume, but

because we believe that they do, we sympathize with what we imagine to
be their satisfaction and are led to desire and work for wealth ourselves.
Upon attaining this goal, we will find "that wealth and greatness are mere
trinkets of frivolous utility."

However, the actual benefits of wealth

follow from the fact that we are more likely to gain the approval of our
fellow men than if we were poor; "mankind are disposed to sympathize more
entirely with our joy than with our sorrow."

Thus Smith has ironically

managed to base ambition not on a self-seeking materialism, but on the
desire for sympathy.

It is not greed but fellow-feeling which motivates
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economic pursuits.

Having injected an ethical element into market-oriented behavior.
Smith was still concerned about the effects of the ’deception' on the
®o^3.1 fiber of society j

this disposition to admire, and almost to wor-

ship, the rich and powerful ... is .. .the great and most universal cause of

the corruption of our moral sentiments."^^

If we seek the respect and

admiration of mankind, we are presented with "two different models...
according to which we may fashion our own character and behavior."

Un-

fortunately, the model of wisdom and virtue elicits the admiration of
"but a small party," while "the great mob of mankind are the admirers

and worshippers ... of wealth and greatness.

Only competition could guide the pursuit of economic gain into conformity with ethical behavior.

For those who are subject to competition,

"the road to virtue and that to fortune.

.

.are.

.

.very nearly the same."

This happy congruence follows from the fact that "the success of such

people .. .almost always depends upon the favour and good opinion of their

neighbors and equals."

The wealthy, on the other hand, are more inde-

pendent from competitive forces, and hence their "success and preferment
depend, not upon the esteem of intelligent and well-informed equals,

but upon the fanciful and foolish favour of ignorant, presumptuous, and
^ superiors. m57
proud
•

Smith constructed a dilemma which may be best understood by reviewing the following points:

sentiments,

(b)

(a)

market outcomes conflict with natural

this conflict may be resolved by a rational apprecia-
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tion of the consequences of market outcomes, but most people
lack the

capacity to gain this appreciation,

(c) an

alternative resolution to

the conflict requires a deception, but this deception corrupts the
r^^bural sentiments.

Thus Smith is left with the conclusion that market

activities, though they may encourage industrious and prudent conduct,
result in a society which is either unacceptable to moral persons
if if is acceptable,

morality.

gains support only through a corruption of

Admittedly, if all persons had the capacity to view society

"in a certain abstract and philosophical light," they would find that it

"appears like a great, an immense machine, whose regular and harmonious

movements produce a thousand agreeable effects."
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They would discover

that the rich "are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same dis-

tribution of the necessaries of life which would have been made had the
earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants."
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Alas, the majority of people are preoccupied with what is near and fa-

miliar to them and cannot fathom such distant advantages.

Most people

"despair of finding any force upon earth which can check the triumph
of injustice."

For them, the only solace is the "hope that the great

Author of our nature.

.

.will,

in a life to come, render to every one

according to the works which he has performed in this world."
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Smith had developed a view of man as a social being who realizes
his human capacities and achieves the good life through developing his
reason.

Why

then, was he unwilling to place a greater burden on rat-

market
ionality to support the position that individuals could affirm
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outcomes without falling prey to a deception which corrupted them?
Part of the answer, as we have already seen, lies with Smith's acknow-

ledgement that the pursuit of economic gain actually destroys the

conditions for moral development among large sections of the population.

More importantly, however. Smith was committed to a

protrayal

of society as a natural process which human reason could only frustrate

but not alter.

While he was concerned to support a certain degree of

autonomy for reason, he refused to allow reason to stand against the
"natural order of things".

If reason were completely autonomous, then

men could, in the name of reason, seek to impose political restraints
on the market process.

By grounding reason and morality in the natural

sentiments of man. Smith was able to portray political intervention as
an infringement on a natural moral order.
In IMS, Adam Smith developed a coherent theory of justice.

Through

role switching, self-interest and sympathy are fused into individual

conscience.

Society's moral code and rules of justice slowly evolve out

of the consensus of individual consciences.

Smith did not seek to define

the content of justice and morality since rules are products of experi-

ence and hence will vary with experience.

To give positive definition

experience.
to morality would be to assert the autonomy of reason against

Thus Smith referred to justice as merely "a negative virtue,

hinders us from hurting our neighbor."

(which) only

To emphasize the absence of posi-

"we may often fulfill
tive content in the term justice. Smith claimed that

doing nothing.
all the rules of justice by sitting still and
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In restricting justice to the prevention of injury of one
person by

another, Smith was following the Aristotelian notion of ’commutative
justice'.

However, commutative justice does not, by itself, constitute the

whole of justice.

Individuals can be expected to desire not only fair

procedures, but also outcomes which conform to a conception of justice.

An implicit criterion of distributive justice can be found in IMS.
believed that

’’that

Smith

action must appear to deserve reward, which appears

to be the proper and approved object of gratitude."

Moveover, due to

an ’irregularity' of the natural sentiments, a person's merit is judged

by his actions rather than by his intentions.

The man "whose whole con-

versation and deportment express the justest, the noblest, and most generous sentiments, can be entitled to demand no very high reward" unless

he has produced an actual good or service which entitles him to compensation.
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On the other hand, "wealth and greatness, abstracted from merit

and virtue. .almost constantly obtain" our respect.
.
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It is "this dispo-

sition of mankind to go along with all the passions of the rich and powerful" which provides the basis for "the distinction of ranks and the

order of society."

However, as previously noted, this 'disposition'

corrupts morality, and hence Smith could locate no moral justification
for the distribution of wealth and the consequent pattern of rewards.
If we were to portray Smith's original notion of distributive jus-

tice in the economic terminology of

WN,’.

we would say that everyone in

of labor
society jointly labors to produce output, but that the quality

differs according to the social rank of each individual.

Distributive
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justice would entail a division of the social product
in accordance with
the amount and the quality of effort by each individual.
is made more explicit in Smith's transitional works.

This viewpoint
He described the

natural price of a commodity as the equivalent of the wages necessary
to

maintain labor in a given industry.

Commodities would exchange at ratios

determined by embodied labor time, where labor would be weighted according to the social rank of the producer.
In the transitional works. Smith also expressed doubts that commodi-

ties were jointly produced by everyone.

opulence is not according to work.

He noted that "the division of

The opulence of the merchant is great-

er than that of all his clerks, though he works less... Thus, he who as it

were bears the burden of society, has the fewest advantages

Smith

.

implicitly acknowledged that labor produces a surplus and that, as a result, productive effort no longer corresponds with reward.

However, so

long as he clung to his wage theory of natural prices, the existence of

surplus remained an anomoly in his theory of production and distribution.
At this point,

I

turn to WN in order to assess the relationship be-

tween Smith's moral philosophy and his economic theory.
I

At the outset,

propose that Smith was fully aware of the shortcomings of his moral

theory and that his growing interest in political economy was motivated,
at least in part, by his desire to provide a more adequate theory of justice.

Smith was initially committed to a theory of value in which com-

modities exchange at ratios determined by embodied labor time.

He implied

receive
that labor is the sole productive agent and hence should naturally
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the whole of its product.^®

tween two stages of history.

However, he was careful to distinguish be-

Prior to the accumulation of land and capi-

tal, the value of a good was determined by the
quantity of labor necessary
to produce it, and the laborer received the whole
of his product.

em

society

,

In mod-

the laborer must share the product with the capitalist and

the landlord, and hence profits and rent become component parts of
the

natural price.
In interpreting Smith’s theory of value, two dominant and opposing

traditions have emerged.

According to one view. Smith rejected the labor

theory of value as inapplicable to
'

labor— embodied

’

modem

society.

The realization that

could not be the determinant of value in modern society

forced Smith to substitute a ’labor-commanded’ theory whereby the value of
a good is measured (rather than caused) by the labor for which it can be

exchanged.

In modern times, the ’regulator’ or cause of value is simply

the cost of production as determined by the sum of the natural levels of

wages, rent, and profit.

Thus Smith finally arrived at an ’adding-up’

theory, where the natural rates of wages, rent, and profit, as determined

by supply and demand, are taken as independent components of value.
A second interpretation maintains that Smith did intend the labor
theory of value to apply to modern society and that he was thus led to
a ’deduction theory’ of rent and prof it.

Both interpretations, I pro-

pose, fail to capture the full measure of Smith’s intentions.

If we view

the economic theory of WN as being at least partially motivated by Smith

desire to solidify the theory of justice presented in TMS, we perceive

s
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that Smith was not, in his own mind, being
inconsistent in proposing al-

ternative theories of value.

The labor theory was essential to locating

an objective criterion to which market prices must conform
if justice is
to be realized.

On the other hand. Smith sought to legitimize competitive

market prices which, he recognized, must cover the prevailing rate
of
and rent as well as wages.

In order to reconcile the empirical

fact of rent and profit with the criterion of labor as "the real measure
of the exchangeable value of all commodities,"

'labor-commanded* theory.

Smith developed the

He was convinced that he had preserved the

objective criterion of his theory of justice while, at the same time, ac-

counting for the empirical fact that commodities do not exchange in accordance with embodied labor time.
Smith's theory resolves the paradox of surplus, but by placing the

determination of value exclusively within the realm of exchange, it severs
any objective grounding for the component costs of production.

The 'labor-

commanded' theory takes as given the very distribution of wealth whose legitimacy an adequate theory of justice must assess.

Smith's principle error

was not, as many critics have claimed, to ignore utility, but rather it was
to lose any objective measure of real cost.
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If we compare the theory of justice developed in WN to that of TMS,

some interesting analogies appear.

In TMS, moral standards are the pro-

duct of individual consciences developed through social interaction.

However,

the operation of the impartial spectator imparts to those moral standards an

objectivity which makes them somewhat independent of the opinions of mankind.
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The degree of autonomy, however, is held in check by
public opinion and
a sense of fair play.

Thus Smith sought to ground his theory of justice

in both a subjective and an objective realm.

He presented a criterion of

right which is simultaneously the product and the regulator of individual

desires and social behavior.
In WN , the checks and controls on individual self-interests appear to

be absent.

Instead of a community of moral persons seeking mutual approval,

society is portrayed as an aggregation of individuals abstracted from particular identities or purposes.

Smith was content to rely on this abstract

individualism, which he had rejected in TMS, because he perceived that the

impersonal market process could accomplish the same ends as the impartial
spectator.

References to internal moral conflict are absent in WN precisely

because individual moral rectitude was no longer regarded as essential to
socially useful conduct.

With the market process guiding individual conduct

into socially useful channels, reason became an attribute of the market

rather than the Individual.

Whereas Locke had appealed to reason to oblige

men to restrain their desires. Smith believed that the full pursuit of desire would, in the context of a competitive market, establish natural rights

and social order.

Even Smith's value theory bears a resemblance to his moral philosophy.

Just as the interplay of opinions would converge on moral standards, so in-

teraction of supply and demand in markets would determine the natural rates
of wages, rent, and profit.

In TMS, Smith sought to synthesize the relati-

vism of opinion with the notion of absolute standards.

In WN, the contingent
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value of a commodity (i.e., its market price) would
converge on an objec
tive standard of measurement expressed in labor time.

In neither case

were the objective standards fixed; for Smith, the absolute
was Itself
relative to circumstances.

Ill

Smith

s

mature theory of justice involved not so much the displace-

ment of ethics by economics as a synthesis of the two.

He sought to de-

monstrate that in both the moral and the material realms, the free interaction of individual interests would both establish standards of right and
generate outcomes which conformed to those standards.
and material realms would be mutually supportive.

Moreover, the moral

In IMS, Smith expressed

the view that society could subsist in the absence of mutual moral obliga-

tions so long as persons refrained from harming each other.
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By the time

of WN, though, he had apparently swung around to the view that complete

justice requires the operation of the impartial spectator which, we recall,
requires a moral atmosphere for its development.

Smith was quick to criti-

cize any group which subverted the interests of society as a whole by its

unbridled pursuit of self-interest.^^
Not only was justice dependent upon the functioning of the impartial
spectator, but ethical behavior would be fostered by the justice of com-

petitive markets.

Smith noted that "when the greater part of people are

merchants, the^ always bring probity and punctuality into fashion, and
.

.

these, therefore, are the principal virtues of a commercial nation.
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It would appear, then, that Smith managed to resolve
the conflict between

markets and morality which had troubled him in IMS.

He attributed most

of society's misery and vice to social factors which he viewed
as exogen-

ous to the operation of the market.

Specifically, we can locate five as-

pects of society which Smith treated as institutional or biological datum,
^itst, hs undoubtedly believed that the bulk of inequality among persons

was attributable to "the averice and injustice of princes and sovereign
states."

Second, population would grow at'a rate sufficient to exert

a downward pressure on the standard of living of the working class.

Smith

observed that "the demand for men, like that for any other commodity, necessarily regulates the production of men."
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A third factor was "a certain

propensity in human nature... the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange
one thcing for another."
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The trucking propensity was held by Smith to

be the cause of the division of labor and thus was indirectly accountable
for all the misery which accompanies that phenomenon.

Smith blamed the
In a com-

division of labor for the virtual ruination of human dignity.

mercial society, he observed, "all the nobler parts of the human character
may be, in great measure obliterated and extinguished in the great body of
the people."

A fourth factor was the limited availability of land.

Smith

predicted that a stationary state would set in when a country "acquired that
full complement of riches which the nature of its soil and climate, and its
.
situation with respect to other countries, allowed it to acquire.
.

•
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T
in

rents
the stationary, state, both wages and profits would be very low, while

would be high.

Finally, Smith took the distribution of property as an in-
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stitutional datum.

He offered no philosophical justification of
property,

but simply recognized that private property belonged to
a few and took
this as an inevitable fact;

’’it

would be to no purpose to trace further

what might have been (the) effects upon the recompense of wages of
labour"
if property had not accumulated so unevenly.

ft?

It would be tempting to conclude that Smith upheld the sanctity of

market outcomes by portraying the market as valiantly struggling to establish justice despite the inherent obstacles posed by nature and history.

On the contrary, he repeatedly revealed his opposition to market outcomes.
Perceiving that the power of wealth would consistently be put to the task
of subverting the competitive market, he railed against the inequity of

market distributions.

Capitalists were "an order of men, whose interest

is never exactly the same with that of the public, who have generally an

interest to deceive and even to oppress the public and who accordingly
have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it."

"love to reap where they never sowed."
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Landlords

Smith argued that both fairness

and efficiency dictated a larger share of the social product for labor.
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The argument can even be made that Smith was willing to employ the

power of the state to correct the injustices of the market.

He assigned

to government "the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every member

of society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it."

S(

Moreover, he explicitly advocated intervention in certain cases; "those
endanger
exertions of the natural liberty of a few individuals which might

restrained by the
the security of the whole society are, or ought to be,
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laws of all governments."®^

If working class resentment over the

'deceit’

and 'oppression* of the owning classes swelled to the
point of threatensocial order, then Smith's maxim would dictate government re-

^^8

straints on the rights of property.

In order to minimize the likelihood

of this action. Smith was quick to condemn the "sacrifice (of) the
ordi-

nary laws of justice to an idea of public utility, to a sort of reason of
state; an act of legislative authority which ought to be exercised only...
QQ

in cases of the must urgent necessity."

Smith's continual equivocation concerning the merits of the market
has puzzled many readers.

Yet, if we assume that underlying all of Smith's

work was the notion of a theory of justice, his various positions merge
into a whole.

He was seeking to demonstrate that subjective intentions

result in objectively right outcomes.

In order to establish an objective

criterion of right, he had recourse to a rationalist methodology inherited
from Locke; the labor theory of value showed that the market works for
justice.

On the other hand. Smith sought a criterion of right which

would correspond with subjective intentions as manifested in empirical
facts.

His empiricism revealed that non-laborers received part of the

social product and hence that the market was perpetrating injustice.

With

this realization. Smith could have called for a major reconstruction of
the economic order, but, observing that society was stable and prospering,

he concluded that the benefits of the market more than offset any violations
of natural liberty, and thus it ought to be supported.
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Smith was on the threshold of a utilitarian theory of
justice wherein
any 'natural' criterion by which the justice of society
can be assessed is

abandoned.

Like Hume, he seemed to recognize that the justification of

market outcomes ultimately required an appeal to consequences and hence a

utilitarian standard of right.

Smith also perceived, however, a flaw in

utilitarianism which Hume, and subsequently Bentham, failed to comprehend.
Without an objective basis for the criterion of right, the liberal theory
of justice was contingent and ultimately groundless.

Should the justice

of the market be contested, there could be no basis for reasoned arguments
in defense of the status quo.

Thus, much to the bewilderment of later

economists. Smith hung onto the labor theory of value.

His tenacity re-

flected not ignorance (even Locke had known that prices are determined by
supply and demand)', but rather a keen appreciation of the requirements of
a liberal theory of justice.

The inadequacy of a natural law criterion

in the justification of market outcomes made an appeal to utilitarian con-

siderations inevitable.

Smith, though, stopped short of a full-blown

utilitarianism, content to believe that the wisdom of a benevolent God

would not permit natural law and utility to be in ultimate conflict.
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CHAPTER

III

JOHN STUART MILL'S THEORY OF JUSTICE

John Stuart Mill's contribution to social theory is generally
thought to consist of insightful, but limited, advances in the areas
of

methodology, ethics, and economic and political theory.

Conversely,

the consensus among most interpreters of Mill holds that he utterly failed
to construct an internally consistent theoretical

system applicable

to any one, let along all, of the aforementioned disciplines.

A brief

survey of the literature confirms this point.

The theme of "muddlehead-

edness and inconsistency" appears repeatedly.

For some critics. Mill's

theoretical confusion reflects his identity crisis and the resulting
inability to choose between conflicting doctrines.

approach is most

This psychohistorical

prominently represented in the work of Mazlish, but

can also be found in books by Britton, Borchard, and Halliday.^

Other

critics simply find Mill's intellect inadequate to the task at hand.

According to Plamanatz, "he was often bewildered by the intricacies of
his own thought, unaware of the implication of what he had said and of
what still remained to be proved."

In a similar

observation, Sabine

concludes that Mill's theories "were always inadequate to the load that
he made them carry."

2

The specific charge against Mill is that he attempted to encompass
and synthesize diametrically opposed viewpoints.

Anschutz contrasts the

naturalistic and deterministic approach of A System of Logic with the
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romantic notion of self-determination found in On
Liberty

.

Himmelfarb

finds an analogous conflict between the absolute principle
of liberty
in On Liberty and the liberalism found in Utilitarianism
which recognizes

such other values as justice, virt.de, community, tradition, prudence,

and moderation.”

Ryan concludes that there is no "way of patching up

Mill's system which will make it both systematic and persuasive.”^
Mill's reputation has not fared much better in the hands of historians of economic thought.

Jevons set the tone for subsequent opinion

when he labeled Mill's mind "essentially illogical” and described his
philosophy as "intricate sophistry.”

Roll claims that Mill's "economic

theory lacks the logical rigour and his social philosophy the unflinching

consistency which are the outstanding characteristics of the 'systembuilders'.”

Gray exemplifies the long-standing belief that Mill lacked

originality; "Apart from certain elaborations of the theory of foreign
trade, it is doubtful whether Mill added much, or anything, to the body
of economic doctrine.”

Finally, in a less than enthusiastic assessment,

Schumpeter praises Mill for his "stimulating discrepancies of doctrine."

4

Those few theorists who have found a consistent theme in Mill have

often done so by simply suppressing important facets of his thought and
thus portraying his as a dogmatist of some particular hue.

Cowling

accuses Mill of "more than a touch of something resembling moral totali-

tarianism."

Furthermore, Cowling adds, "Mill's liberalism was a dog-

matic, religious one" and his "principle of individuality is designed
to detract from human freedom, not to maximize it."

In a less polemical
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work, McCloskey also cautions that "Mill was seriously
exposed to the

danger of becoming... a moral totalitarian."^
Recently, however, several authors have argued for a comprehensive

unity in Mill's work.

Most notable is John M. Robson who finds "a unity

underlying Mill's mature thought, a unity both of purpose and method,

hidden often in a welter of detail, seldom explicitly formulated, but
always present."

Similarly, John Rees persuasively rejects the notion of

deep-seated conflicts within or between Mill's major works.

In fact,

Rees propses that Mill's conception of liberty cannot be fully understood

apart from his treatment of rights in Utilitarianism .^
I

would like to propose that the diversity of opinion among Mill

scholars is indiciative of a widespread misperception of Mill's self-

conceived intention as a social theorist.

The impetus for my claim is

John Rawls' recent attempt to reconstruct the liberal theory of justice.^
In addition to its contemporary relevance, Rawls' work makes us more

sensitive to the strengths and shortcomings of previous theorists.

In

the case of Mill, much apparent inconsistency may be resolved if his

theoretical constructions in the areas of methodology, ethics, politics,
and economics are viewed as components of a more or less conscious attempt
to forge a coherent theory of justice in which conflicting class inter-

ests are both recognized and granted legitimacy.

Thus

I

shall join with

Robson and Rees in arguing for an underlying unity in Mill's thought,
but

I

shall attempt to show that the theme of that unity is justice.
In the first section of this chapter,

I

examine the material and

.
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intellectual trends leading up to Mill.

Toward the end of the eighteenth

century, changing material conditions rapidly eroded
the legitimacy of

Adam Smith's theory of justice.

The two major candidates for a post-

Smithian theory of justice, Benthamite Utilitarianism and Ricardian

political economy, were insufficiently comprehensive in light of the
increasing class divisions of the period.

Bentham's theory lacked an

objective criterion of right capable of appealing to conflicting interests, while Ricardo's system left no room for subjective intentions and

aspirations
The second section contains an interpretation of Mill's ethical

theory as furnishing the objective criterion of right which was lacking
in traditional utilitarianism, while in the third section, I shall argue

that Mill's theory of justice was designed to appeal to the aspirations
of an emerging working class.

From this perspective. Mill will appear

not as a muddleheaded romantic, but as an intellect who, more than any

other liberal social theorist of the nineteenth century, was acutely

aware of the requirements facing a coherent liberal theory of justice.

Mill's reputation has suffered precisely because he did not shrink from
the task of constructing a comprehensive rational criterion by which the

justice of society could be assessed; he pursued the implications of
that criterion even to the extent of questioning major institutional

aspects of capitalism.

In the end, the inadequacy of Mill's theory

stems not so much from internal inconsistency as from his inability to
grasp key elements of capitalism.

In the fourth section, we shall see
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that the Millian theory of justice assumes that
individual preferences

will follow a path of rational development toward virtue and
selfactualization, but in practice, a capitalist economy poses obstacles
to
individual moral development which Mill failed to comprehend.

I

Beginning around 1780, England entered a period of accelerated
social change.

The mutually reinforcing phenomena of technological

advance and a resurgence of the Enclosure movement led to increases in

both the supply of and demand for free and mobile wage laborers.

The

ascendency of mobile property and competitive market relations placed
a growing strain on prevailing notions of justice which incorporated

elements of natural law.

The tension, felt most acutely by intellectuals

and theorists, had several facets. First, appeals to either reason or

natural sentiments were viewed as insufficiently objective.

Prejudices

could masquerade as legitimate norms and no grounds would exist for
rational assessment.

This fear became more pronounced with the perception

that opposing class perspectives would undermine moral dialogue.

The

prominence of natural rights in the ideological justification of the
French and American revolutions served to discredit natural law and appeals to reason as bases for liberal theory.

We should not conclude,

however, that natural rights were jettisoned simply to avoid their revo-

lutionary implications.

Progressive thinkers perceived that inviolable

property rights posed an obstacle to social harmony.

In certain instances.
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thfei.igood

of society could be advanced through the limited abrogation of

property rights.

A second motive for rejecting natural rights came from the incoherence
of Adam Smith's theory of justice.

His backward-looking notion of justice

entailed linking rewards with effort (i.e., labor expended).

Yet, byi Smith's

own admission, the uneven accumulation of land and capital caused product
prices, and hence factor payments, to diverge from the labor standard.

Smith's weak attempt to avoid the conclusion of exploitation by resorting to
a 'labor-commanded' theory of value was apparently not persuasive even to

himsdlf
system.

,

as indicated by his numerous remarks on the inequity of the market
By switching to a forward-looking theory of justice, where consequences

become the standard of justification, theorists hoped to eliminate all notions
of fixed entitlements or duties.

Another aspect of Smith's theory of justice gave rise to a third motive
for eliminating appeals to reason or natural sentiments in liberal theory.

Smith had carefully described the interpersonal process by which rampant

egoism would be held in check by an 'impartial spectator' within each person.
Central to Smith's theory of moral development was the phenomenon of mutual

recognition and approbation between persons based on shared values.

Smith

of invoiced his fears that the market process would impede the formation

that
dividual conscience, and subsequent theorists saw little evidence

exchange-oriented system
egoistic behavior would be curbed in an impersonal,
of social relations.

Optimism concerning social stability would have to

so that individuals could simulbe based on an assumed harmony of interests

.
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taneously be egoistic and fulfill their moral obligations.
The attack on natural rights served a dual purpose; a purpose
that was

conservative and, at the same time, progressive.

The elimination of any

natural criterion of right which might be employed to challenge the justice
of the status quo freed the accumulation process to follow the course of

the maximum self-expansion of capital with no

resulting contours of society.

^

priori constraints on the

In addition, however, disposing of natural

rights opened the door to working class interests, so long as appeals were

couched in terms of consequences rather than deserts.

This dual nature of

early nineteenth century liberalism reflected the paradox of defending, on
one hand, the legitimacy of property against the challenge' ^ef the developing

working class movement and seeking, on the other hand, to extend liberalism’s
base of support in order to solidify its strength against the landed aristocracy.

The primary appeal which liberal theorists offered to the working

class was a strong opposition to fixed status, hierarchy, and arbitrary
authority.

i

Property would be a social convention, and hence the rules of

justice would be open to revision in the light of new knowledge and revised

circumstances
The opposition to natural rights, under the leadership of Jeremy Bentham
took the form of Utilitarianism.

Bentham sought a doctrine which would have

widespread appeal and, at the same time, not stir up the revolutionary fervor
which had engulfed France.

Although Bentham never used the term, Utilitarian

ism can be viewed as ’a theory of justice'.

It offers a criterion of right

which is purported to be both appealing and compelling,

Bentham claimed to
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have constructed a rational basis for determining rights and duties simply
by taking human nature and society as they exist.

Individuals were assumed

to be pleasure maximizers and thus infinitely desirous of consumable objects.

Society was taken to be nothing more than the aggregation of these individuals.
If individuals are infinite consumers, then clearly all desires or intentions

cannot possibly be met.

In order to avoid social unrest, this disappointment

must be seen to flow from an impartial and equitable process.

In other words,

each individual's inability to fully realize his essence must be attributed
either to personal inadequacy or to 'necessary' conditions imposed by nature.
If this is accomplished, disppointment should not translate into resentment

or envy toward those who have fared better, and social stability can be

maintained.
In order to generate consensus on questions concerning rights and justice,

Bentham wanted to prove the existence of a single criterion of right which
no rational man could reject.

Although he recognized the legitimacy of

both deductive and inductive proofs in other areas, Bentham admitted that
the single criterion of right, by its very nature, was insusceptible to

formal proof.

Thus his approach consisted of refuting all candidates for

the criterion other than the principle of utility.

He rejected appeals to

right reason, common sense, natural law, or moral sentiment on the grounds
that they provided no "extrinsic ground" for moral judgements.

tham 's view.
What one expects to find in a principle is something that
points out some external consideration as a means of warapprobation
ranting and guiding the internal sentiments of

From Ben-
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and disapprobation; this expectation is but ill fulfilled
by a proposition which does neither more nor less than hold
up each„of those sentiments as a ground and standard for
itself.
S^ritham s goal of eradicating the infludnce of feeling on morality

and subjecting moral judgements to rational assessment was quite different from Locke’s conception of uncovering a rational natural law.

Reason,

for Bentham, was not an 'inner light' to be consulted in the quest for
right, but rather a calculating assessment of objectively measurable con-

sequences flowing from acts or rules.

Any theory not grounded in conse-

quences, whether it appealed to reason or to sentiments, was, according
to Bentham,

'subjective' and hence incapable of offering a principle

which could command the assent of different persons.

Thus in the hands

of the Utilitarians, the classical liberal methods of rationalism and

empiricism underwent a peculiar transformation.

By disclaiming any

reliance on subjective knowledge, the Utilitarians firmly aligned themselves with the empiricist side of liberal theory as developed by Hume
out of Locke's dual epistemology.

Yet the Utilitarians were actually

rationalists insofar as they believed that reason could disclose objective
grounds for moral decisions.

They believed that their rationalism avoided

the subjectivity of Lockean rationalism because they focused on interper-

sonally verifiable consequences rather than

_a

priori assumptions.

Utilitarianism does involve assumptions of a nonempirical nature.

Yet
First,

for happiness.
all individuals are assumed to have roughly equal capacities

exist between pleasSecond, it is assumed that no qualitative differences

.
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ures so that pleasures and pains are susceptible to being the objects of
a rational calculus.

Third, pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain

are assumed to be the sole motivating forces behind human behavior and
the maximization of utility is made the criterion of right; thus the

moral person is obligated to act so as to maximize social utility.
The Utilitarians were also mistaken in thinking that the measurement
of pleasures and pains resulting from acts and rules can be an entirely

objective process.

The ultimate ramifications of any particular act are

potentially infinite, and thus assessing consequences must necessarily
involve a subjective judgement as to which consequences are reasonable to
include.

More significantly, pleasures and pains are themselves subjective

phenomena, and although Bentham went to great lengths to describe the various dimensions of pleasure and pain and thus to make plausible the notion
of measurement, he acknowledged that sensations were not interpersonally

commensurable
Tis vain to talk of adding quantities which after the addition
will continue distinct as they were before, one man's happiness
will never be another man's happiness: a gain to one man is not
gain to another: you might as well pretend to add twenty apples
to twenty pears, which after you had done that could not be forty
of any one thing but twenty of each just as there were before.
argues
After affirming the incommensurability of pleasures, Bentham then
that we must proceed as though the opposite were true.
however,
This addibility of the happiness of different subjects,
is a poswhen considered rigorously, it may appear fictitious,
reasoning
pblitical
all
which
of
tulatum without the allowance
is at a standstill.

utility is ultimately an appeal
Thus Bentham 's defense of the principle of

87

to faith.

The principle could only remain practicable as a basis for

social organization if it was assumed that major institutions and pre-

vailing patterns of behavior were naturally .-oriented toward the maximization of utility.

Bentham made this assumption;

he posited a nat-

ural harmony of interests, at least in the economic sphere, and thus a
laissez faire policy would maximize social utility.

Another consequence of the harmony of interests assumption was that
individuals motivated purely by jileasure could pursue their interests

without violating their moral obligations to serve the general interest.

Bentham did recognize short-run
due to insufficient education.

11

conflicts of interest that might arise
Thus, in the political sphere, the legis-

lator should create an artificial harmony of interests by providing in-

centives and punishments to insure that individuals would associate
their own pleasure with the general well-being of society.

Even in the

economic sphere, utility maximization may require some redistributive

intervention on the part of the State.

If all persons have equal capa-

cities for pleasure, then, assuming a diminishing marginal utility for
money,

it would seem to follow that utility would be maximized with a

perfectly equal distribution of wealth.

Bentham initially agreed;

The

more nearly the actual proportion (of wealth) approaches to equality,
the greater will be the total mass of happiness."

siderations must enter into a redistributive scheme.
only a foundation of expectations.
the thing said to be possessed,

.

However, other con-

Since "property is

.of deriving certain advantages from

any threat to the oertalntyoof this
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expectation may be destabilizing and destroy the original
harmony of
interests.

Thus Bentham rejected the supposition that greater
equality

increase social utility; "When security and equality
are in opposition, there should be no hesitation:
way.

equality should give

..15

Just as Bentham believed that the long-run interests of society would
be best served by a laissez faire economic policy, he held that the need
for legislative intervention in the political sphere would decrease as

time passed.

His optimism was based on his belief in a human proclivity

for benevolence, sympathy, and a disinterested viewpoint;
the general and standing bias of every man’s nature is,
therefore, towards that side to which the force of the
social motives would determine him to adhere. This being
the case, the force of the social motives tends co^^inually to put an end to that of the dissocial ones.

James Mill’s associationist psychology persuaded Bentham to formulate the
'law of progressive sympathy’.

As society developed, the process of in-

dustrialization and socialization would cause people to become "everyday
more virtuous than on the former day."
if ever,

They "will continue to do so till,

they naturally shall have arrived at its perfection.

Utilitarianism was viewed by its proponents as providing a theory of
justice superior to those of Locke and Smith which had been based at least

partially on natural rights.

By rejecting a natural criterion of right,

Bentham believed that he had freed social theory and social policy from
any metaphysical entanglements which might pose obstacles to the most rapid possible expansion of social utility.

Yet it was precisely the absence
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of a natural criterion which rendered Benthara's theory
inadequate as a
i

theory of justice.

Both Locke and Smith had perceived that a theory

of justice based solely on empiricism will fail to provide an
objective

criterion of right capable of appealing to conflicting interests.

Ben-

tham’s claim to have developed an objective criterion (i.e., maximum
social utility) remains plausible only so long as a natural harmony of
interests prevails.

If any conflict of interest is admitted, then inter-

personal comparisons of utility must be made in order to ascertain the
position of maximum social utility.

At that point, Bentham’s theory

loses its objectivity as class interests vie with one another to deter-

mine whose pleasures and pains will count most.

Political obligation

becomes totally contingent as each individual assesstJthe advantages of

obedience versus resistance.

Benthara fully recognized this implication;

he noted that for each person, the decisive factor in deciding whether
or not to revolt must be "his own internal persuasion of a balance of

utility on the side of resistance."

18

Ironically, then. Utilitarianism, which had begun as a theoretical

device for eliminating dogma and inflexibility from liberal theory, ended

with destroying any objective justification for the capitalist system.
By focusing on the forward-looking notion of consequences rather than the

backward-looking notion of merit. Utilitarianism undermined the ordinary
conception of justice as reward in accordance with merit.
nition of rights was made the object of contestation.

The very defi

Those groups having

own interests would
the political power to weight consequences in their

—
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thereby have the power to determine rights and justice.

Thus Bentham’s

utilitarianism could serve as a functional ideology only so long
as
a widespread belief in a natural harmony of interests
prevailed.

the

erne rgingfc lass

By 18A0,

consciousness of the working class effectively destroyed

this condition.
I

turn now to the other major intellectual trend connecting Adam Smith

and John Stuart Mill

— David

Ricardo’s political economy.

Unlike Smith, who

concentrated on the growth of national income, Ricardo was more concerned

with its distribution among the three classess
and laborers.

— landlords,

capitalists,

Wliile Ricardo's theory is not usually thought of as a theory

of justice, it served the purpose of demonstrating that those aspects of
the distribution process which were dependent on human intentions did

conform to an objective criterion of right.

However, the fundamental de-

terminants of the division of the social product were, according to Ricardo,

phenomena over which society had no- control and hence they could not be
called either just or unjust.
Ricardo contracted his economic theory around three natural phenomena
the fertility of the soil,

the rate of population growth, and the develop-

ment of technology in agriculture.

According to Malthus' population theory,

long-run wages would be determined by the subsistence standard of living.
Profits per worker, in turn, would be determined by the difference between
the marginal product of labor applied to the marginal, or least fertile,

land under cultivation and the subsistence wage.

Then, given the fertility

the surplus over
of the soil and agricultural productivity, rent was simply
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and above wages and profit on all inframarginal land.

From the Ricardian

viewpoint, the economy advanced when improvements in agricultural pro-

ductivity led to increases in profits (determined by the surplus over

wages for production on the no-rent, marginal land).

In turn, rising

profits would increase the rate of capital accumulation which would result
in a larger 'wages-fund* to advance to workers as wages.

However, rising

wages would cause the population to increase which would necessitate the

cultivation of inferior land, leading to falling profits, a slower rate
of increase in the 'wages-fund

growth.

'

,

and finally a slowing of population

Thus the long run distribution of the social product was por-

trayed as an objectively determinateoprocess

.

The technical conditions of

production in agriculture determined the prevailing rate of profit, the
subsistence standard of living determined the wage rate, and rent comprised the remainder of the value of output.

Only one element is missing.

Unless it is assumed that the economy produces only a single product, some

measure of value is needed in order to compare the total value of the
different distributive shares through time.

Since Ricardo sought to

ground his theory of distribution exclusively in the conditions of production, he rejected Smith's 'labor-commanded' theory of value.

He argued

that labor— commanded "is subject to an many fluctuations as the commodities

compared with it," and therefore it cannot serve as "an invariable standard,
indicating correctly the variations of dJther things.

20

Ricardo believed

invariable
that only a 'labor-embodied' theory of value could provide an

standard.

actuHe was not troubled by the fact that commodities did not

1
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ally exchange at ratios determined by embodied labor time
because he

understood that different capital/labor ratios and durations of the

P^^^^^bion process in different industries would cause actual exchange
ratios to deviate from the ratios of embodied labor time.

For Ricardo,

this phenomenon made the labor theory of value inexact, but he still

considered it the best theory of relative prices. 2

A determinate theory of the economic process cannot, by itself,
remove the distribution

of.

output from the realm of moral assessment.

Conceivably, state intervention could alter the initial conditions of
the economy so as to give a preferred outcome.

Thus, if Ricardo's

theory is to serve as a theory of justice supporting market outcomes,
it must show not only that those outcomes are determinate, but also

that the initial conditions underlying those outcomes are acceptable
to rational persons.

This second requirement can be met by demonstratFor this purpose,

ing a natural harmony of interests in capitalism.

the labor theory of value can be employed to show the justice of the

static laws of exchange in competitive markets.

However, Ricardo's

dynamic theories of population, rent, wages, and profits reveal funda-

mental conflicts of interest between the classes.

Since rent is the

residual after wages and profits have been deducted from the social
product, the interests of the landlords are opposed to those of both

capitalists and workers.

,

Furthermore, Ricardo's claim that wages and

clash
profits vary inversely with each other would seem to indicate a

between the interests of workers and capitalists.

Yet, aside from vol-
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untary limitations on population growth, Ricardo
believed that high

profits and rapid accumulation held the only hope for
improvement in
the workers* standard of living.

Thus he does argue for a certain

degree of harmony between capitalists and workers, but he was more

concerned to show that any attempts by workers to forcefully push up
their wages would necessarily result in lower profits.

Conversely,

any successful attempts by employers to push down wages would result
in higher profits.

Significantly, both these cases (i.e., workers com-

bining to raise wages and employers combining to lower wages) are based
on violations of the rules of the competitive market.

Thus Ricardo

might be defended as having demonstrated a harmony of interests between

capitalists and workers within the rules of competitive markets.
even this qualified statement cannot be supported.

Yet

In the third edition

of his Principles , Ricardo argued that if more capital were invested in

machinery, then less capital would be available to pay wages.

Thus the

ordinary process of accumulation and investment creates unemployment as

machines displace workers.

We must conclude, therefore, that Ricardo

did not support the notion of a harmony of interests between any of the

classes in capitalist society.
Without the harmony of interests doctrine, Ricardo's theory collapses
as a theory of justice.

True, he had located an objective criterion of

right (i.e., abstract labor time), and he delineated the determining role
of the

'natural* constants; distribution was portrayed as the outcome of

individual effort operating under 'natural' >'.oonstraints.

However, Ricardo
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took as a constant something that was increasingly
the subject of conflict

the distribution of property.

His dismal prognotications assumed

man’s powerlessness to alter the conditions of his existence.

One of

these conditions was supposed to be the prevailing distribution of property, yet the Utilitarians were engaged in destroying the ’natural’

aspect of property rights.

Simultaneously, the working class began to

exert its newly realized political clout.

With the legitimacy of pro-

perty rights under attack, the labor theory of value could be employed
to reveal exploitation rather than harmony arising from the exchange of

value-equivalents in a capitalist market.

Under these conditions, the

need for a reformulation of the liberal theory of justice was urgent.
Both the Utilitarian’s forward-looking appeal to consequences in terms
of pleasure and painland Ricardo’s backward-looking appeal to abstract

labor time had failed to provide an objective criterion of right for
a society built around fundamental conflicts of interest.

The search

for a viable liberal theory of justice would occupy the bulk of John

Stuart Mill’s intellectual energies for the next several decades.

II

The complexity of Mill’s philosophy demands a step-by-step recon-

struction of his theory of justice.

In this section,

I

shall examine

the methodological underpinnings of Mill’s ethics before proceeding to
a full elaboration of his theory of justice in the following section.

At the outset,

I

acknowledge the inherent difficulty of developing a
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consistent interpretation of a philosopher who has
alternately been
labeled a rationalist and an empiricist, a nominalist
and a realist, a

materialist and an idealist, and an advocate of free will
and determinism.

Clearly, I must demonstrate a great deal of ingenuity on
Mill's

part in order to argue that he successfully spanned these
diametrically

opposed philosophical traditions.

I

begin by outlining the alleged con-

flicts within Mill's logic and scientific method.

Mill aligned himself firmly with the school of experience as opposed
to intuition, and thus he was attracted to inductive logic.

Normally,

induction can only lead to empirical generalizations, but Mill sought
a demonstrative theory of inductive proof.

The very notion of induc-

tive proof presupposes a thoroughly rationalist conception of nature,

and Mill's cosmology presents just such a view.

Nature means the sum of all phenomena, together with
the causes which produced them; including not only
all that happens but all that is capable of happening;
the unused capabilities of causes being as much a^gart
of the idea of Nature as those which take effect.
Thus, for Mill, experienced phenomena must always be analyzed by con-

necting them with underlying natural laws.

In terms of logic, particulars

are simply expressions of underlying universals.

Mill postulates a law of universal causation behind all phenomena.
This law is discovered empirically and proven inductively, but, once
proven, it permits inference from "particulars to particulars".

Mill's

notion of inductive proof seems to lead him to the conclusion that certainty is attainable through scientific experimentation.

His theory of
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the syllogism, on the other hand, states that universals
are merely col-

lections of particulars, and thus all inferences must be
uncertain.

Ac-

tually, this switching from a realist to a nominalist theory
of universals
is more apparent than real.

Mill's universal laws of nature are more

accurately described as inferences from his cosmology rather than as
inductions from experience.

He maintained that

the nature and laws of things in themselves, or of the
hidden causes of the phenomena which are the objects of
experience appeaj^to us radically inaccessible to the
human faculties.

The conflict between Mill's realism and his nominalism is further

les-^

sened if we understand that the particulars in the theory of the syllo-

gism are, from Mill's viewpoint, the sensations of states of consciousness produced by the universal laws of nature.

Thus Mill's deductive or

ratiocinative method should actually be less uncertain than he admits,

while his 'inductive method, with its reliance on rationalist assumptions,
provides nothing approaching proof or certainty.
The overwhelming tendency of Mill's philosophy supports the view
that inductive generalizations can never be fully proved.

Even when em-

pirical laws are connected by deduction with previously postulated laws
of nature, they must still be only approximations of an unknowable reality.

What, then, is to be gained by the postulation of universal laws?

To

answer this, we must understand that Mill's dual motivation in refining

methodology was to both demolish the intellectual stranglehold which intuitionism held on moral reasoning and to establish a new scientific basis
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for moral and political theory.

Thus his efforts to develop a theory of

inductive proof were aimed at depriving intuitionism of "the appeal it
is accustomed to make to the evidence of mathematics and of the cognate

branches of physical science."
school of Locke and Bentham'

,

Yet despite his adherence to 'the

Mill was not an empiricist.

He always

maintained that while experience furnishes all the material of knowledge,
experience must be connected with universal laws before it can provide a
suitable basis for understanding.
Being unable to examine the actual contents of our consciousness until our earliest, which are necessarily our
most firmly knit associations, are fully formed, we cannot study the original elements of mind in the facts of
our present consciousness. These original elements can
only come to light as residual phenomena by a previous
study of the mental elements which are confessedly not
original.

Mill was convinced that with the concepts of sensation and association, he had uncovered the basis for a science of the formation of character.

Furthermore, since "human beings in society have no properties but

those which are derived from and may be resolved into, the laws of the

nature of man," Mill holds that "the laws of the phenomena of society
are, and can be, nothing but the laws of the actions and passions of

human beings united together in the social state."

27

Thus social science

will be deductive because it begins with "the laws of nature of individual
man".

Social science cannot be inductive because in social affairs, a

effects are
"p lurality of causes exists in almost boundless excess and

another."
for the most part inextricably interwoven with one

Yet Mill
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does not dismiss the role of observation and experience in social science.
He notes that

the ground of confidence in any concrete deductive science
is not the a priori reasoning itself, but the accordance
between its results and those of observation a posteriori.
Either of these processes, apart from the other, diminishes
in value as the subject increases in complication.

We may conclude that Mill's logic and scientific method are built
around a synthesis of a realist and nominaliS;t theory of universals
and also aosynthesis of an

knowledge.

^

priori and an experientialist theory of

The connecting thread for this curious amalgam is Mill's

cosmology; Nature is an arena of orderly cause and effect relations.

Consciousness, fully a part of this natural process, can register sensations and make associations, but the laws of the universe; '.are effectively removed from the realm of certain knowledge.

We must rely on

experience and observation, but, at the same time, we will be unable
to decipher Nature without tfaeoadd of,

a.

prioric reasoning.

Paradoxically

then. Mill's commitment to experience does not deny the existence of

universal laws, nor does his commitment to a priori postulates deny
the necessity of observation.

Mill's fundamentally rationalist cos-

mology combined with his experientialist epistemology allows him to
have it both ways.

Turning now to Mill's ethics, we find similar conflicts apparent
in his writings.

His cosmology leads to a thoroughly naturalistic view

of man as a locus of interacting laws of nature.

Mill was thus drawn to

view of knowledge.
a deterministic view of man and a relativistic

At
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the same time, however, he admired the free-will
doctrine for "keeping
in view precisely that portion of the truth which
the word Necessity puts

out of sight, namely, the power of the mind to co-operate
in the formation
of its own character." 30

Mill

s

appreciation of free-will does not, however, prevent him from

asserting the determining effect of circumstances in the last instance;
Our character is formed by us as well as for us; but the
wish which induces us to attempt to reform it is formed
for us... by our experience.
Thus we do have the power to alter our character so long as we wish to

use it, and Mill places a moral obligation upon mankind to alter both
the conditions of existence and individual character.

The duty of man is to co-operate with the beneficient
powers (of nature) not by imitating but by perpetually
striving to amend the course of nature and bringing
that part of it over which they can exercise control
more nearly into donformity with a high standard of
justice and goodness.
,

—

The artificially created, or at least artificially perfected, nature of the best and noblest human beings,
the only nature which it is ever commendable to follow.
By what standard would Mill have men determine the ethically superior

role models and conditions of existence?

Again, we find apparent conflict.

Mill seemingly wants a deductive ethics; he stresses the need for a first
principle in moral philosophy if human conduct is to be rationally justified;

There must be some standard by which to determine the
goodness or badness, absolute and comparative, of ends
And whatever that standard is,
or objects of desire.
for if there were several ulti—
there can be but one;
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mate principles of conduct, the same conduct might be
approved by one of those principles and condemned by
another; and there would be needed, some more general
principle as umpire between them.
The standard Mill proposes is, of course, the principle of utility.

Yet

he is unwilling to accept its Benthamite version; Bentham’is abstract de-

ductive reasoning was based on an overly simplified account of a complex

empirical reality.

Mill noted that under Bentham’s influence, progres-

sive thought had become "abstract and metaphysical", while conservative
thought, as exhibited by Coleridge, at least had the strength of being

"concrete and historical".

35

Utilitarianism tended to ignore the aspi-

rations and experiences of individuals in its determination of rights
and duties.

Mill's introduction of the doctrine of Individuality and

of qualitative distinctions between pleasures was intended to make Utili-

tarianism more concrete and inductive rather than, as mo^t critics have
claimed, to inject a rational or metaphysical element into Bentham's

philosophy.

The confusion arises from the supposition that Mill wanted

a standard of pleasureas a basis for a deductive ethics and hence a justi-

fication for a reorganization of society along elitist lines.

Quite to

the contrary, he objected to modeling moral science after Newtonian physics.

According to Mill, the task of the scientist in the moral disci-

plines is to develop empirical laws on the basis of observation and then
naverify these laws by deducing them from the postulated laws of human
ture.

for
But the empirical laws cannot determine the correct behavior

because they can
an individual nor the correct policy for a legislator

only

determined ethical ends.
be applied to the fulfillment of separately
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The formulation of these ends falls under the category
of Art rather than
Science.

Mill's ethics can be described as concrete and inductive in
yet
a more fundamental way.

Mill was willing to grant the validity of the

principle of utility only if utility was "grounded on the permanent
terests of man as a progressive being."

in-^

At the same time, he was

unwilling to define the content of these interests since to do so would
require a purely deductive ethics.

Mill's solution was to encourage a

diversity of lifestyles and let experience prove which ones are superior.
The worth of different modes of life should be proved
practically .. .Unless there is a corresponding diversity
in their modes of life, (men) neither obtain their fair
share of happiness, nor grow up to the mental, moral,
and aesthetic stature of which their nature is capable.

Implicit in Mill's proposal is the asumption that individuals, in their
drive to maximize utility, will compare personalities and lifestyles ex-

hibited by others when choosing their own.

More importantly, the cogency

of Mill's position depends on the further assumption that individuals

exposed to different lifestyles will indeed choose those which are

ethically superior.

In a sense, this second assumption is tautological,

since Mill proposes that in any situation of choice between Alternatives,
"the judgement of those who are qualified by knowledge of both, or if they

differ, that of the majority amongst them, must be admitted as final."

38

Thus the fact that certain lifestyles are popular should serve as prima

facie evidence of their ethical superiority, but Mill is uncomfortable

with such extremeiiirelativisra.

In its present imperfect condition, society
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does not afford many individuals the opportunity to experience diversity

and thus be cognizant of preferred lifestyles.

The pressure for conform-

ity is immense and tends to stifle the desire to alter one’s personality.
Thus, while knowledge of alternatives is a necessary condition for the

transformation of preference, individual initiative is the sufficient
condition.

Mill believed that one or both may be absent in society.

To sum up Mill’s ethics,

i.

then, we may recognize the potential incomr

patibility of his varying degrees of commitment to deductive and inductive
methods, determinist and free-will doctrines, and experientialist and

rationalist criteria of right.

Yet underlying these tensions is Mill’s

unwavering commitment to the belief that Nature, including man, is more
that just exhibited phenomena.

It includes ”t'he unused capabilities of

causes... as much... as those which take effect.”

The moral duty of man-

kind is to fully realize the potential inherent in Nature, but to fulfill
We must not

this obligation, both knowledge and desire are necessary.
fall into

the error of expecting that the regeneration of mankind, if
practibable at all, is to be brought about exclusively by
the cultivation of what (many of our social reformers) somewhat loosely term the reasoning faculty; forgetting. .that,
even supposing perfect knowledge to be attained, no good
will come of it, unless the ends, to^^hich the means have
been pointed out, are first desired.
.

The realization of Nature’s potential must be pursued artistically
as well as scientifically, inductively as well as deductively.

The good

the developsociety will both reflect individual desires and facilitate

ment of new and superior desires.

Mill is a moral relativist to the ex-
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tent that he acknowledges man's inability to discern an
objective criterion
is an absolutist insofar as he believes that competition

among diverse views must converge on a superior position.

This fundamental

necessity for diversity leads Mill to the belief that moral advancement
liberty, and that liberty, in turn, must be based on justice.

rC'

In

the following section, I shall analyze Mill's theory of justice.

Ill

Mill came to intellectual maturity in an increasingly polarized political environment.

The natural harmony of interests doctrine had been dis-

credited, but without it, liberal social theory was adrift; there was no

longer an ethical basis for laissez faire, yet neither were there any functional norms to guide alternative policies.
for the

^

Having eliminated any basis

priori determination of rights, the Utilitarians themselves could

not offer an effective criterion for the weighing of consequences.

Thus

the Benthamite theory of justice made the definitions of right and just the

objects of social conflict.
Mill was acutely aware of the ideological vacuum left by Bentham and
of the urgency of filling that vacuum in the face of the increasing challenge
of socialism;

Even those who take the most unfavorable view of the changes
in our social arrangements which are demanded with increasing
energy on behalf of the working classes, would be wise to
consider that when claims are made which are partly just and
partly beyond the limits of justice, it is no less politic
than honest to concede with a good will all that is just, and
able to
take their defensive stand on the line, if they
find it, which separates justice from injustice.

.
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In order to understand how Mill drew the line
between justice and injustice,

we begin with his principle of liberty which may be
expressed as follows:
The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any m^^ber of a civilized community is to prevent harm
to others.
Clearly, the cogency of this principle requires some specification of
what
sorts of disutilities experienced by others are to be counted as ’harm'.

Mill states that any psychic disutility arising from actions which are

merely offensive to another persons values must be tolerated and cannot
serve as grounds for an infringement of liberty.
to defining ’harm’

The closest Mill comes

is a reference to "injuring the interests of

which ought to be considered as rights."

42

..

.another.

.

But this leaves us in no better

position than before; we now need a definition of rights.
The Benthamite notion of rights is too vague for Mill because it leaves
the individual open to possible subjugation in the interest of advancing

social utility.

In their short-sightedness, legislators may give insufficient

weight to the benefits over time of maintaining diversity.

Yet Mill was

determined not to abandon the principle of utility since without it, morality
would lose the essential single criterion of right.

The dilemma facing Mill

is thus to define rights and explain the claims of justice in utilitarian

terms while simultaneously defending an absolute principle of liberty and

developing a theory of justice which conforms with common notions linking
rewards to merit or desert.

Mill approaches the task by acknowledging that justice is frequently
thought of as having a basis in natural instincts and thus posing an alter-

;
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native criterion of right to the principle
of utility.

Mill even agrees

that the original source of the sense of
justice is the animal desire for

retaliation which comes from
of sympathy.”

’’the

impulse of self-defence and the feeling

But these sentiments are not, in themselves, moral
and do

not become so until they are;

united with a conviction that the infliction of punishment
in such case is conformable to the general good, and when
the impulse is not allowed, to carry us beyond the point at
which the conviction ends.

When the sentiments underlying the sense of justice have been fully moralized,
we will observe
just persons resenting a hurt to society, though not otherwise a hurt to themselves, and not resenting a hurt to themselves, however painful, unless it be of the kind which society has a common interest with them in the repression of.^^
So far. Mill has only shown that mankind has the capacity to develop
a sense of justice.

He still needs to explain the requirements of justice

and to prove that they do not conflict with the principle of utility.

In

an effort to differentiate the requirements of justice from other moral

obligations. Mill claims that justice entails ’’duties of perfect obligation...
in virtue of which a correlative right resides in some person or persons.”

This is hardly a satisfactory explanation of justice; to say that the rules
of justice are transgressed when a person’s rights have been violated is

tautological and hence vacuous.

However, Mill subsequently clarifies his

position

When we call anything a person's right, we mean that he has
a valid claim on society to protect him in the possession of
it, either by force of law, or by that of education and opinion.

6
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We begin to suspect that we are being led in a
circle, but Mill does expalin that these 'valid claims’ may arise on the basis
of formal laws or
simply from a tacit understanding concerning consideration
among persons.
If laws are violated, the government should intervene,
but for the mere

disappointment of a legitimate expectation, "the offender may... be
punished
by opinion, though not by law."

Mill warns of the danger of allowing

government to punish violations of justice which do not break the law;

We should be glad to see just conduct enforced and injustice
repressed, even in the minutest details, if we were not, with
reason, afraid of trusting the magistrate with so unlimited
an amount of power over individuals.
Does Mill's theory of justice, then, effectively reduce to a Hobbesian

positive law theory where civil laws become the criterion of right?
at all.

Mill admits the possibility of unjust laws and differentiates be-

tween moral rights and legal rights.

Positive laws, and indeed all social

rules, derive their ultimate legitimacy from their contribution

utility.

Not

to social

Known and rigid rules are expedient because they both simplify

moral choice and encourage moral behavior;
As mankind are much more nearly of one nature, than of one
opinion about their own nature, they are more easily brought
to agree in their^^ntermediate principles ... than in their
first principles.
To be held to rigid rules of justice for the sake of others
develops the feelings an^^^capacities which have the good of
others for their object.

However, Mill finds the greatest utility of rules of justice to be their

contribution to security;
We depend on (security) for all our immunity from evil, and
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for the whole value of all and every good, beyond
the
passing moment; since nothing but the gratification of
the instant could be of any worth to us, if we could
be deprived of everything the next instant by whoever
was momentarily stronger than ourselves. ^
Now, either Hobbes or Bentham could have offered a nearly
identical

explanation of justice, so we have clearly not yet uncovered the unique
aspect of Mill

s

theory.

Mill’s contribution may be described as charting

a middle course between Hobbes and Bentham so that security is not given

such priority that the rules of justice become inflexible and, at the same
time, expediency is not permitted to dictate violations of common-sense

notions of justice as fairness.

Thus we find Mill warning of;

the error of setting up such unbending principles, not
merely as universal rules for attaining a given end,
but as rules of conduct generally; without regard to
the possibility, not only that some modifying cause
may prevent the attainment of the given end by the
means which the rule prescribes, but that success itself may conflict with some other
which may possibly chance to be more desirable.

Mill believed that the dictates of justice cannot be static because they
are at least partially a function of the social environment;

The entire history of social improvement has been a
series of transitions, by which one custom or institution after another, from being a supposed primary necessity of social existence, has passed into the ran^^
of an universally stigmatized injustice and tyranny.

Having avoided the Scylla of security. Mill still needs to steer clear
of the Charybdis of expediency if the dictates of justice are to possess

the firm commitment to fairness demanded by men’s natural sentiments.

To

compound the difficulty, justice as fairness must be subsumed under, or at
avoid
least made consistent with, the principle of utility if Mill is to
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having two competing criteria of right.

It is precisely this latter con-

dition which some critics claim Mill cannot possibly
meet; a distributive
ideal, they say, cannot logically be subsumed under
an aggregative one.^^

In a static sense the critics are right, but Mill is concerned
with the

dynamic maximization of utility and hence with the development of
capacities
for pleasure as well as the satisfaction of existing desires.

According

to Mill, the essential conditions for the development of human potential

are an awareness of superior preference structures and a desire to attain
them.

These conditions, in turn, require for their fulfillment a diversity

of lifestyles and personalities, which can only flourish in a fair and

just society.

Thus fairness is both central to and consistent with Mill’s

principle of utility.
The exact manner in which justice fosters utility will bear some further

examination.

Mill's rejection of both Bentham and Ricardo was motivated by

his perception that neither of them effectively appealed to the individual

aspirations of persons.

In Ricardo's case, the conditions of justice were

imposed by immutable laws of nature, while Bentham' s utilitarianism left
the individual's fate in the handsof societal calculations of pleasure and
pain.

Both theories viewed the requirements of justice as something imposed

(by nature or society) on the individual and then sought to legitimize the

constraints.

Mill, on the other hand, believed that justice can only be

realized when individuals actively aspire to initiate programs of self-

development based on the expectation of increasing their capacities for
enjoyment in the future;

.
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Morality consists of two parts. One of these is selfeducation the training by the human being himself, of
his affects and will... The other and co— equal part,
the regulation of his outward actions, must be altogether halting and imperfect without the first.
This requirement that self —development be a preferred goal carries with
it major implications for both the political and economic contours of

society.

In the next section, I shall examine the nature of social insti-

tutions dictated by Mill’s theory of justice.

IV
If ethically superior preference structures are to emerge, different

lifestyles and personalities must compete on a fair basis.

Mill was not so

idealistic as to believe that virtuous, but economically nonviable, lifestyles

would be deemed worthy of emulation by large numbers of people.

Thus the

focus of his economics was the determination of those conditions under which

society’s rewards

would be distributed so as to foster the maximum develop-

ment of human capacities and hence the most rapid possible expansion of
social utility.

For Mill, distributive justice was backward-looking in the

sense that reward should correspond with merit, but this theory of justice

was ultimately forward-looking because merit should reflect the potential
as well as the realized development of capacities.

The theoretical task which Mill set for himself may be summarized as
follows:

which aspects of a capitalist economy are consistent with the

encouragement of human development and which aspects suppress development

Mill predicted that ’’attacks on private property" would continue

until
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the laws of property are freed from whatever portion
of injustice they

contain.

He sought to demonstrate that private property has "no
neces-

sary connection with all the physical and social evils which
almost all

socialist writers assume to be inseparable from it."^®

Competition was the most attractive aspect of capitalism for Mill.
In order to show that competitive market exchanges are consistent with

justice, he, like Smith and Ricardo, was attracted to the labor theory of

value; "the value of commodities, therefore, depends principally .. .on the

quantity of labour required for their production." 59

However, Mill could

not accept Ricardo’s simplifying assumption of equal ratios of capital to
labor in all industries.

Thus he concluded that costs of production would

not be proportional to the labor embodied in different commodities.

To

resolve this problem. Mill adopted the subjective approach to real cost

which had been initiated by Smith and Nassau Senior.

This approach treats

the abstinence of the capitalist who refrains from present consumption as
a disutility comparable to labor and hence equally deserving of compensation;

As the wages of the labourer are the remuneration of labour,
so the profits of the capitalist are properly, according to
Mr. Senior’s well-chosen expression, the remuneration of abstinence.
They are what he gains by forbearing to consume
his capitaifor his own uses, and allowing it to be consumed
For this forbearance
by productive labourers fgg their uses.
he requires a recompense.
By maintaining the distinction between the physical productiveness of
the factors of production and the rewards accruing to their owners. Mill

could defend that part of property income which called forth abstinence,
landed
skill, and energy while condemning income accruing to inherited or

—
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wealth.

Thus he recommended stiff inheritance taxes but opposed
progres-

sive taxation;
to tax the larger incomes at a higher percentage than the
smaller, is to lay a tax on industry and economy; to impose a penalty on people for having worked harder and

saved more than their neighbors.

Mill would have favored appropriation of land by the State, but he foresaw
a greater potential for injustice arising from State power than from private

ownership of land;
the land ought to belong to the nation at large, but I
think it will be a generation or two before the progress
of public intelligence and morality will permit so great
a concern to be entrusted to public authorities without
greater abuses than necessarily attach to private property
in land.

While Mill was attracted by the incentives and reward structure associated with competition, he condemned the injustice of the existing distribution of rewards;

The distinction between rich and poor, so slightly connected
as it is with merit and demerit, or even with exertions g^d
want of exertion in the individual, is obviously unjust.

Mill attributed the bulk of injustice to an exogenous historical factor
the forcible and fraudulent seizing of land and wealth prior to the strict

observance of contractual rights.

He was unwilling to advocate the expro-

priation of property acquired through improper means, but he favored programs aimed at dispersing wealth such as inheritance taxes, universal education, and limitations on the rate of population growth.

Mill even sup-

ported the trade union movement in their efforts to bargain for higher
wages.

believed
Having rejected the Classical notion of the wages-fund, he
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that unions could be effective in raising the total income going
to the

laboring class.

Distributive equity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
competition among alternative lifestyles.

Just as an unfair distri-

bution of rewards would undermine the viability of potentially superior
practices, so would government suppression of individual liberties.

Thus

Mill defended an absolute principle of liberty which permits intervention
only when one persons actions infringe on the rights of others.

As we have

seen, Mill's principle of liberty rests on the definition of rights developed
in his theory of justice.

The only rights whose violation demands interven-

tion are those established by civil law.

These laws, in turn, ought to pro-

tect those individual claims on society which serve to maximize the expan-

sion of social utility.

Clearly, then. Mill's principle of liberty is not

a defense of 'absolute' liberty, but rather a principle which ought to be

applied absolutely in the defense of those liberties deemed advantageous
to society.

Many critics claim to have detected a fatal flaw in Mill's principle
of liberty.

They view Mill as being forced to choose between an absolute

principle of liberty (in which case he becomes a libertarian) or a principle
of liberty which defends only those interests which advance social utility
(in which case he becomes a moral totalitarian)

.

Yet Mill falls into neither

of these simplistic models; he doesn't defend 'absolute

liberty, and, at

determining precisethe same time, he doesn't claim any a priori method for
ly which rights and interests ought to be protected.

For Mill, utility must
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be "grounded on the permanent interests of man as a
progressive being,"
and he admits that the nature of these interests will only
gradually become

evident as mankind progresses through experience.
The obvious objection to Mill is to ask who will determine the legitimate rights and interests at any particular time.

The theoretical elegance

of a concept like "the permanent interests of man as a progressive being"

does not preclude the necessity of rigid laws based on specified rights.

With his forward-looking, dynamic criterion of right. Mill could not follow
his Classical predecessors in relying on the market mechanism as the source
of the standard of value; market values simply reflect the expression of

existing desires which may or may not be consistent with man’s 'permanent
interests’.

Thus Mill turned to the political process as an arena for the

rational determination of the proper ends of society.
The tension in Mill’s political theory is a reflection of an underlying

conflict between his rationalist cosmology and his experientialist epistemology.

On one hand. Mill believed that Nature, including man, is rife

with unrealized potential, but, on the other hand, he claims that man can
have no direct access to knowledge of the ultimate state of Nature.

Thus

Mill wavers between an elitist view of politics whereby the more knowledgeable

members of society fashion laws designed to maximize utility, and a democratguide
ic view which will permit popular judgement based on experience to

society.
pessiMill’s elitist tendencies are most pronounced when he voices his

mism concerning the rationality of the massess.

He expressed admiration for
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the toryism of Wordsworth and Coleridge which was;

duly sensible that it is good for man to be ruled;
to Submit both his body and mind to the guidance of
a higher intelligence and virtue.
In contrast;

liberalism, which is for making every man his own
guide and sovereign master, and letting him think
for himself and do exactly as he judges best for
himself (is based on a) ... thorough ignorance of
man’s nature, and of what is necessary for his happiness or what degree of^^appiness and virtue he
is capable of attaining.

Mill envisioned political leaders who were dispassionate and knowledgeable.
In On Liberty

,

he argued that the only means by which the masses could rise

above mediocrity was

’’by

the counsels and influence of a more highly gifted

and intructed One or Few."^^

Yet Mill also exhibited strong democratic tendencies; in Cons iderat ions
on Representative Government

,

he makes two strong defenses of democracy.

the ideally best form of government is that in which
the sovereignty, or supreme controlling power in the
last resort, is vested in the entire aggregate of the
community; every citizen not only having a voice in
the exercise of the ultimate sovereignty, but being,
at least occasionally, called on to take an actual
part in the government, by the personal discharge of
some public function, local or general.
the only government which can fully satisfy all the
exigencies of the social state is one in which the
whole people participate; that any participation,
even in the smallest public function, is useful; that
the participation should everywhere be as great as
the general degree of improvement of the community
will allow, and that nothing less can be ultimately
all to share in the
desirable than the admission
sovereign power of the State.
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Both of these statements contain qualifying
phrases, but Mill's attraction
to democracy was authentic and more than
just a facade to mask capitalist

inequality.

He believed that participation was itself an
important element

in raising the general level of intelligence.

Having stressed the value of participation. Mill sought to
defend inequality of participation.

Equal voting is, from Mill's viewpoint,

in principle wrong, because recognizing a wrong standard,
and exercising a bad influence on the voter's mind. It
is not useful, but hurtful, that the constitution of the
country should declare ignorance to be entitled to as
much political power as knowledge.

To guard against equal voting. Mill advocated plural voting whereby the more

successful members of society would be allowed two or more votes.

He

suggested that inequality in participation should not disturb the common

man if "this superior influence should be assigned on grounds which he can
comprehend, and of which he is able to perceive the justice." 69

Thus Mill

believed that plural votes should be granted on the basis of education rather
than ownership of property.
In comparing Mill's political and economic theories, an analogy emerges

which reflects the central importance of justice in virtually all of his
work.

Mill does not oppose unequal advantages when theycorrespond to rele-

vant inequalities of merit.

In the economic sphere, the criterion of merit

is sacrifice and contribution as measured by either labor or abstinence.

In

the political sphere, the criterion of merit is intellectual and moral contri-

bution as measured by level of education and range of experience.

In both

spheres. Mill opposed any "inequality of privilege grounded on irrelevant

.
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or adventitious circumstances."^^

The ambiguities which appear so evident in Mill's writings on politics and economics cannot be resolved without penetrating into his moral

philosophy and particularly his theory of justice.

There we discover that

the conflicts between positive and negative freedom, laissez faire and in-

tervention, elitism and democracy, and an adding-up theory of value and a

subjective real cost theory of value all boil down to a basic dilemma; an

objective truth exists but we have no way to discover it except through
experience.

Because he believed in an objective criterion of right. Mill

supported a positive notion of freedom, state intervention, elitism, and a

subjctive real cost theory of value.

All of these were designed to ascertain

and fulfill the requirements of justice.
At the same time. Mill believed that the objective criterion of right

could only become evident through a gradual competitive process whereby al-

ternative lifestyles, characters, and ideas proved their worth in practice
and hence became desired ends for the mass of people.

In other words, the

objective criterion of right could only function in society when individuals
came to it through their own initiative and found it congruent with their

subjective aspirations.

This perspective leads Mill to support a negative

theory of
conception of liberty, laissez faire, democracy, and an adding-up

value
tension between
The tensions in Mill's theory are no more than the

being and becoming.

whose inter
Humans are simultaneously bundles of desires

self-conscious entities who have a
ests lie in fulfilling those desires and
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strong interest in realizing their potential capacities.

In deference to

the autonomy of the individual, the good society must recognize
the legiti-

macy of and seek to satisfy the desires of its citizens.

When Mill takes

perspective, he is a thorough realist and utilitarian.

However, the

good society must also foster the development of superior personalities,

and to do this, judgements must be made by both individuals and legislators
as to the rightness and wrongness of actions and the truth or falsity of

opinions.

For this task. Mill proposed the only standard

available to a

theorist who has cut himself off from any reliance on innate instincts, reason, or intuition; experience alone could instruct men in the fashioning of

higher ends.

Yet Mill’s notion of experience, as described in the second

section of this chapter, dictates that perceptions alone cannot give knowledge.

Experienced phenomena can be understood only by by linking them

with the natural laws embodied in Mill’s cosmos.

Hence judgement requires

prior knowledge; only the highly educated minority is capable of ascertaining right and wrong.

We might conclude that Mill succeeded in developing an internally consistent and coherent theory of justice.

He correctly perceived the require-

ment of postulating an objective criterion of right on which subjective in-

tentions might reasonably be assumed to converge.

He was perhaps the first

liberal theoretician to recognize that individual desires are the product
as well as the cause of social institutions.

In a period of intense class

rights and
conflict, he saw the wisdom of limited abrogations of property

privileges and
universal suffrage on one hand, and the protection of earned
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minority opinions on the other hand.

Mill can be compared to the captain

of a ship which is heading into uncharted waters.

He wants to deliver his

safely to the most ideal terrain, but he doesn't know in advance where
this piece of land is located or what it looks like.

He welcomes the assis-

tance of his officers who are on the deck with him examiningthe different

landing sites.

He even believes that the decision would be aided by other

opinions, but the deck can only accomodate a limted number of persons.

How-

ever, he has ordered the crew members who work below to enlarge the deck so

that gradually they can come up to assist in charting the course of the ship.
In fact, the captain strongly suspects that the ideal site won't be known

until all the ship's crew had had an opportunity to participate in the decision.

However, the limited size of the deck prohibits this for the present,

and so the task of the captain and his officers is to steer the boat in the
right direction while encouraging the enlargement of the deck.

This metaphor captures Mill's conflicting commitments to democracy and
elitism, social equality and privilege.
time.

The resolution, for Mill, requires

In the interim, public education, higher standards of living, and

perhaps most importantly, restraints on population growth are prerequisites
to a just society.

By appealing to a future just society while upholding

the basic institutions of existing society as being essential to achieving
an internthe future society. Mill would appear to have developed not only

ally consistent, but also a viable theory of justice.

Yet it is on the

weakness.
issue of viability that Mill's theory encounters its fatal

functioning of a
The cogency of Mill's theory of justice requires the

y
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private morality which stresses the principle of self-realization.
o'v&T

More-

if ethically superior personalities are to be consistently
preferred,

the basis on which individuals assess alternative personalities must be

independent of the system by which expressed desires are satisfied.

In

short. Mill must assume that the system of rewards effected by the competitive

market is congruent with the choice of ethically superior personalities.
Several objections may be raised against this assumption.

First, the com-

petitive market economy develops according to efficiency critera, and hence
those personalities oriented toward abstinence, labor, and material rewards

will be reinforced by the market.

Second, market efficiency may dictate a

structure of work in which narrow and routinized tasks are promoted at the

expense of more stimulating and fulfilling work experiences.

Again, the

personalities which are compatible with routine work will be rewarded and

hence will, at least to some extent, become preferred role models.
The foregoing criticisms would not apply to Mill if he claimed that
the personality types engendered by the competitive market were indeed

ethically superior.

But Mill denies this;

confess I am not charmed with the ideal of life held
out by those who think that the normal state of human
beings is that of struggling to get on; that the trampling, crushing, elbowing, and treading on each other's
heels, which form the existing type of social life, are
the most desirable lost of human kind, or anything but
the disagreeably j^symptoms of one of the phases of indusI

trial progress.
individual initiative
At one point. Mill actually abandoned his appeal to
in the choice of preferred lifestyles;
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That the energies of mankind should be kept
in employment by the struggle for riches .. .until the
better minds succeed in educating the others into
better
things, is undoubtedly more desirable than that
they
should rust and stagnate. While minds are course,
they require course stimuli, and let them have thera.^^

This statement illuminates the essential conflict between
Mill's theory of

justice and the operation of a capitalist economy.

In his effort to legiti-

mize the system of private property and individual competition. Mill
must
destroy the coherency of his theory of justice.
rectitude could be imposed on persons

j

He consistently denied that

the individual must actively

aspire to develop a superior personality and this desire can come only from

personal assessments of the worth of competing lifestyles.

Yet Mill now

admits that in the present society, the mass of men are doomed to a narrow
and uninspiring existence;

Hitherto it is questionable if all the mechanical inventions yet made have lightened the day's toil of any
human being. They have enabled a greater population
to live the same life of drudgery and imprisonment,
and an increased ni^^ber of manufacturers and others
to make a fortune.

Mill's theory of justice is not viable for a laissez faire capitalist
economy, and thus his ultimate recourse is an appeal to rational and disin-

terested politicians who will undertake the interventions required to maintain justice.

However this solution runs afoul of Mill's observations on

the effect of class power on political decisions;

In every country where there are rich and poor, the
administration of public affairs would, even under
the most democratic constitution, be mainly in the
hands of the rich. .Political power will generally
^
be the rich man's privilege, as heretofore.
.
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Moreover, it cannot be supposed that the rich will rule
wisely and benevolently;

All privileged and powerful classes, as such, have used
their power in the interest of their own selfishness, and
have indulged theirse If -importance in despising, and not in
lovingly caring for, those who were, in their estimation,
degraded, by being under the necessity of working for their
benefit. I do not affirm that what has always been must
always be,
.but though the evil may be lessened, it cannot
be eradicated, until the power itself is withdrawn.
.

.

If politics must remain class-biased until the power of the privileged

class is withdrawn, then Mill as much as admits that State intervention
cannot be the source of justice.
In the final analysis. Mill's belief that the system of private prop-

erty and individual competition is necessary to the realization of justice
can be reduced to his optimistic, and rather unfounded, opinion that edu-

cation and knowledge would free men from class prejudices and that the
'united authority of the instructed' would prevail over the divisive and

narrow interests of the classes.

Mill's optimism stems from his faith in

an objective criterion of right, but we must remember that Mill denied that

reason could bring men to a consensus on this criterion.

Instead, he re-

lied on experience, yet he does not show that the experience of living in
a class society will foster a widespread commitment to the objective cri-

terion of right.

Maurice Cowling offers an insightful description of

Mill's optimism;
Mill's situation, as a highly articulate, intellectually
ambitious member of a middle— class , literary intelligentsia
with little opportunity to exercise open, conventional political power, made it likely that his claims to political
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authority would be based , if based on authority they were,
on intellectual rather than social superiority. Looked at
from one point of view, that is what his moral and political writings are claims to supersede leadership based on
social, by leadership based on intellectual, superiority.^^

—

I

conclude that the viability of Mill's theory of justice for a capi-

talist economy is shattered by an incapacity to deal with the on-going re-

ality of class conflict.

An adequate theory must demonstrate the material

conditions under which class conflict would disintegrate as men reached mutual agreement on a criterion of right.

Instead, Mill simply posits the

erosion of class divisions as a precondition for the realization of justice.
Thus, despite the underlying unity of his thought and his valuable contri-

butions to the liberal theory of justice, John Stuart Mill, like Locke and
Smith before him, was unable to offer a satisfactory legitimation of capitalist society.

.

,
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CHAPTER

IV

JOHN RAWLS AND THE DEMISE OF THE LIBERAL THEORY OF
JUSTICE

After 1870, the rapidly declining authority of John Stuart Mill's
social theory reflected more than just the rejection of Classical politi-

cal economy.

Mill marked the end of a liberal tradition which offered

both an empirical analysis of a private, market society and an unabashed
justification of that society as the only rational form of organization
for realizing the most rapid and extensive development of human capa-

cities.

After Mill, changing material conditions created increasing ten-

sion between analysis and legitimation.

Classical liberalism was based on the assumption of free competition

between self-interested persons with ground-rules laid down by a neutral
State.

With the rise of a working class movement, increasing monopoliza-

tion of the economy, and the growth of State power, the tension between
the ideals of classical liberalism and the reality of contemporary liberal

society proved to be greater than a single theoretical framework could
bear.

Thus out of Mill's work emerged the two rival strands of modem

liberalism.

The humanistic vision of classical liberalism was incorpor-

ated in the idealist political theory initiated by Hegel and developed by
T.H. Green.

In contrast, neoclassical economic theory retained the

hedonistic and empiricist aspects of Utilitarianism.
The conflict between the two strands is exemplified by the efforts
of each school of thought to claim Mill as a member.

Green claimed that

Utilitarianism in
Mill had really deserted the hedonistic calculus of
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favor of a self-realization principle,

while Sidgewick. observed that

the distinctions of quality that Mill and others urge
may still be admitted as grounds of preference, but
only in so far as they can be resolved into distinctions of quantity.
I

shall argue that the strength and coherency of liberal social

theory has been seriously undermined by the schism which developed

during the late nineteenth century.

My interest here is primarily with

the difficulties faced by neoclassical economists as they sought to

develop rational norms for the organization of society while explicitly

rejecting both the existence of and the need for an objective criterion
of right.

They have either consciously avoided the topic of justice or

else have sought to smuggle considerations of justice into their theories

disguised as scientific analysis.

The latter tactic has inevitably been

discredited by more intellectually honest colleagues, while the former
has become increasingly untenable in light of both the internal and external challenges to the legitimacy of liberal societies.

Given these developments, it is hardly surprising that John Rawls
recent attempt to synthesize the rationalist and empiricist strands of

liberalism has been received with widespread interest if not approval.
In constructing his theory, Rawls has judiciously returned to the social

contract traditions, yet, at the same time, he affiliates himself meth-

odologically with neoclassical welfare economics and the formal rigor

which accompanies that tradition.

As if the foregoing combination were

entire work with Kantnot sufficiently heterogeneous, Rawls infuses his
ian ethics.
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maintain that his peculiar amalgam of various aspects of the

liberal tradition is incomprehensible without an appreciation of the

historical development of both liberal societies and liberal theories
of justice.

Rawls has been criticized for illogic and internal incon-

sistency, but the ultimate test of his theory must be its viability as
a description and

legitimation of a liberal society in which rewards

and duties would be distributed in such a way as to foster continual af-

firmation of that society by its members.
As a prelude to analyzing Rawls' theory, I shall devote the first

section of this chapter to the series of unsuccessful attempts by neo-

classical economists to develop welfare critera based solely on considerations of efficiency.

Understanding the impasse reached by neoclas-

sical welfare economics will make us more appreciative of the methodology
shall briefly sketch Rawls'

employed by Rawls.

In the second section,

theory of justice.

The third section consists of a rather lengthy cri-

I

tique designed to show that Rawls has not presented a compelling argument
for obligation to a capitalist state and thus has failed to construct a
Finally, I shall devote the fourth

viable liberal theory of justice.

section to some reflections on the future of theories of justice.

I

economics.
In 1871, the 'marginal revolution' ushered in neoclassical
the neoclasFor our purposes, we may note two distinctive changes which

sical orientation brought to liberal notions of justice.

First, rational
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choice came to be equated with market behavior; Mill's conception of
an

objective hierarchy of pleasures was scuttled.

Second, all efforts to

legitimize the prevailing distribution of productive assets were ostensibly placed beyond the scope of economic theory.

Given these develop-

ments, we might conclude that neoclassical economics has little relevance
for our historical analysis of justice.

However, despite their attempts

to rigidly dichotomize positive and normative elements, neoclassical econ-

omists prior to Pareto consistently blurred this distinction.

After Pareto,

considerations of equity found a home in the branch of the discipline called

welfare economics.

Since this historical progression is extremely relevant

to understanding Rawls, I shall briefly summarize the efforts by neoclassical

economists to develop rational principles for the organization of society.
Jevons led the neoclassical attack of Mill's theory of justice.

Mill's

objective criterion of right had peirmitted a contrast between the dictates
of justice and the prevailing pattern of distribution.

Even though

his

experientialist epistemology constrained him from actually judging the
ethical status of specific preference structures, the moral force of Mill's
theory of justice rested on the interpersonal comparability of pleasures.

Furthermore, it is precisely this aspect of Mill's theory which, if taken
society
in isolation, potentially leads to the illiberal conclusion that

preference
has an interest in suppressing inferior and promoting superior

structures.

Thus Jevons and the other pioneers in neoclassical thought

individual during a
may be viewed as reasserting the sovereignty of the

instrumentality through which
time when the State was becoming a contested
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group interests sought expression.

Jevons explicitly rejected inter-

personal comparisons of utility; "every mind is thus
inscrutable to
every other mind, and no common denominator of feeling
seems to be

possible."^
Since Mill had denied the practical feasibility of comparing pre-

ference structures, we must wonder whether Jevons was motivated solely
by the noble effort to rescue the individual from Millian totalitarian-

ism or whether he simply sought to reconstruct the moral justification
for laissez faire.

After all. Mill's advocacy of intervention was

severely limited, but he had raised the spectre of widespread injustice
inherent in the very institutional make-up of capitalist society.

Mill

encouraged a continual questioning of the status quo and experimentation

with alternative lifestyles and even economic systems.

Thus it is plaus-

ible that Jevons was concerned more with Mill's radical individualism

and the implied destabilization of the status quo than with any centralist tendencies which can be read into Mill's work.

Further evidence for this interpretation of Jevons 's conservatism
can be found in his reversionto a Benthamite harmony-of-interests doctrine.

Jevons boldly stated that "the supposed conflict of labour with

capital is a delusion," and that "in economics

—

(we)

should regard all

men as brothers (rather than looking) at such subjects from a class point
of view."^

With a harmony of interests, all exchanges must be mutually

beneficial, but Jevons makes a jump in logic to conclude that "perfect

freedom of exchange, therefore, tends to the maximizing of utility.
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Clearly, such a conclusion is relative to a
given distribution of

productive assets, but Jevons makes no attempt to
justify the existing distribution.

Thus we find the early neoclassical economists seeking
to legitimize laissez faire on grounds of efficiency but then making
the un-

warranted jump

to arguments that an efficient allocation of resources

is ethically superior to an inefficient one.

Their arguments are

couched in terms of positive analysis and they protest vigorously
against allowing ethical considerations to enter economics.

Thus

Menger remarks that;
One of the strangest questions ever made the subject
of scientific debate is whether rent and interest are
justified from an ethical point of view or whether they
are "immoral” .. .VTher ever the services of land and capital bear a price, it is always as a consequence of their
value, and their value to men is not the result of arbitrary judgement, but a necessary consequence of their
economic character.^

Menger has managed to imbue the distribution of income with an objective necessity only by assuming that the distribution of productive

assets is an objective necessity.

Yet by offering no ethical justi-

fication for this latter assumption, he must certainly fail to lift
the distribution of income above the realm of moral assessment.
In addition to Jevons and Menger, Walras is usually regarded as
a founding father of the neoclassical approach.

His unique contribu-

tion was to portray a competitive economy as a general equilibrium

model in which a set of simultaneous equations would yield a consis-
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tent set of prices.

Yet Walras also falls prey to the temptation to

add moral force to his mathematical model

j

developed do show freedom of production.

.procures the maximum of

utility."^

.

"The equations we have

This widespread tendency to identify the outcomes of a

competitive market with a utility maximum reflects more than just an
implicit validation of the prevailing distribution of assets.

The

assumptions that utility is cardinally measurable and additive also

underlie early neoclassical analysis.

In fact, despite the proclaim-

ations to the contrary, these neoclassical economists were engaged in

interpersonal comparisons of utility.

They were able to avoid explicit

comparisons only because theyimplicitly assumed that equal amounts of
income gave equal amounts of utility to all persons.

Thus their com-

parisons of utility could be presented as comparisons of money amounts.
The problem with this assumption was that it carried the implication
that utility maximization would require a perfectly equal distribution
of income.

As neoclassical economics developed during the last quarter of
the nineteenth century, many of the presumptions of the originators

were rejected as being metaphysical or, applying Occam
unnecessary.

s

razor, as

Edgeworth discarded the notion of equal capacities for

pleasure among all persons.

Marshall and Bdhm-Bawerk claimed that

economics need have no basis in a hedonistic psychology.

As the

assumption that
science of rational choice, economics could drop the

what people do is necessarily good for them.
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The intention behind these revisions was the drive to
make econ-

omics more scientific.

Yet the unforeseen effect was to undercut

that a private, competitive economy was necessarily de-

sirable.

In Schumpeter's words, the neoclassical proof that compe-

tition maximizes utility "boils down to a definition of rational

action and can be paralled by analogous theorems for a socialist
society."

g

Wicksell noted that "an exchange between a rich man and

a poor man may lead to a greater total utility if it is effected at
a suitably fixed price than if left to free competition."

Q

Having effectively destroyed the normative implications of competitive equilibrium and private enterprise, Marshall and Edgeworth
(and later Pigou) evaded these implications by covertly reintroducing

the notion of identical capacities for pleasure into their public

expenditure theory.

Edgeworth implicitly makes such an assumption in

defending the rule of equimarginal sacrifice in taxation.

Marshall's

concept of consumer's surplus is based on a specific demand curve which
must reflect the prevailing distribution of income.

Any policy recom-

mendations based on the size of the consumer's surplus require the
assumption of identical capacities for pleasure if interpersonal comparisons of utility are to be avoided.
Our overview of the neoclassical treatment of justice would not
be complete without consideration of John Bates Clark.

Perhaps more

than any other neoclassical economist, Clark was acutely aware of the

importance of applying economic theory to the problem of justice.

.
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If it is humanly possible to thus settle the questions at the basis of the law of wages, no scien-

bific work can be more immediately and widely beneficient.
These questions tend, if rightly answered,
to public order; if wrongly answered, to communism;
and, if unanswered, to agitation and peril. ^

Moreover, Clark recognized the need for an objective criterion of
right in order to justify the distribution of income.

The preface

of The Distribution of Wealth begins with the following statement:
It is the purpose of this work to show that the
distribution of income of society is controlled
by a natural law, and that this law, if it worked
without friction, would give to every agent of
product
the amount of wealth which that agent
i^Y
creates

Clark’s "productivity ethics" states that each person is morally

entitled to the marginal product of the factors of production which
he owns.

Exploitation occurs whenever any factor receives income

less than its marginal product.

This theory was buttressed by Wick-

steed’s proof that under certain assumptions, rewarding factors in

proportion to the marginal contribution to output would precisely
exhaust the total product.

Clark purported to show that the distribution of income depends
only on technical information embodied in the various production functions that that distribution is thus independent of any specific type
of economic system.

However, by listing the three factors of produc-

tion as labor, capital, and entrepreneurship, he included a type of

activity (i.e., providing capital) which is specific to a private property system.

More importantly, in referring to

providing capital
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as a productive activity. Clark confused
the productivity of capital

with the productivity of the capitalist.

Finally, he seems to have

overlooked the fact that the existing pattern of factor
endowments
will affect the marginal productivity of each factor by
shaping both
the pattern of demand for final goods and the relative
intensity of

employment of the various factors.

Thus, despite its sophistication.

Clark’s theory fails to provide the objective criterion of right

essential to a liberal theory of justice.
Alfred Marshall was also deeply concerned with the ethical aspects of economics.

Drawing on the notion of subjective real cost,

he substituted the term "waiting" for Senior's "abstinence".

Thus

labor and waiting were the two ultimate factors of production for

Marshall.

If he had proposed that waiting was productive, then he

would have followed Clark in confusing the productive contribution
of capital with the activity of the capitalist.

But Marshall instead

portrayed waiting as a sacrifice comparable to labor.

This view

requires some common standard by which to measure the disutility of

both labor and waiting, and Marshall suggested money could be used.
The disutility of waiting should be proportional to the increased

value of output attributable to additionalcapital since the same
interest rate needed to induce the marginal unit of saving will be
paid to borrow the marginal unity of financial capital.

However,

the use of money as a measure of sacrifice fails on two counts.

First,

a dollar will not represent an equal sacrifice for persons in differ-
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ent economic circumstances, and second, a uniform interest
rate will

result in compensation greater than sacrifice for those persons who

would save even at a lower interest rate.

Thus Marshall, too, was

unable to develop a justification for the distribution of income
that was independent of the prevailing distribution of wealth.

Neoclassical economics was approaching an impasse.

The attempt

to make the theory objective by abstracting from considerations of

equity was clearly a failure.

Even after dropping the utilitarian

basis of the theory, the seemingly less ambitious claim that free

competition maximized nation income (rather than social utility) was
likewise insusceptible to proof.

In order to aggregate physical goods,

prices are necessary, and prices reflect the distribution of wealth.
This inability to locate an objective criterion of right should not

surprise us.

Once the hedonistic underpinnings of the theory had been

dropped, the marginal utility theory of exchange value became logically

independent of any pure value theory.

objective grounding

It contained no subjective or

independent of the situation for which it was

supposed to serve as a criterion of right.
Into this emergingintellectual vacuum stepped Pareto.

Or, perhaps

more accurately, we should say that Pareto closed the door on the concerns which were rapidly draining neoclassical economics of its opti-

mistic spirit.

He recognized that neoclassical analysis had been un-

successful in separating the scientific study of allocative efficiency
from the normative considerations of equity.

Determined to correct

—
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matters, he first rejected the notion of cardinally
measurable and

additive utility functions and then restricted welfare
conclusions
to those that do not depend on interpersonal comparisons
of utility.

His refusal to evaluate either the existing distribution of resources

or the existing state of preferences implied
i^^firiite

the acceptance of an

number of noncomparable optimal situations corresponding to

the infinite variety of preference structures and resource ownership.

These situations were noncomparable because a move from one to another

would require comparisons of losses and benefits between persons
a procedure which Pareto had ruled out.

The trouble with Pareto’s criterion was that it separated efficiency from equity only by refusing to consider equity at all.

For

economists interested in practical policy recommendations, the Pareto

criterion was so restrictive as to permit
policy.

almost no active economic

After Pigou demonstrated that efficiency would be destroyed

by nonmarket interdependencies (i.e., externalities), the justification
for intervention was strengthened, and economists became increasingly

uncomfortable with the conservative implications of the Pareto criterion.

However, the rise of logical positivism in the 1920 's and 1930 's,

a particularly Lionel Robbins influential work on economic methodology,

raised doubts that welfare was a proper area of study for economists.
Thus, by the late 1930' s, when some economists did seek to broaden the

range over which welfare judgements could be made, they based their

analysis on Pareto’s ethically neutral criterion.

The project of the

13
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New Welfare Economics, as it came to be called, was to
reinforce the
broad legitimacy of laissez faire by showing that market failures
could be remedied with delimited interference based solely on consid-

erations of efficiency.

Thus Hicks and Kaldor, based on the earlier

work of Barone, proposed that an intervention could be considered to
improve efficiency if those who gain are able to compensate those who
lose and still be better off. ^

Later, Scitovsky noticed that the

Hicks-Kaldor criterion could potentially justify both an initial change
and then a subsequent change back to the original situation.

Thus he

introduced a stricter test, known as the Scitovsky double-criterion,

which required that the initial change meet the Hicks-Kaldor criterion
and that the reverse change does not meet that criterion.

Neither the compensation principle nor the double-criterion
represented a significant theoretical advance.

If the compensation

were actually paid, then the Hicks-Kaldor criterion would be identical
to the Pareto criterion, whereas if compensation were not paid, people

would have an incentive to hide their true preferences.

Even if people

were honest, the measure of the intensity of losses and gains could
not be expressed in dollars offered or demanded without allowing the

existing distribution of income to affect the result.

To accept dollars

offered or demanded as a measure of utility changes would imply that
a dollar is equally valuable to all persons

— an

interpersonal comparison

of utilities.
as their
Kaldor, Hicks, and Scitovsky encountered the same impasse
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predecessors.

The attempt to make policy recommendations solely on

considerations of efficiency is doomed to failure.

The very notion

of economic efficiency is based on a given pattern of factor
endow-

ments, and thus considerations of equity are necessaily attached to

most policies aimed at improving ef f iciency

.

Nor can this problem

be circumvented by refusing to pass judgement on the distribution of
wealth.

The acceptance of the status quo is as much a normative judge-

ment as the rejection of the status quo.

Thus neoclassical welfare

economists were compelled, at least in part, by the internal logic
of their discipline to admit that the efficiency criteria, and hence

the entire defense of free competition, were normatively vacuous

without a prior specification of an optimal distribution of wealth.
In addition to the compelling force of theoretical logic, the

intellectual honesty of welfare economists was undoubtedly bolstered
by the changing nature of the economy.

The phenomena of increasing

monopolization, the Great Depression, and a resurgence of working class

militancy served to further undermine the notion that the outcomes of
a laissez faire economy were either natural or desirable.

Keynesian

theory played an important role in demonstrating that a market economy

could suffer from too much inequality as well as from too little, thus

destroying one of the pillars in the traditional defense of inequality.
The neoclassical response to these changes came in the form of the social

welfare function developed by Bergson.

Unlike the New Welfare Economics,

that.
the social welfare function is premised on an acknowledgement

^

;
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in Myrdal s words
’

The very attempt to study society "from the economic
point of view" makes it necessary to assume such a
unified subject and to determine it scientifically
in order to derive the general interest or general
welfare.
For the most part, those practicing within the tradition of the
social

welfare function have been content to relegate the task of determining
an optimal distribution of initial assets to an unspecified decision-

making process outside the theoretical model.
this

The consequences of

inability to close the neoclassical model are far-reaching.

No

matter how the social optimum is derived, its implementation involves

lump-sum transfers to achieve an equitable distribution and then market competition to achieve allocative efficiency.

By allowing equity

to assume priority over property rights, neoclassical economists have

dropped the commitment to private property as essential to the just
social order.

Perfect competition is no longer portrayed as an ethi-

cal norm inferred from either natural law or utilitarianism.

Markets

are to be justified solely on the basis of efficiency, and the old

arguments linking market efficiency to private property, laissez
faire, and a harmony of interests are rejected.

The social welfare function represents an acknowledgement that
the coherency of economic theory must rest on a criterion of justice.

However, welfare economics has not developed a liberal theory of justice because it has been unable to describe a procedure by which free
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and rational individuals could collectively
determine a social ordering of alternative distributions without
introducing interpersonal

comparisons of utility.

In other words, as Arrow has shown, a contra-

diction exists between democratic decision-making and
a public choice
rule capable of giving a transitive ordering of alternatives.^^

The

Arrow paradox is to be expected, as Winch explains;
That the political problem of social choice should
be insoluble without some means whereby individuals
can indicate strength of preference should come as
no surprise to economists, for no system of resource
allocation, through' the market or otherwise, could
function efficiently without such a mechanism.

The obstacle to attaching weights to individual preferences lies
not only with an inability to assess the intensity of desires, but

with the fact that desires would presumably reflect the interests of
persons in protecting or advancing their own position and hence would
be dependent on the prevailing pattern of factor endowments.

Thus

the social welfare function, to the extent that it was formulated

democratically, ccu2d not serve as an objective criterion by which to

assess the justice of the initial distribution of assets; a different
social welfare function would correspond with each initial distribution.
The same dilemma undercuts Hochman and Rogers attempt to specify
the Pareto-optimal degree of income redistribution.

22

Acknowledging

interdependence between utility functions, they argue that the optimal

redistribution in a two-person society is a function of the initial

distribution of income and the wealthier person's marginal rate of
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substitution between the utility derived from income retention and
that derived from income redistribution.

However, by making the

initial distribution of income exogenous to their model, Hochman and

Rogers offer nothing in the way of an independent criterion of justice.
By the late 1960 's, neoclassical welfare economics had apparently

exhausted itself, with little to show for the effort.

Its internal

weaknesses had been the subject of several penetrating and widely influential critiques.

24

While the concept of the social welfare function

contributed little to a liberal theory of justice, it was ideologically
costly.

The inviolability of property rights was sacrificed and yet

no criterion of justice was gained; the social welfare function re-

presented an open invitation to power struggles over the distribution
of wealth and income.

This vacuum in liberal theory became increasingly

p rob lemma tic as larger numbers of individuals, groups, and classes

challenged the legitimacy of dominant institutions.

In this light,

the significance of John Rawls' attempt to reformulate the liberal

theory of justice becomes apparent.

In the next section, I shall sketch

his approach to the problem.

II

Rawls describes the thrust of his efforts as an attempt

to con-

(utilitarstruct a workable and systematic moral conception to oppose

ianism)."^^

tradiIn doing so, he reaches back to the contractarian

be misled into
tion of the seventeenth century, but we should not
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treating Rawls as merely a restatement of seventeenth century
liber•

1
aiism.

26

The contrast can be highlighted by reviewing the essential

points of the classical liberal theory of justice.

In that tradition,

people are viewed as rational egoists who are bound only by political
or legal obligations to which they consent or to which it is reasonable
to suppose they would consent.

Presumably, any loss of their full

natural liberty can be justified only in terms of enlightened selfinterest.

An essential strategy of classical liberalism was to argue

that political institutions exist solely to provide the social condi-

tions in which a free market can develop and operate without constraint;
the institutions neither enhance nor detract from the advantage of

any participant in the market.

Thus rational egoists should accept

political authority and its constraints because they can reap the benefits of cooperation and exchange, enjoy security of the fruits of their
labor, and make no greater sacrifice of natural liberty than any other

person.

The difficulties facing modern liberal theory stem from the un-

willingness of large segments of the population to accept the universal
advantageousness of the free market.

In the face of working class

unrest, the universalization of the franchise was granted with the

understanding that an expanded role for government was necessary for
the survival of liberal society.

The State became a contested instru-

to
mentality which different classes, sectors, and groups attempted

make serve their conflicting interests.

The pluralist State served
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as a steam valve for the pressures generated by
class conflict.

The changed role of the capitalist State has destroyed
the coher-

ence of the classical liberal theory of obligation and
justice.

In

a class society with an interventionist State, political
obligation

becomes a contingent matter.
S^'^i^ed,

If the working class is weak and unor—

the propertied class will push its advantage in seeking a

non- interventionist State.

In the opposite situation, a united work-

ing class will demand large scale redistribution of social wealth if

not socialization of the means of production.

Thus, once the image

of the neutrality of the State has been subverted, the classical

justification of liberal institutions collapses.
As described in the previous section, neoclassical economics has

been unable to offer any rational criteria for the structure of ownership and rewards in a society in which the State plays an active role.

Similarly, liberal political theory has responded to the non-neutrality
of the State by abandoning the project of providing moral justification

for liberal societies.

This trend, which was initiated by Schumpeter

and has been developed by Dahl and others,

27

views the capitalist

State as a process for sttling conflicts among competing interest
groups over politically distributable goods.

This approach accepts

the situation of competition and compromise without offering any moral

criteria of the limits of legitimate compromise.
Rawls' reformulation of the problem of legitimacy and its solu-

tion may be seen as aresponse to the breakdown of the liberal theory
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of justice in the face of class conflict
and the resulting politici-

zation of society.

The historical significance of his work lies in

the fact that he follows modern liberal political
and economic theory
in repudiating the doctrine of the neutrality of
the State, but then

proceeds to offer a determinate criterion of justice.

Rawls starts

from the premise that the basic economic and political institutions
of any society effect a pattern of distribution of relative wealth,

status, and power.

The structure of this distribution is the most

profound influence on the relative life-prospects of individuals.
Therefore, the problem of legitimacy for Rawls is to demonstrate that
a specific pattern of distribution can be morally justified.

He re-

jects any justification based on the notion of desert because desert
is itself a function of the institutions of society.

Referring to

the unequal advantages offered by various social positions, Rawls notes;

Not only are they pervasive, but they affect men’s
initial chances in life; yet they cannot possibly be
justified by an appeal to the notions of merit or
desert.
It is these inequalities, presumably inevitable in the basic structure of any society, to which
the principles of social justice must in the first
instance apply. These principles, then, regulate
the choice of a political constitution and the main
elements of the economic and social system. The
justice of a social scheme depends essentially on
how fundamental rights and duties are assigned and
on the economic opportunities and ^gcial conditions
in the various sectors of society.

Rawls rejects merit as the criterion of justice on both moral and

empirical grounds.

He claims that it is one of "the fixed points of our
pq

considered judgements"

that we do not deserve our natural endowments.
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Nor do we deserve our acquired capacities to use our natural endow-

ments, to the extent that acquiring those capacities reflects the

families and status groups into which we are born.

Thus neither

natural nor acquired differentials in ability to achieve entitles
anyone to a greater distributive share.

If the criterion of merit

is to be repudiated, a viable substitute must be acknowledged by

every rational person as'the legitimate criterion for the design of

basic institutions.

Rawls argues that there can be no objective basis

for just distributions other than that developed through a social contract.

In other words, since humans must formulate their own moral

principles, the principles gain objectivity only insofar as they
are the outcome of fair procedures.

Assuming that all natural and

social contingencies are morally arbitrary, Rawls claims that fairness

dictates that persons must choose principles of justice from an
"original position" where a "veil of ignorance" shields them from

knowledge of the actual positions they will hold in the society upon
whose principles they agree.

30

What principles of social organization would individuals choose
in the original position?

quite straightforward:

Rawls' "general conception of justice" is

"All social primary goods

— liberty

tunity. income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect

and oppor-

are to be

distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of
these goods is to the advantage of the least favored."

31

However,

Justice as
Rawls quickly leaves aside the "general conception of

.
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Fairness” in favor of the ’’special conception” which involves two

principles of justice.

The first states that ’’each person is to have

an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic

liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.”
The second is the novel Difference Principle:

’’Social and economic

inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both t6

benefit of the least advantaged.

.

the greatest

.and attached to offices and positions

open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.”

•

Based

on the choices of individuals in the ’’original position,” the ’’special

conception” provides a lexical ordering of the principles of justice.
Equal liberty will normally be inviolable and the Difference Principle
cannot be sacrificed for the sake of greater efficiency.
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According to Rawls, the Difference Principle provides a determinate
solution to the distributional problem

welfare economics.

34

— the

bete noire of liberal

In fact, Rawls is a neo-Paretian in the sense

that he locates the optimal distribution of income by applying the

compensation principle to an initial situation of equality.

Any ad-

vantages accruing to groups of persons are morally defensible only if
those persons actually compensate others who are made relatively less

well-off

Ill

viable and
In order to assess Rawls' success in formulating a
that the very
coherent liberal theory of justice, we must first note
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meaning of the word 'liberal' has evolved beyond the definition
set
forth in the preface of this work.

There, I idefined a liberal society

as one in which property was privately owned and the maximum
feasible

range of individual liberties prevailed.

Thus neither neoclassical

welfare economics nor the Rawlsian theory of justice is necessarily
liberal; they both claim agnosticism on the virtues of private ownership.

Rawls maintains that the "background institutions" dictated by his

principles of justice are compatible with either private property or
social ownership economies

— the

choice between the two depending upon

each country's "circumstances, institutions, and historical traditions."

35

He argues that the use of markets is conducive to the stability of equal
liberty, fair equality of opportunity, and the decentralization of power,

although he acknowledges that markets must be amended by state action

were public goods and externalities are present and where distributional
outcomes fail to conform to the Difference Principle.

More significantly,

Rawls recognizes that markets are not incompatible with social ownership
and thus embraces a versionof the "mixed economy"

intervention with public or private ownership
circles

of liberal and socialist thought.

— markets

— now

plus state

current in advancec(
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Given Rawls' ambivalence on the issue of property ownership, a
thorough assessment of his achievement must examine the viability of
context of
the two principles of justice as they would function in the

both a state capitalist and a market socialist economy.

In the former

151

case,

I

shall argue that Rawls has given insufficient
attention to

those aspects inherent in a capitalist economy
which would

(a)

render

the model of moral development upon which Rawls bases
his theory

highly implausible, and

(b)

cause individuals who had attained Rawlsian

consciousness to reject capitalist as an unjust social system.

In the

case of market socialism, the model of moral development becomes plausible,
but, I shall argue, individuals could still not be expected to continually

affirm the Difference Principle.
Let me begin analyzing the relevance of Rawls’ theory to capitalism

by presenting his argument that a natural basis exists in human psychosocial development for commitment to the principles of justice.

Rawls

believes that a sustained commitment to justice cannot follow merely
from the dictates of reason.

Commitment must be reinforced through

the daily experiences of individuals in society.
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Stated differently,

social stability requires that the institutional arrangements chosen in
the "original position" function such that individuals experience "con-

gruence" between their actual desires and conformity to the principles
of justice.

Rawls believes that his principles will generate their own support
by appealing to "the general facts of moral psychology." These facts

determine sequential stages of moral development in the individual

which culminate in a capacity for a sense of justice.

Maturation en-

tails passage from the morality of authority to the morality of associ-

ation and finally to the morality of principles.

The morality of
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authority is that of the child, but we proceed to the
morality of

association by engaging "in a system of cooperation known to
be for
the advantage of all and governed by a common conception of
justice.
As a consequence, we develop "the intellectual skills required
to

regard things from a variety of points of view and to think of these

together as aspects of one system of cooperation."^^
Rawls then claims that we are naturally led from the morality
of association to the morality of principles since, in learning from

social interaction to adopt the perspective of others, we eventually

are able to adopt an objective perspective which is independent of
our own status and aspirations as well as those of any particular as-

sociates

.

Clearly there are aspects of capitalism which serve to stifle

moral development.

First, progression from the morality of authority

to the morality of association is impeded by the absence of egalitarian

economic institutions and reciprocal social interaction within
sphere of production.
and

the

Social relations are characterized by hierarchy

by oppression of groups according to their race, sex, and class.

Thus, there is little opportunity for people to develop an ability
to see the general perspective of others.

Second, the transition to the morality of association requires
that individuals develop "a conception of the whole system of cooper-

ation that defines the association and the ends which it serves.

,,41

Such a conception is made difficult in capitalism where production
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is geared toward exchange rather than use, so that
the only definable

end" served is the continual accumulation of capital and
expansion
of marketable output.

A sense of the social totality finds expression

only in the State, the goals of which are severely constrained by its
need to reproduce and stabilize the conditions under which market-

based accumulation can occur.
Third, the morality of association presupposes „ that individuals

can identify "what it is that others largely want and desire, what are
their controlling beliefs and opinions."

In capitalism, intergroup

and interpersonal antagonisms are caused by the fragmentation of the

division of labor, the limited opportunity for consolidating mutual
trust and understanding through participatory planning and decision-

making, and the often bitter competition among groups for access to

fundamentally unequal economic positions.

A basic commitment to the

capitalist system precludes the perception that these antagonisms
are products of the structure of social rules; hence it tends to lead

individuals to inaccurate imputation of motives and intentions.
Since the principles of association in capitalism are fragmented
and hierarchical, it seems unlikely that maturation to the morality
of principles would occur in the manner described by Rawls.

In a social

structure maintained and promulgated largely by class position, it
is difficult and unnatural for members of one class to accord equal

status to the perceptions and aspirations of another class.

Hence

principles
they are unlikely to be in a position to objectively choose
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of justice.

Putting aside the obstacles which capitalism poses
for moral
development, we can locate characteristics basic to
a capitalist

economy which would be objectionable to persons commited
to the

Rawlsian principles of justice.

Capitalism is consistentwith the

principle of equal liberties only if the separation of political and
economic spheres of social life can be sustained.
refe,rring to

civil" and "political" liberties, but

Rawls is clearly
I

maintain that

any plausible account of political liberty cannot exclude the liberty
to participate in decisions involving production.

In capitalist pro-

duction, workers lose their equal liberties and are subjected to the

will of the minority who own the means of production and/or control
the production process.

Moreover, the extension of democratic principles to the production process would have the effect of strengthening the system of total

liberties, since the experience of equal participation in decision-

making strengthens individual commitment to principles of justice.

In

addition, the democratic control of production would tend to render
the formal principles of representative government a substantive reality.

For historical evidence indicates that those who control the means of

production have an inordinate influence in the political sphere, and
that decisions made in the economic sphere impose severe constraints

on the latitude of State action.
It may be argued that democratic control of production is economic-
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inefficient, and that the structure of control is dictated
by

technical necessity.

There are two problems with this argument.

premise is probably false; numerous studies show that moves
toward more democratic control of production can increase output and
job satisfaction.

44

Second, the sacrifice of equal liberty to increased

efficiency (if liberty is taken to include participation in production
decisions) would represent a violation of Rawls' first priority rule

which place liberty above efficiency.

A further defense of Rawls' claim that the principle of equal
liberties is potentially compatible with capitalism is still possible.
The despotic organization of production could be only a contingent

aspect of capitalismwhich could be altered without rejecting capitalism
as such.

But this is not the case.

The reproduction and expansion of

capitalism dependson the maintenance of an adequate level of profits,
and it is precisely through the hierarchical control over workers in
the production process that surplus is extracted.

Rawls has been misled

by neoclassical economic theory, which holds that profits reflect the

productivity of capital and the time preference of individuals.

The

neoclassical theory of profits has been rather decisively descredited
in recent years by Cambridge economists and others who have demonstrated
j
It deficiencies.
.

Liberal economic theory misconstrues the origin of profits by
treating labor as a commodity essentially identical with all other

^ac tors of production.

But labor is unique in that the amount applied
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in a given production process depends, in
part, on the relative

strengths of opposing class interests.

Hence, the organization of

^

production must reflect essential elements of class struggle.

Tra-

ditional issues such as length of the work day and the size of
the

wage bill must be understood in these

terras

but so must the structure

of hierarchical authority, job fragmentation, wage differentials,

racism, and sexism.

talist firm.

These are the basic characteristics of the capi-

Work organization is the historical product of a dynamic

of interaction between technology and class relationships.

In arguing that capitalism is incompatible with the principle of

equal liberties, I have extended the notion of "basic liberties" to

include rights in control over production.

Rawls, however, would most

likely reject this extension, since he describes the control of the

means of production not as a basic liberty but as a form of wealth.
But if this is the case, then the control of production becomes a pri-

mary good to which the Difference Principle would apply.

Thus it

becomes necessary to my critique to show that the Difference Principle
is also incompatible with the functioning of a capitalist system.

The capitalist firm creates and/or reinforces forms of inequality

whose basic purpose is to fragment the work force in order to allow

maintenance of control by bossess.
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....

In fact, profit maximization

actually entails divergences from Pareto-ef f iciency which can be understood only in terms of class analysis.

The employer can increase the

piece of the pie accruing to capital and management by reducing the

.
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size of the pie to less than its maximum.

Such a paradox can occur

because productive activity, in addition to
creating economic goods,
shsDpes

!

the consciousness of those involved.

In order to maintain

forms of consciousness appropriate to capitalist
social relations,

production techniques which threaten prevailing assessments
of interpersonal and interclass relations may be rejected, even though
they
are technically more efficient.

Thus the democratic control of pro-

duction could render members of the least-advantaged group better off

both relatively (in that certain inequalities would no longer be required to legitimize capitalist social relations) and absolutely (since
total output could probably expand with the utilization of more efficient

production techniques)
Let us now turn to market socialism, which conforms in all respects
to Rawls

'

mixed-economy conception of capitalism, except that private

ownership of capital and wage labor are replaced by worker ownership
and democratic control of the production process.

It is at least

plausible that market socialism could satisfy the principle of equal
liberty, and it should be better able than capitalism to foster the

moral development essential to widespread acceptance of Rawlsian principles of justice.

The passage from the morality of authority to the

morality of association is facilitated by the system of mutuality and
reciprocity to which workers are subjected in production.

The communi-

cative experience of democratic decision-making and participatory

planning are more likely to allow individuals to identify the wants.
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needs, and desires of others.

Finally, disparities in social position

are reduced by the elimination of capitalist
prerogatives and the

hierarchical division of labor in the firm, thus
easing the strain of
commitment to acting on the basis of Rawlsian principles.
Yet market socialism also poses obstacles to the
implementation
and affirmation of the principles of justice, for it
shares with

capitalism the following fundamental mechanism for attaining distributive eqity:

an initial distribution of income is determined through

market forces, and redistribution to attain equity is effected through
State intervention.

I

shall argue that such an arrangement cannot be

expected to satisfy the Difference Principle.
The attainment of justice through redistribution requires that

particular individual interests not enter effectively in the determination of actual social policy.

Yet the principle of equal liberty

requires a form of democracy in which social decisions represent in
some sense the choices of citizens.

Thus justice will inevitably

require that citizens, as voters and legislator, support and affirm

policies conforming to the Difference Principle, with full knowledge
of the effect of these politicies on their own social positions.

Citizens, then, are required to legislate social justice even

when it conflicts with other moral obligations and personal concerns.
The frequency and severity of those conflicts

"strains of commitment"

economy in question.

—will

— what

Rawls calls the

naturally depend upon the particular

In a class society such as capitalism, the strains
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of commitment would clearly be formidable.

Even in market socialism,

'^here Rawlsian consciousness is more completely and firmly reproduced,

it is by no means clear that motivational priority for concerns of

social justice could be attained.
Rawls’ commitment to the absolute priority of socially moral duty

reflects his repudiation of classical individualism.

potentially confusing.

•;

This point is

because Rawls does retain a methodological in-

dividualism;

The essential idea is that we want to account for
the social values, for the intrinsic good of institutional, community, and associative activities, by
a conception of justice that in its theoretical basis
For reason of clarity among others,
is individualistic.
we do not want to rely on an undefined concept of community, or to suppose that society is an organic whole
with a life of its own distinct from and superior to
that of ^^1 its members in their relations with one
another.
However, Rawls reveals his intention to transcend individualism when
he adds the following:

From this (contractual) conception, however individualistic it might seem, we must eventually explain the
value of commun^^y. Otherwise the theory of justice
cannot succeed.
Later in the text, Rawls makes explicit

his commitment to a

communitarian view of human nature;
It is sometimes contended that the contract doctrine entails that private society is the ideal, at least when
the division of advantages satisfies a suitable standard
But this is not so,... human beings have
of reciprocity.
in fact shared final ends and they value their common
institutions and activities as good in themselves. We
need one another as partners in ways of life that are
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in for their own sake, and the successes
and enjoyments of others are necessary for the
complementary to our own good. ^
If Rawls is indeed a communitarian, we may legitimately
ask

why he devotes the first third of his book to deriving the principles
of justice from the original position construction before making

any appeals to intuitive or a prioristic notions of altruism, fra-

tornity

,

or community

.

He seems to believe that he can strengthen

his position by employing only "widely accepted but weak premises"^^

about human nature and society.

Every person is assumed to want to

maximize his index of primary goods, and persons are assumed to be
"mutually disinterested" ;"they are conceived as not taking an interest
in one another's interests".
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These premises would appear to be totally consistent with the

individualism of classical liberalism.

Even Rawls' principle

of

equal liberties does not appear to conflict with the tenets of classical liberalism.

He denies that one conception of the good, one

dominant end, can be shown to be the appropiate end for all persons.
However, Rawls departs

f romclassical

individualism in asserting that

life plans are social and can best be pursued in voluntary associations.

Humans only gain liberty or autonomy by acknowledging and acting on

principles of justice;
a person is acting autonomously when the principles of
his action are chosen by him as the most adequate expressi^^ of his nature as a free and equal rational
being.
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By adopting a Kantian perspective, Rawls makes morality
the ex-

pression and mutual recognition of a common human nature rather
than
servant or device of selfish interest.

a

This respresertps a sharp break

with classical individualist doctrines of political and social ties
founded in the psychology of rational egoism.

Indeed, at the end of

his book, Rawls acknowledges that;
The original position is first used to determine the
content of justice, the principles which define it.
Not until later is justice seen as part of our, good
and connected with our natural sociability. The
merits of the idea of the original position cannot
be assessed by focusing on some single feature of
it, but.^^only by the whole theory which is built
upon it.
Is this a plausible method?

Can Rawls, on one hand, have people

choosing principles of justice "solely on the basis of what seems
best calculated to further their interests so far as they can ascertain

them,"^^ and, on the other hand, derive from these consequentialist

calculations two deontological principles of justice?

Initially, it

would appear that he succeeds by employing Kant’s argument that a
person's interest in achieving freedom and self-realization dictates
that his actions not reflect his contingent status or desires.

Rather,

one expresses human nature (i.e., Kant's noumenal self) by acting as
a 'free and equal rational being'.

Thus Rawls concludes that "we

deliberately assume the limitations of the original position.
,
N
nature.
expression to (our)

..

to give

..56

Yet Rawls is hardly a pale reflection of Kant.

Indeed, sophisti-

attempt to
cated liberal political philosophy has long given up the
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ground political obligation in the moral rectitude
of isolated pre-

social individuals.

In Rawls this rejection is reflected in his

recurrent concern with congruence, reciprocity, and
experiential

reinforcement in the validation of the principles of justice
through
social intercourse.

The social nature of consciousness in Rawls gives

evidence of his deep commitment to the communitarian tradition in
liberal theory which considers individual consciousness and behavior

more a result thap a cause of social organization and tends to view
the State as the ultimate regulator of social development.

The first

and perhaps most brilliant adherent to this view was Marx's teacher,
Hegel.

Hegel's advance over Kant was to perceive that by accepting the
ends of mutually disinterested individuals as ultimate and inviolate,

liberal theory constrained itself to viewing "civil society" as the
only conceivable form of social union, thus failing to provide a moral
basis for community.

Rejecting Kant's individualism, Hegel made the

individual's relation to the State determinate of his moral identity.

Political society would achieve the community of which civil society
was incapable.

Now Rawls fully accepts the Hegelian critique of civil society, or
as Rawls calls it, "private society," which is an association "not held

together by a public conviction that its basic arrangements are just
and good in themselves, but by the calculation of everyone.

..

that any

practical changes would reduce the stock of means whereby they pursue
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their personal ends."^^

Private society could not be a just society

because it lacks universally agreed upon
principles of justice.
Rawls merely amplifies the growing receptiveness
of liberal thought
to the Hegelian notion of the State.

In the face of social conflict

engendered by capitalist development, and because, conceptually,
there
was no way of demonstrating precisely which moral principles
a "free
and equal rational person" would choose, liberal social theory
has

quietly ushered in the interventionist State as an antidote to the
chaos of private society.

Rawls* commitment to democracy, however,

will not permit him to embrace the monarchical predilections of Hegelianism, wherein the State requires no participation by the governed.

Hence we witness a developing polarity in Rawls* thought as he
seeks a stable synthesis of two positions, each of which he finds

unacceptable.

On one hand, modern liberal societies have shown them-

selves unable to rely solely on individual moral choice to achieve

social justice.

Yet individual liberties and authentic democracy

become meaningless in the absence of individual moral responsibility.
On the other hand, the preservation of individual liberties and

democracy, not to mention social equity, in liberal societies has

required State intervention on an increasingly wider scale.

Yet liberal

theory has been unable to either fully legitimize or propose definitive

guidelines for the activities of the State.
Rawls claims to have developed a consistent and stable juxtaposition
of these two dilemmas, resolving both of them by means of his methodo-

.
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logical construct, the Original Position.

With it, he has seemingly

derived the Hegelian conclusion that the interventionist State
is the
only basis for a rational society while using only the premises
of

classical liberalism (that is, the individual choices of "free and
equal rational persons")

.

Conversely, the Original Position frees

Hegelianism of its anti— individualistic implications by providing
explicit policy guidelines for the State and lending to its activities
the moral weight of the unanimous consensus of objective and rational

individuals
I

maintain, however, that Rawls' synthesis does not hold and that

a sound intellectual edifice cannot be constructed by leaning Kant

against Hegel.

The fundamental weakness of Rawls' theory stems from

his attempt to integrate two radically different and equally untenable

conceptions of human nature.

Classical liberalism views the individual

as pursuing only private interests and tolerant of social institutions

only to the extent that they enhance the fulfillment of those interests.

Although widely divergent in substance, both the Kantian and the utilitarian traditions within liberal thought share the view of the isolated

individual as choosing how best to fulfill his private ends.

Social

cohesion is presumed to follow either from the universality of the
imperatives of practial reason in the of Kant or from the

Invisible

Hand" logic or notions of sympathy in Utilitarian doctrine.

The Hegelian conception of human nature, and with it the modern

corporate liberal tradtion, on the other hand places no reliance on
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individual moral choice since the common citizen cannot
have the concept
of the social totality required to make rational choice.

Only the

State can act rationally, and individuals can best assure their
own

allegiance to the State.

In other words, one

can behave morally only to the extent that one recognizes and acts

from one's position as a member of the social body.
That the Hegelian conception of human nature is a part of Rawls’

analysis is shown by his concern with congruence and the reinforcement
of the principles of justice in daily life.

Rawls would seem to

hold that a failure on the part of the State to actively impose the

Difference Principle would cause disruption in the generation of
ideals and aspirations consistent with the principles of justice.
But this could be true only if the individual's capacity for moral

behavior is dependent on the quality of his social environment

— the

Hegelian position.
I

now come to the crux of my argument.

Can Rawls' Original Posi-

tion actually accommodate and synthesize the polar opposites repre-

sented by Kantian and Hegelian ethics?

One the one hand is the

individual's ability to act justly through the isolated exercise of
free will abstracted from social contingencies.

On the other is

his ability to so identify his good with that of society as to conform
to principles of justice which may sharply interfere with the fulfill-

ment of other personal goals and obligations.

Can he do both?

I

claim that neither conception is plausible and that the assertion.
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upon which the coherency of Rawls’ theory depends,
that both concep
tions simultaneously describe human nature is
inconceivable.

Rawls

has ascribed material existence to the limiting cases
of moral be-

havior and even his theoretical elegance cannot withstand
such a
fundamental error.

IV

In this final section,

shall address myself to three questions

I

concerning the implications of Rawls’ failure to construct a viable
liberal theory of justice.
theory of justice possible?

First, is a consistent and viable liberal
I

shall argue that it is not.

Second, can

any theory of justice be both internally consistent and yet viable in
a modern society?

I

shall support an affirmative answer, and that

answer leads directly to the third question; what would be the central
features of a just society?
Rawls’ lack of success was, in a sense, dictated by the very

nature of the task he set for himself.

By acknowledging that a private

society cannot be just, Rawls forces himself to defend the position that
a liberal society can offer a sense of totality and purpose sufficiently

compelling to cause individuals to suppress their private intentions and
goals.

Yet an essential aspect of liberalism is the notion of a plural good,

as evidenced by Rawls’ sharp and adamant distinction between liberal society

and societies dedicated to a dominant end or common vision of the good life.

Thus Rawls is left with the rather difficult task of arguing that individ-
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uals can reach a consensus on what constitutes justice in the distri-

bution of means (i.e., primary goods) without sharing a common valuation of ends.

While we might reject the viability of such a procedure

as requiring loftily virtuous decision-making behavior by the partici-

pants, Rawls does present arguments to support his case.

We have already assessed Rawls’ reliance on the Kantian moral im-

perative and found it to be inadequate as the sole basis for a theory
of justice.

However, let us accept, for the sake of argument, Rawls’

claim that moral persons would act within the constraints imposed by
the Original Position.

We are still left with the question of whether

or not a liberal society can engender and affirm the sort of communi-

tarian ethic which underlies Rawls’ conception of morality.

To answer

this question we must examine his notion of self-respect.

Rawls defines self-respect as a "person’s sense of his own value,
his secure conviction that his life plan is worth carrying out" and
"a confidence in one’s own ability so far as it is within one’s power,
to fulfill one’s intentions."

spect are:

1)

58

The conditions which support self-re-

the plan of life satisfies the Aristotelian Principle;

"other things being equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their

realized capacities (their innate or trained abilities) and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the greater
its complexity.

2)

Others confirm our sense of worth by their ap-

preciation of our abilities and achievements.

This latter condition

in the pursuit of at
is met when others are willing to join with us
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least one activity central to the realization of our life
plan.^°

Such a voluntary association Rawls calls a social union.
The examples Rawls gives of social unions are families and friendships, sciences and arts.

Yet he seemingly ignores the fundamental

importance of the structure of work in shaping values.

In liberal

societies, most gainful employments do not requir.eor permit the reali-

zation of Aristotelian capacities.

They are undertaken for the sake

of compensation rather than for the sake of the activity itself.

If

economic activities do not take on the character of social unions, we
must question the ability of liberal societies to foster self-respect.
Rawls anticipates this concern, and he meets it with the notion of a

"well-ordered society."

In such a society, the principles of justice

are generally acknoweldged and the basic institutions are known to
Indeed, a well-ordered society is

satisfy the principles of justice.
"a social union of social unions^"
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in the sense that social unions,

including a generalized community of the whole, are likely to flourish
and abound.

Now Rawls has captured a certain truth which had been pushed to
the periphery by the individualist tendencies of liberal thought.

He

shows that autonomy requires community, that the nature of human self-

realization requires not only that communitarian activity be a valued
end but also that private ends be affirmed by others.

Yet

I

want to

suggest a degree of incompatibility between Rawls’ communitarian ethics
and the value he places on autonomy.
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To the extent that the individuals composing a society
share values,

an objective standard is erected by which to assess preferred
ends.

Rawls employs the Aristotelian principle as his objective standard,
but
this strategy would seemingly lead to the conclusion that those whose

life plans exhibit little dedication to the realization of their human

capacities (as defined by societal standards) would suffer a loss of esteem
form their peers and a consequent inability to maintain adequate selfrespect.

Rawls struggles to avoid this implication.

He insists that

human values are pluralistic as well as communitarian.

Pluralism permits

autonomous choice, diversity, and a kind of Millian progess through

the

competition and testing of alternatives.
Yet even Rawls* ideal of pluralistic communitarianism remains in-

compatible with his vision of individual autonomy.

A plurality of ends,

even in the context of tolerance, carries with it the likelihood that
in a society which values the Aristotelian principle, those persons whose

ends reflect a weak commitment to self-realization will be excluded from
the broad endeavors aimed at realizing societal goals.
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Ironically,

these same people will likely experience a more severe loss of self-

respect than if they were the pure egoists of classical liberalism.

The

very presence of a communitarian ethic in a liberal society intensifies
the potential for exclusion and hence threatens the autonomy of the indi-

vidual

.

liberal
To return, then, to the question of whether or not a viable
to fully
theory of justice is possible, we have seen that Rawls is unable
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synthesize individual autonomy and the notion of a communitarian ethic.

Without this synthesis, a liberal theory of justice faces an irresolvable
dilemma; either the criterion of right is based on the intentions of

autonomous individuals (in which case the theory of justice is totally

contingent and hence nonviable)^^ or the criterion of right is based
on an objective, or intersubjective, standard (in which case the notion
of a plural good would be undermined and rule by a benevolent despot would

be justified).

Thus the theory is either nonviable or illiberal.

We must now ask whether any viable theory of justice can be conceived.
I

propose that such a theory would have to begin with the recognition that

humans are both the initiators and the products of their social environment.

To look to the structure of society for a criterion of right is to

miss the on-going input of human intentions.

On the other hand, if we

look to individuals for the criterion of right, we miss the societal logic

which functions to structure individual evaluations and aspirations.
Rawls* fundamental error lies in the fact that, in spite of his aware-

ness of the dialectic between individual and society, he reduces both indi-

vidual intentionality and the social environment to idealized, ahistorical
abstractions.

Thus he makes the human reflective capacity motivationally

dominant over all other human capacities and needs.

Similarly, in arguing

that the commitment to justice would be nurtured by the functioning of

just institutions, he gives the socialization process a greater priority
than it could possibly have in a class-divided society.

A correct pro-

viewing autonomy
cedure for constructing a theory of justice cannot begin by
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as the private selection of personal goals and then seek,
to graft a

communitarian ethic onto an individualist model.

The weakness of this

approach is refMcted in the fact that, except for the "constitutionmaking" stage, the Rawlsian model neither requires nor permits partici-

pation by individuals in the shaping of just institutions.

Like Locke,

Smith, and Mill, Rawls lends potential support to an authoritarian State

while attempting to protect individual autonomy.
At the very base of a viable theory of justice must lie a concep-

tion of human lives as centering around voluntarily undertaken communi-

tarian activities.

The value of autonomy must be transformed into the

value of participation in the formulation of a common plan for the social
units with which the individual is associated.

The participation model

of autonomy would involve willingness to collaborate, compromise, and

be outvoted.

It would imply that we can only discover or construct our

ends in community.
The obvious objection to this notion of autonomy is the traditional

liberal fear that the individual will be swallowed up in a social purpose
which, by its very nature, cannot be real.

For the liberal viewpoint, a

social purpose can only be the individual purposes of those who have
gained power.

Thus to be engulfed by a social purpose is to be subservient

to the will of other persons.

This line of thinking leads Rawls to his

adamant rejection of "dominant end" societies.

Yet the contradiction

transcended.
between individualism and collectivism can be effectively

which;
Habermas has developed the notion of a "communicative ethics"
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—

guarantees the generality of admissible norms and
the autonomy of acting subjects solely through the
discursive redeemability of the validity claims with
which norms appear. That is, generality is guaranteed
that the only norms that may claim generality are
those on which everyone affected agrees (or would agree)
without constraint if they enter into (or were to enter
into) a process of discursive will— formation. .Only
communicative ethics is universal. .only communicative
ethics guarantees autonomy.”
.

.

Habermas is seeking to reformulate a central thesis of classical

liberalism

the inseparability of truth and goodness.

He argues that

a collective and ’rational will' can emerge when;

...reciprocal behavioral expectations raised to normative status afford validity to a common interest
ascertained without deception. The interest is common
because the constraint-free consensus permits only
what all can want; it is free of deception because
even the interpretations of needs in which each individual must be able to recognize what he wants become
the object of discursive will-formation.
The discursively formed will may be called "rational" because the
formal properties of discourse and of the deliberative
situation sufficiently guarantee that a consensus can
arise only through appropriately interpreted, generalizable interests, by which I mean needs that can be
communicatively shared. The limits of a decisionistic
treatment of practical questions are overcome as soon
as argumentation is expected to test the generalizability
of interests, instead of being resigned to an impeneggable
pluralism of apparently ultimate value orientations.
If a society based on a participatory model of autonomy and a

communicative ethics would be just, we must finally ask what would be
the institutional characteristics of such a society.

I

suggest that

liberal theory itself has contributed a great deal to the proper con-

ception of the just society.

The four major theorists examined in

between
the present work were all troubled by a perceived incompatibility
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class divisions and social justice.

The existence of classes inter-

feres with the process of reciprocal human interaction
and the develop-

ment of shared standards.

Thus

I

conclude that an essential aspect

of the just society would be an extension to the economic
sphere of

the democratic rights now formally exhibited in the political
sphere.

A thorough democratization of the economy is certainly a step which no
liberal theorist has been willing to advocate, yet by moving beyond the

perimeter of liberalism, we do not necessarily resolve the conflict between individual autonomy and communitarian ends.

Unless the potential

for conflict between individual and social interests remains, the indi-

vidual can no longer be regarded as an autonomous agent carrying rights
and responsibilities.

Admittedly, the absence of conflicting class

interests would greatly enhance the harmony of individual interests, but
an opposing force would also function in a democratized economy.

The

fact that all aspects of the economy are subject to public choice would

remove any ’naturalness” to economic outcomes and would potentially in-

crease the conflict between individual interests.

As Habermas explains;

At every level, administrative planning produces unintended
unsettling and publicizing effects. These effects weaken
the justification potential of traditions that have been
flushed out of their nature-like course of development.
Once their unquestionable character has been destroyed,
the stabilization of validity claims can succed only
through discourse. The stirring up of cultural affairs
that are taken for granted thus furthers the politicization of areas of life previously assigned to the private
sphere. .. Efforts of participation and the plethora of
alternative models... are indicators of this danger^^as
is the increasing number of citizens' initiatives.
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Habermas suggests that conflict in a just society
could be mini-

mized through the development of "communicative
competence" wherein
individuals are able to discursively justify their actions
and beliefs.

Without meaning to belittle the significance of communicative
competence,
I

propose that any attempt to allocate resources in a complex, modern

economy on the basis of individual evaluations expressed solely through

political mechanisms can be neither just nor efficient.

Individuals

would necessarily be engaged in continual assessment of the merits of
their own intentions and those of others.

Consensus would be conceivable

only on the basis of an objective criterion of right.

Yet given the

different dimensions of justice (i.e., merit, need, etc.), we would
expect consensus to be problemmatic even among individual committed to

’communicative competence'.

Mill left a valuable legacy in stressing the indeterminacy of the
proper end of human existence.

Humans are actively engaged in becoming

as well as in being , and any attempt to truncate the developmental process

by establishing a fixed criterion of right cannot be consistent with
justice.

Yet we need not conclude with Mill that a class society is

essential to the competitive dynamic through which superior humans
emerge.

In fact,

the solution to the indeterminacy problem is to

democratically establish an institutional framework which is sufficiently
flexible^ to accomodate the dynamism of changing preference structures
and yet sufficiently rigid to give outcomes which are affirmed because
they are believed to derive from just institutions (as opposed to affirm—
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ation based on a consensus of opinions concerning a specific outcome).
Rawls employs this approach when he argues that:
...the correctness of the distribution is founded on
the justice of the scheme of cooperation from which
it arises and on answering the claims of individuals
engaged in it. A distribution cannot be judged in
isolation from the system of which it is the outcome
or from what individuals have done in RQod faith in
the light of established expectations.

The point is that the just society could function largely on
the basis of institutional mechanisms so that individual virtue would

consist of affirming those institutions rather than continually assessing the merit of every claim made on society.

Habermas affirms this

conclusion when he acknowledges that;
The question of which sectors»should, if necessary, be
regulated through compromise or formal^^orms of action
can also be the subject of discussion.
The final balance between formal or institutionalized procedures and
the on-going, participatory input of individuals cannot be ascertained

beforehand.

The just society, like the moral person, must choose the

correct path leading from a specific past to an indeterminate future.

.

176

FOOTNOTES, CHAPTER IV

1.

T.H. Green, Prolesemena To Ethics p.
,

174.

See also pp.

2.

Henry Sidgewick, Method of Ethics

121.

See also p. 94.

3.

4.
5.
6.

p.

,

W.S. Jevons, Theory of Political Economy

Jevons, The State in Relation to Labour
Jevons, Theory of Political Economy
K. Menger, Principles of Economics

p.

,

,

p.

85.

pp.

98,

104.

173.

p.

,

,

166-7.

173.

7.
L. Walras, Elements of Pure Economics
p. 256.
Walras did believe
that rent should accrue to the State; "it is contrary to justice that the
individual should turn to his exclusive profit the social conditions
established by the state." Economie Sociale p. 201.
,

,

Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy

8.

J.

9.

K. Wicksell, Lectures on Political Economy , p.

,

p.

48.

79.

10.

J.B. Clark, Philosophy of Wealth , p.

11.

Clark, The Distribution of Wealth

12.

P.H. Wicksteed, An Essay on the Co-ordination of the Laws of

Distribution
13.

L.

,

109.

p. v.

.

Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic

Science
14.
E. Barone, "The Ministry of Production in a Collectivist State,"
N. Kaldor, "Welfare
in Collective Econo mic Planning , F.A. Hayek (ed.).
Propositions in Economics," Economic Journal , 1939, p. 549.

Scitovsky, "A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics,"
Review of Economic Studies Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 77.
15.

T.

,

The exception, of course, is the Pareto superior move where no
person is made worse off and at least one person is made better off.
16.

Bergson, "A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare Economics," Quarterly Journal of Economics February, 1938.
17.

A.

,

,,

177

18.

Theory

,

G.

Myrdal, The Political Element in the Develo pment of Economic
~

141.

p.

19.
The most concise treatment of this issue is F.M. Bator, "The
Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization," American Economic Review,
March, 1957.

20.

K. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values

.

21.

D.M. Winch, Analytical Welfare Economics

181.

,

p.

22.
H.M. Hochman and J.R. Rogers, "Pareto Optimal Redistribution,"
American Economic Review September, 1964, pp. 652-7.
,

For an elaboration of this point see R.A. Musgrave, "Pareto
Optimal Redistribution; Comment," American Economic Review, December,
1970, pp. 991-3.
23.

24.

Cf. J. de V. Graaff, Theoretical Welfare Economics
E.J. Mishan,
F.M.
.
I.M.D. Little, A Critique of Welfare Economics
.

Welfare Economics

.

cit .

Bator,
25.

John Rawls, A Theory of Justice

p. viii.

,

26.
The tendency to read Rawls as a classical liberal has been
especially prevalent among leftist critics. See M. Teitelbaum, "The
Limits of Individualism," The Journal of Philosophy Vol. LXIX, No. 18,
October, 1972, pp. 545-555; A. Schwartz, "Moral Neutrality and Primary
Gooods," Ethics Vol. 84. July, 1973, pp. 294-307; A. Eshete, "Contractarianism and the Scope of Justice," Ethics Vol. 85, October, 1974,
,

,

,

pp. 38-49.

chapters 21-23. R.A. Dahl, A Preface
Schumpeter, o£. cit
Democracy in the United States
Pluralist
Also
Dahl,
to Democratic Theory.
27.

J.

.

28.

Rawls

29.

Ib id

.

,

p.

30.

Ibid.

,

pp.

31.

Ibid

.

p.

303.

32.

Ibid.

p.

302.

33.

Ibid.

op. cit.

,

pp.

104.

11-

302

,

.

,

..

.

178

34.

Ibid

35.

Ibid., p. 280.

36.

Ibid.

.

,

,

75.

p

272.

p.

37.
For cogent expositions of the liberal viewpoint, see R. A. Dahl
and C.E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics, and Welfare
P, A. Samuelson,
Foundations of Economic Analysis
an example of socialist thought may
be found in 0. Lange and F.M. Taylor, On the Economic Theory of Socialism
;

;

38.

Rawls

39.

Ibid., p

472.

40.

Ibid

.

,

p

468.

44.
41.

Ibid.

,

p.

468.

42.

Ibid.

,

p.

469.

,

op

cit

This point is
Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval
U)

.

;

,

For example, see P. Blumberg, Industrial Democracy: The Sociology of Participation W.F. Whyte, Money and Motivation and C. Riskin,
"Incentive Systems and Work Motivation," Working Papers I, no. 4, Winter,
;

;

1974.
45.
A thorough exposition of the Cambridge controversy, as well as
an excellent bibliography, is provided by G.C. Harcourt, Some Cambridge
Controversies in the Theory of Capital
.

Rawls, "Fairness to Goodness," Philosophical Review
no. 4, October, 1975.
46.

,

Vol. 84,

See S. Bowles and H. Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America
and Gintis, "The Nature of the Labor Exchange in the Theory of Capitalist
Production," Review of Radical Political Economics, Vol. 8, no. 2, Summer,
47.

;

1976.
00

Rawls

A Theory of Justice,

49.

Ibid.

pp.

264-65.

50.

Ibid.

pp.

522-23.

,,,,,,,

179

51.

Ibid.

pp.

18,

129.

52.

Ibid.

pp.

13,

127.

53.

Ibid.

P-

252.

54.

Ibid.

P-

584.

55.

Ibid.

P-

584.

56.

Ibid.

P-

320.

57.

Ibid.

P-

522.

58.

Ibid.

P-

440.

59.

Ibid.

P-

426.

60.

Ibid.

pp.

440-441.

61.

Ibid.

PP

453-454.

62.

Ibid

P-

.

527.

Rawls offers the ra
63.
respect can be maintained by participating in at least one social union
which is devoted to an activity important to realizing one’s life plan.
Ibid
pp. 441-442.
.

,

64.
The single case in which a liberal theory of justice could be
based on the intentions of autonomous individuals and be simultaneously
viable is the Lockean case of a society of independent producers whose
exchange of goods is based on roughly equal access to nature.
65.

Jurgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis,

66.

Ibid

.

p.

108.

67.

Ibid

.

p.

72.

68.

Rawls

69.

Habermas, op. cit., p. 89.

A Theory of Justice,

p.

88.

.

.

180

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aaron, Richard I., John Locke (Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1971).

Anschutz, R.P., The Philosophy of J.S. Mill (Oxford:

Clarendon Press,

Anspach, Ralph, "The Implications of the Theory of Moral Sentiments
for
Adam Smith's Economic Thought," History of Political Economy Spring,
.

Arrow, Kenneth, Social Choice and Individual Values (New York:
Wiley, 1951)^
Barry, Brian, The Liberal Theory of Justice (Oxford:
1973).

John

Clarendon Press.

Bator, F.M. , "The Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization, American
Economic Review March, 1957.
,

Bentham, Jeremy, A Fragment on Government edited by F.C. Montague,
(London:
Oxford University Press, 1931).
,

Jeremy Bentham's Economic Writings
f
Allen and Unwin, 1952-54)

edited by W. Stark (London:

,

The Works of Jeremy Bentham , edited by John Bowring, (New York:
,
Russell and Russell, 1962).
Bergson, Abram, "A Ref omrulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare Economics,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics February, 1938.
,

Billet, Leonard, "The Just Economy: The Moral Basis of the Wealth of
Nations," Review of Social Economics December, 1976.
,

Bird, Otto, The Idea of Justice (New York:

Random House, 1967).

Blaug, Mark, Economic Theory in Retrospect (Homewood, 111.:
Irwin, 1968).

Blumberg, P., Industrial Democracy:
Schocken Books, 1969).
York:

The Sociology of Participation (New

Bonar, James, Philosophy and Political Economy (New York:
1966)

Richard D.

A.M. Kelley,

.

.

181

Borchard, Ruth, John Stuart Mill the Man (London:

Watts

&

Co., 1957 ).

Bowles, Samuel and Gintis, Herbert, Schooling in
Capitalist America
(New York:
Basic Books, 1976).

B^ibton, Karl, John Stuart Mill (London:

Penguin, 1953)

Campbell, William F., "Adam Smith's Theory of Justice, Prudence and
Beneficience," American Economic Review , May, 1967.

Alfred F., Natural Law and the Rise of Economic Individualism
in England," Journal of Political Economy , August, 1951.
Clark, John Bates, Philosophy of Wealth (New York:

The Distribution of Wealth (New York:

»

A.M. Kelley, 1967).

A.M. Kelley,

1965).

Clark, John Maurice, et. al., Adam Smith 1776-1926 (New York;
Kelley, 1966).

Cowling, Maurice, Mill and Liberalism (Cambridge;
Press, 1963).

A.M.

Cambridge University

Cropsey, Joseph, Polity and Economy; An Interpretation of the Principles
of Adam Smith (London:
Greenwood, 1957).
Dahl, Robert A., A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago:
Chicago Press, 1956).

University of

Pluralist Democracy in the United States (Chicago:

Rand McNally,

,

1967).

Dahl, Robert A. and Lindblom, Charles E.
(New York:
Harper and Row, 1953)

Politics, Economic, and Welfare

,

Daniels, Norman (ed.), Reading Rawls (New York;

Basic Books, 1975).

de Roover, Raymond, "The Concept of the Just Price: Theory and Economic
Policy," Journal of Economic History December, 1958.
,

Dobb, Maurice, Studies in the Development of Capitalism (New York:
ternational Publishers, 1963).

In-

Theories of Val ue and Distribution Since Adam Smith (Cambridge:
,
Cambridge University Press, 1973).
Duncan, Graeme, Marx and Mill (Cambridge:
1973).

Cambridge University Press,

.

182

Dunn, John, "Justice and the Interpretation of Locke's
Political Theory,"
Political Studies . Vol. XVI, No. 1, 1968.

Dumont, Louis, From Mandevill to Marx (Chicago
Press, 1977).

;

University of Chicago

Emmet, Dorothy, Rules, Roles, and Relations (Boston:

Beacon Press, 1966)

Eshete, A., "Contractarianism and the Scope of Justice," Ethics, October,
1974.

Friedreich, Carl J. and Chapman, John W.
York: Atherton Press, 1974).

NOMOS IV

f

;

Liberty (New York:

,

(eds.), NOMOS VI; Justice (New

Atherton Press, 1962).

Gellner, Ernest, Legitimation of Belief (London, Cambridge University
Press, 1974)
Gill, Emily, "Justice in Adam Smith: The Right and the Good," Review
of Social Economics December, 1976.
,

Gintis, Herbert, "Alienation and Power; Towards A Radical Welfare Economics,"
(Unpublished dissertation. Harvard University, 1969).

"The Nature of the Labor Exchange and the Theory of Capitalist
,
Production," Review of Radical Political Economics , Summer, 1976.
Gough, J.W.
1973).

,

John Locke's Political Philosophy (Oxford:

Clarendon Press

Graff, J. de V., Theoretical Welfare Economics (Cambridge:
University Press, 1957).

Cambridge

Gray, Alexander, The Development of Economic Doctrine (New York:
and Sons, 1931).

Green, T.H.
Arbor:
,

,

Wiley

Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (Ann
University of Michigan Press, 1967).

Prolegomena To Ethics, edited by A.C. Bradley (New York:

Kraus,

1968).

Habermas, Jurgen, Legitimation Crisis (Boston:

Beacon Press, 1975).

(Oxford:
Hahn, Frank and Hollis, Martin, Philosophy and Economic Theory
Oxford University Press, 1979).

.

183

Halevy, Elie, The Growth of Philosophic
Radicalism (Boston:
Press, 1955)

Halliday, R. J.

,

John St uart Mill (New York:

Beacon

Barnes & Noble, 1976).

Harcourt, G.C., Some Cambridge Controversies In
the Theory of C apital
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).
Harrison, John L., "The Expedient, the Right, and
the Just in Mill's
Utilitarianism," Canadian Journal of Economics Supplement
I,
,

Hayek, F.A. , (ed.). Collectivist Economic Planning (New York:
Kelley, 1967).

A

Hegel, G.W.F., Lectures on the History of Philosophy (London:
and Kegan Paul, 1963).

Routledge

Himmelfarb, Gertrude, On Liberty and Liberalism (New York:

Knopf, 1974)

Hirschman, Albert 0. The Passions and the Interests (Princeton:
ton University Press, 1977).
,

Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan , edited by M. Oakeshott (Oxford:
1960).

M

Prince-

Blackwell,

Hochman, H.M. and Rogers, J.R. , "Pareto Optimal Redistribution," American
Economic Review , September, 1964.

Hollander, Samuel, The Economics of Adam Smith (Toronto:
of Toronto Press, 1973).
Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature
(Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1960).

,

edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge,

An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
,
Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957).

,

Jevons, W.S., The State in Relation to Labour (London:

The Theory of Political Economy
(Baltimore:
Penguin, 1970).
,

,

The University

edited by L.A.

Macmillan, 1882)

edited by R.D. Collison Black

Kaldor, Nicholas, "Welfare Propositions in Economics," Economic Journal ,
1939.

Kendall, Willmoore, John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority-Rule (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1959).

.

.

184

Lamprecht, Sterling P., The Moral and Political
Philosophy of John Locke
(New York:
Russell & Russell, 1962)
Lange, Oskar and Taylor, Fred M. On the Economic Theory
of Socialism
(New York:
A.M. Kelley, 1970y!
,

Lazonick, William, "Karl Marx and Enclosures in England," Review
of
Radical Political Economics , Summer, 1974.
Lindgren, J. Ralph, The Social Philosophy of Adam Smith (The Hague:
Martinas Nijhoff, 1967).
Little, I.M.D., A Critique of Welfare Economics (Oxford:
versity Press, 1950).
Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
Fraser (New York: Dover Publications, 1959).

Essays on the Law of Nature
Clarendon Press, 1954).

_i

»

,

,

Oxford Uni-

edited by A.C.

edited by W. von Leyden (Oxford:

The Works of John Locke (Aalen:

Scientia Verlag, 1963).

Two Tracts on Government edited by Philip Abrams (London:
y
Cambridge University Press, 1967).
,

Two Treatises of Government , edited by Peter Laslett (London:
,
Cambridge University Press, 1967).

Losman, Donald L., "J.S. Mill on Alternative Economic Systems," American
Journal of Economics and Sociology January, 1971.
,

Lowe, Adolph, On Economic Knowledge (New York:

Harper Torchback, 1965).

Lyons, David, In the Interest of the Governed (Oxford, Clarendon Press,
1973)

Macfie, A.L.

,

The Individual in Society (London:

Macpherson, C.B., Democratic Theory:
ford University Press, 1973).

Allen & Unwin, 1967).

Essays in Retrieval (Oxford:

The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford:
University Press, 1962).

Ox-

Oxford

,

Marshall, John, "The Proof of Utility and Equity in Mill's Utilitarianism,"
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, September, 1973.

.

,

•

185

Marx, Karl, Capital (New York:

International Publishers, 1967).

The German Ideology (new York:

»

International Publishers, 1947).

Mazlish, Bruce, James and John Stuart Mill (London:

McCloskey, H.J., John Stuart Mill:

Hutchinson, 1975).

A Critical Study (London:

Macmil-

Meek, Ronald, Studies in the Labor Theory of Value (New York:
Review Press, 1976).

Monthly

lan,

1971).

Menger, Karl, Principles of Economics (New York:

Free Press, 1950).

Mill, John Stuart, A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive
(London:
Longman, Green, & Co., 1949).
,

Collected Works (Toronto:

University of Toronto Press, 1963).

Considerations on Representative Government (Indianapolis:
,
Bobbs-Merrill, 1958).
,

Dissertations and Discussions (New York:

,

Nature' and -Utility of Religion (New 'York:

Henry Holt, 1874).

Liberal Arts Press,

1958)

Norton, 1975).

,

On Liberty (New York:

,

Principles of Political Economy (New York:

,

Utilitarianism (Indianapolis:

A.M. Kelley, 1965).

Bobbs-Merrill, 1957).

Mishan, E.J., Welfare Economics (New York:

Random House, 1964).

Studies,
Moore, James, "Hume’s Theory of Justice and Property," Political
June, 1976.
(New
Morrow, Glenn R. The Ethical and Economic Theories of Adam Smith
York: A.M. Kelley, 1969).

"Pareto Optimal Redistribution:
Musgrave, R.A.
Economic Review December, 1970.

Comment,

American

,

t of Economi c
Myrdal, Gunnar, The Political Element in the Developmen
Theory (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1969)

.

186

—

Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York:
1974).

Basic Books.

O’Driscoll, Gerald P., (ed.), Adam Smith and Modem Political Economy
(Ames:
The Iowa State University Press, 1979).
Oser, Jacob, The Evolution of Economic Thought (New York:
Brace, and World, 1963).

Harcourt,

Parsons, Talcott, The Structure of Social Action (Glenroe, 111.: Free
Press, 1949).

Perelman, Chaim, Justice (New York:

Random House, 1967).

Plamanatz, John, The English Utilitarians (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958)
Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1971).
,

"Fairness to Goodness," Philosophical Review

,

October, 1975.

Rees, John, "A Re-reading of Mill on Liberty," Political Studies
VIII, 1960.
,

3,

,

Vol.

"The Thesis of the Two Mill’s," Political Studies, Vol. XXV, No.
1977.

Riesman, David A. Adam Smith’s Sociological Economics (New York: Barnes
& Noble, 1976).
Ricardo, David, The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (New
York: Dutton, 1957).
Riley, Patrick, "On Finding an Equilibrium Between Consent and Natural
Law in Locke’s Political Philosophy," Political Studies Vol. XXII,
,

No. 4.

Riskin, Carl, "Incentive Systems and Work Motivation," Working Papers
Winter, 1974.

,

Robbins, Lionel, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic
Science (London: Macmillan, 1962).

Robertson, H.M. and Taylor, W.L.
of Value," Economic Journal

,
,

"Adam Smith’s Approach to the Theory
1957.

and Politi£^^
Robson, John M. The Improvement of Mankind: The Social
Paul, 1968).
Kegan
&
Routledge
(London:
Thought of John Stuart Mill
,

.

.

187

Roll* Eric, A History of Economic Thought (Homewood,
111.; Richard D.
Iirwin, 1974).

Routh, Guy, The Origin of Economic Ideas (New York:
Ryan, Alan, J.S. Mill (London:

Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974).

The Philosophy of John Stuart Mill (London:

»

Sabine, George H.

,

Vintage, 1977).

Macmillan, 1970).

A History of Political Theory (New York:

Holt, 1950)

Samuelson, Paul A., Foundations of Economic Analysis (New York:
University Press, 1963).

Oxford

Schumpeter, Joseph, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York:
Harper, 1950).

History of Economic Analysis (New York:

,

Oxford University Press:

1963).

Schwartz, A., "Moral Neutrality and Primary Goods," Ethics

,

July, 1973.

Schwartz, Pedro, The New Political Economy of J.S. Mill (London:
denfeld & Nicholson, 1972).

Wei-

Scitovsky, T. , "A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics," Review of
Economic Studies Vol. 9, No.l.
,

Sewall, Hannah, The Theory of Value Before Adam Smith (New York:
Kelley, 1968).

Sidgwick, Henry, The Method of Ethics (London:

A.M.

Macmillan, 1962)

Skinner, Andrew S. and Wilson, Thomas, (eds.). Essays on Adam Smith
Clarendon Press, 1975).
(Oxford:
Smith, Adam, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of The Wealth of
Nations (New York: Random House, 1937)
,

Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenues and Army (London:

T. Nelson,

1963).
,

The Theory of Moral Sentiments (New York:

A.M. Kelley,

1966).

(London: Kegan
Stark, W., The Ideal Foundations of Economic Thought
Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1943).

.

L8B

Stoarnes, J. Brenton, "Bontham on I’ubLlc and
Private Ethlca," Cauadinn
Journal o£ Philoaophy December, 1975.
.

Stiglor, George F., Essays In the History of Economics
(Chicago:
versity of Chicago Press, 1965).
Strauss, Leo, Natural Right and History (Chicago:
Press, 1953^

Uni-

Unlverlty of Chicauo

Taylor, W.L., Francis Hutcheson and David Hume as P redecessors of Adam
Smith (Durham, N.C.
Duke University Press, 1965).
:

Teitelbaum, M. , The Limits of Individualism," The Journal of Philosophy,
October, 1972.
Unger, Roberto M.
1975).

,

Knowledge and Politics (New York:

The Free Press.

Wallerstein, Immanual, The Modern World-System (New York;

Academic Press,

1964).

Walras, Leon, Elements of Pure Economics (Homewood, 111.:
Irwin, 1965).

Richard D.

Whyte, William F., Money and Motivation (New York;

& Row,

Harper

Wicksell, Knut, Lectures on Political Economy (New York:

1955).

A.M. Kelley,

1967)

Wicksteed, Philip H.
An Essay on the Coordination of the Laws of Distribution (London: Macmillan, 1874).
,

Wilson, George W.
"The Economics of the Just
cal Economy No. 7, 1975.
,

Price," History of Politi-

,

Wilson, Thomas and Skinner, Andrew S., The Market and the State (Oxford;
Clarendon Press, 1976).
Winch, D.M., Analytical Welfare Economics (Harmondsworth:

Penguin,

1971).

Winch, Donald, Adam Smith’s Politics, An Essay in Historiographic Revision
Cambridge University Press, 1978).
(New York:
Wolin, Sheldon, Politics and Vision (Boston:

Little, Brown,

1960).

Worland, Stephen, "Justum Pretium; One More Round in an Endless Series,"
History of Political Economy Vol. 9, No. 4, 1977.
,

189

—

Yolton, J.W., (ed.)» John Locke Problems and Perspectives (London;
Cambridge University Press, 1969).

